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EYES ON JAPAN

BY
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AUTHOR OF

"Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East,"

"The Chinese Soviets,"

etc., etc.

Illustrated



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To
MY WIFE AND MY DAUGHTER
together with whom
I enjoyed many years
in
Japan

“Within the four seas all men are brothers.”

CONFUCIUS.

“From the evils sent by Heaven there is deliverance;
from the evils we bring upon ourselves there is no
escape.”

Japanese Maxim.

P R E F A C E



THERE are a multitude of books on Japan and the Far East. Even the short Bibliography found at the end of this volume, listing mostly the works published in recent years only, offers a proof to the above statement. But still there are very few, if any, among them which may be considered as giving under one cover all the fundamentals necessary for the acquaintance with Nippon.

The present book is an attempt to give such a concise source for reference on various aspects of Japan's life—economic, social, political and cultural—past and present, domestic and international. It is by no means a substitute for the unique work of the late Professor Basil Hall Chamberlain, "The Things Japanese." That work still remains an unsurpassed short encyclopedia, even though, being published more than thirty years ago, a part of it now should be accepted as history of things as they were and not as they are. The present volume does not pretend to do much more than to bring information up to date. It is designed to offer the general reader a book answering without minor details most of the questions arising from reading the daily press. It seems timely, for the press is constantly and increasingly discussing Japan and the Far Eastern problems.

It includes material that may well serve to refute some of the numerous and widespread erroneous notions about that part of the world.

It shows, for example, that the old conception of Japan as a small insular country, deprived of natural resources, is no longer correct. Japan of today is a large colonial empire in control of a territory larger than that of Germany, England and France, without their colonies, combined. It controls a population already larger than that

of the United States, and (who knows?) may soon have under her control a population larger even than that of her other neighbor, the U.S.S.R.

Another point the book may serve to dissipate is that war between Japan and the U.S.S.R. is unavoidable. That war can be prevented.

Finally, the book tries to show that the assertion that the U.S.A. has no particular interest in Asia in general, and in China in particular, is not warranted by facts.

There are numerous Japanese names to be found in the text, but always accompanied with the explanation or translation, and invariably set in italics. Of course, they are found in the Index too, where one may look for the unfamiliar word and consequently find the explanation in the text. The family names in Japan usually precede the given name, though along with her modernization the Western style is being adopted more and more. Therefore we thought it advisable to keep the given names of personages of modern time in parentheses, be it before or after the family name.

The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the co-operation of his good friend, Mr. J. Fletcher Smith, for improving on numerous points his imperfect English.

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EYES ON JAPAN



HOW JAPAN BECAME WHAT SHE IS TODAY

Historical Sketch

Mythology—Period of Autocracy, 660 B.C.—A.D. 1192—From the Ascension of the first Emperor to the establishment of the Shogunate—The Shogunate—The Period of Feudalism, 1192–1868—House of Minamoto—House of Hojo—House of Ashikaga—Toyotomi Hideyoshi—Tokugawa Period—Period after the Restoration—Meiji Era.

JAPAN the Enchanting—Japan the Encroaching! Which, if either, is the real Nippon?

The answer depends entirely on the point of view. To thousands of tourists, delighted by a first glimpse of Fujiyama, glorious vegetation, and abundance and variety of flowers, captivated by the quaint exotic charm of gay and colorful kimonos, and fascinated by the sight of jinrikishas, fragile houses, numerous temples and shrines, and lanterns of every imaginable size and shape, displayed on all occasions, Nippon must always be the first. To many students of international relations, alarmed by the ruthless methods of expansionists and bewildered by the workings of an alien psychology rooted in a remote past, she is apt to seem the second. But such visitors perceive only the charm, such armchair alarmists only the menace! Neither sees the complete picture. Both are partially right; neither is wholly right. For the attention of both is centred on the divergences which contrast Japanese customs, interest and conduct with that of the rest of mankind. Neither takes into sufficient account the fact that the resemblances are of far greater importance to the future.

Nippon today is a country in transition. It is only some seventy years—the single lifetime span allotted by the

Bible—since she cast off isolation and, entering into relationship with Western nations, commenced for good or ill to imitate their ways. At the present moment the Japan that is so far from us in terms of miles and days is already a great deal nearer psychologically than she was when she set out as a fellow-traveler with the Westerners on the road of modern economic development in the Age of Machinery and Power. As aircraft is further perfected she will soon come even closer to the rest of us in point of distance. She should come closer psychologically at the same time. The divergences, already disappearing, will fade with even greater rapidity, while the resemblances may just as rapidly increase.

To examine these divergences and resemblances—to learn to what extent Japan differs from the rest of the world, and why—is the main purpose of these pages. But in order to understand what Japan is today we must first know what she has been in the past.

MYTHOLOGY

Japan is no exception to the rest of the world in having in her mythology the story that before the beginning of the universe of men there had existed many generations of gods, and that the Sun was the origin of that country.

One of the latest among these divine generations, according to Japanese mythology, consisted of a brother and sister named Izanagi and Izanami, who joined in marriage and gave birth not only to a great number of other gods and goddesses, but also—so runs the legend—to the various islands of the Japanese archipelago. Eventually Izanami died while giving birth to the God of Fire, and the most striking episode in the entire mythology of Japan ensues when her husband, Orpheus-like, visits her at the gate of the underworld and implores her to return with him. She would fain do so, and bids him wait until she takes counsel with the deities of the place. But Izanagi, impatient at her long tarrying, breaks off a tooth from the comb in his hair and, lighting it, goes in only

to find his wife a hideous mass of putrefaction, in the midst of which are the eight gods of Thunder. Izanagi then returns to earth and purifies himself by bathing in a stream. As he does so, new deities are born from each article of clothing he throws upon the river bank, and from each part of his person. One of these deities was Amaterasu, the Sun-Goddess.¹

Such, according to mythology, was the beginning of Japan. The Sun-Goddess Amaterasu is considered the creator of the state of Nippon, a word which means "the base of the sun" or "the Land of the Rising Sun." The temple of Naiku consecrated to her in the province of Ise is still the most venerated as well as the oldest in the land; and in this temple are held the three gifts of the goddess which are considered the three sacred emblems of Imperial power. These gifts—a mirror, a sword and a piece of jasper—may very well be taken to represent the three prehistoric epochs, the Stone, the Copper, and the Iron Ages. But in Japanese legend the mirror symbolizes Justice, the sword indicates Courage, while the jasper stone signifies Mercy.

PERIOD OF AUTOCRACY. (660 B.C.—A.D. 1192)

From the Ascension of the First Emperor to the Establishment of the Shogunate

According to tradition, the foundation of the Japanese Empire occurred in 660 B.C. Certain modern critics place the event in 60 B.C. But whether in 660 or six hundred years later, it is reckoned from the time when Kamu-Yamato-Iware-Biko, or Jimmu-Tenno, became the first Mikado, or Emperor of Yamato. Yamato is the region to the southeast of present-day Kyoto; and Jimmu-Tenno, who is best known by this his posthumous name, is regarded as the founder of the Dynasty which has reigned in Japan ever since.²

¹ Basil Hall Chamberlain, "Things Japanese." London, 1905.

² It should be pointed out that the succession has by no means followed those stringent rules which Europe considers necessary for

For a period of almost five hundred years following the reign of Jimmu-Tenno the so-called historical records of Japan are little better than genealogies and registers of places where sovereigns dwelt and were buried; and the reliability of even these meagre records is slightly suspect when we consider the Methuselah-like ages which some of these monarchs are reported to have attained. Only a few lived less than one hundred years, while some reached the venerable total of one hundred and sixty-eight. A mass of legend concerning this early period does, however, exist—and a few of the stories may well be mentioned here if only because they are included in the text-books used in Japanese schools, and so give a certain idea of the foundation on which the minds of the youth of Nippon are developed.

One of these stories concerns the Empress Jingo (170–269). She was the widow of Chuai, son of the famous hero Yamatotakeru-no-Mikoto, who conquered numerous tribes and reigned over an already much extended Nippon. According to the Japanese legend, not supported by Chinese and Korean records, Jingo conquered San-Kan, or what is now Korea; and in order to accomplish this—so says the story—the Empress postponed giving birth to her son Ojin till after the end of the campaign and long after the death of her consort. It was proclaimed that the new-born child had descended from a beautiful cloud; and he was later known as the God of War, under the name of Hachiman. Another legend tells of the Emperor Nintoku (313–399) and his profound interest in the welfare of his people. Once, looking down on the city, Nintoku noticed that no smoke was coming out of the chimneys. He concluded from this that the population was too poor to afford fuel for heating or cooking, and therefore decreed the abolition of taxes for a period of three years. This was accompanied by various measures designed to improve agriculture, which in their turn were

legitimacy. Many Mikados, even down to quite recent times, have been the sons of concubines; others have been adopted from some related branch. (B. H. Chamberlain, "Things Japanese.")

followed by bumper crops; and thus prosperity returned to the nation, and Nintoku became one of the most beloved rulers of Japan. This same Nintoku, if we may believe the legend, also appointed official historiographers to all the provinces, thus commencing the recording of events in Nippon.

More definitely, however, the recorded history of Japan begins with the eighth century when two famous historical works, the *Kojiki* and the *Nihonki* were written. They were composed around A.D. 710 and 720 respectively, and clearly owe much to the example of Chinese scholars. This was only natural; for soon after the introduction of Buddhism into Japan, between A.D. 552 and 620 by immigrants from China and Korea, and by certain Japanese who had visited these countries, the sciences, arts and crafts of their more advanced neighbors on the continent had become known to the islanders. At the time of the appearance of the two histories a continental influence was already paramount in all branches of Japanese life.

The Chinese Influence. China, at the time of the introduction of Buddhism to Japan, was a highly advanced country, and this particular period, under the Tang Dynasty, was her "age of renewed vigor and national greatness." Fostered by the Imperial Court of Japan, especially by the Emperor Kotoku and the Prince Shotoku, who compiled the "Constitution of Seventeen Articles," which was the first written law of Nippon, the civilization of China became a model for the islanders. As a result the administration of Japan was gradually reshaped to resemble that of the Celestial Empire, with its centralized bureaucratic plan; her laws, first codified under Shotoku-Taishi (572-621), were revised and further codified, a new codex "Daiho" being promulgated under Mommu-Tenno (701-703); the arts were encouraged; and the brilliant age of Japanese classical literature came into being. As for Buddhism, that religion retained such influence over the Court that Koken-Tenno, who was Empress from 749 to 758 and again from 765 to 769,

even contemplated elevating her favorite monk Dyoko to the throne, her plan failing only because of the bitter opposition of powerful courtiers. Architecture also was affected by the example from across the sea; in 794 the fiftieth Emperor, Kwammu, built the city of Kyoto, with a gorgeous palace on the Chinese pattern. The capital was moved from Nara, where it had been from 710 to 793, to this new city, and the latter remained the residence of the Emperors until the Restoration of 1868. With the Restoration, and the beginning of the Meiji Era, the debt, universally recognized, of Japan to China in all phases of her development, draws to an end. Western ideas then began to replace those of the Celestial Empire. The ascendancy of Chinese civilization in Japan had lasted only a little less than thirteen hundred years.

Beneficial as much of all this may have been, an uncritical imitation of Chinese customs and *mores* not unnaturally brought into Japanese life many less desirable influences too. Court life, fashioned by the Chinese prototype, became sophisticated and over-luxurious. The Mikados, "living in idleness, and surrounded by women and priests, oscillating between indolence and debauchery, between poetasting³ and gorgeous temple services, naturally became effeminate and degenerated into political impotence." Thus by the latter part of the ninth century the autocratic power was already on the wane.

The princely family of Fujiwara, from which most of the Empresses were selected, became so powerful that in point of fact the country was ruled by this house, though in name the Emperor remained an absolute monarch. The more luxurious the life at Court became, the less satisfactory grew the economic conditions of the country; more opportunity occurred for abuse and intrigue on one hand, and more occasion for discontent on the other. Outside of the Court, however, there remained in the country plenty of manly and warlike elements who disapproved

³ To this period belong the classical literary works of a Court lady, *Sei Shōnagon*, known under the name of *Makura-no-soshi*, which may be translated "Notes Kept Under the Pillow." Cf. Ch. VI.

HOW JAPAN BECAME WHAT SHE IS

of these innovations at Kyoto; and their opposition soon developed into a form destined to shape Japanese history for the next seven centuries. The real masters of the Empire were now the leaders of the soldiers, who possessed the strength of the sword, and were able to muster a larger following. This they did, in a measure at least, by partitioning land among their lieutenants. In other words, there existed a distinct military caste, which had originated with the assignment of various members of the Imperial family—Fujiwara, Taira and Minamoto being, perhaps, the most famous—to govern different parts of the country. This in turn gave birth to the peculiarly Japanese form of the feudal system, known under the name of the Shogunate.

By this division of authority the power of the Emperor was undermined, and conditions were created which provoked endless quarrels between the various princes, resulting in the civil wars that ravaged Japan for several centuries. One of the most powerful houses, that of Taira (descendants of the Emperor Kwammu), was successful in keeping its rivals at bay during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; but after the death of their most illustrious leader, Kiyomori, the House of Taira lost the hegemony to that of Minamoto (the descendants of the Emperor Saga). This struggle for power was marked by much cruelty—though probably by nothing worse than might have been seen in Europe during the same period—and not only were adversaries from the other house mercilessly slain, but frequently also the strife involved fratricide and the assassination of members of the same family who were considered rivals in the race for power and wealth. For this was not a struggle for the glory of leadership alone, but for material rewards, including lands, castles and other property.

In 1190 the famous leader of the Minamoto family, Yoritomo, won a decisive victory over the Taira in the great naval battle of Dan-no-Ura, near present-day Shimonoseki. As a consequence Yoritomo—who, by the way, was a contemporary of Richard Cœur-de-Lion—

was named by Imperial order the "superintendent of the sixty-six provinces." Two years later he became the *Sai-I-Tai-Shogun* or Generalissimo.


THE SHOGUNATE

The period of Feudalism: 1192-1868

House of Minamoto. With the elevation of Yoritomo Minamoto to the post of the Shogun a new era was inaugurated in Japanese history. The Emperor became a figurehead, to be regarded chiefly as a divine father, linking the nation with his ancestors, the gods. Thus the Mikado's functions were virtually limited to religious ceremonies; and when some of the Emperors, such as Go-Toba-Tenno, made attempts to restore the Imperial prestige and to acquire real power, they paid for it very dearly. The rôle of the Shogun, on the other hand, gradually developed into that of actual master. Originally little more than a commander-in-chief of the Imperial troops—the first Shogun had been appointed by the Emperor Kwammu in 801 for the special task of subjugating the Ainu tribes—he became not only commander-in-chief of the military forces, but a dictator, though theoretically the Emperor remained head of the country, while the Shogun ruled only by virtue of delegated authority. However, it is wrong to suppose, as many foreigners do, that the Shogun was a secular Mikado, while the Emperor at Kyoto was the spiritual one. No such dualism existed, and the divine authority of the prisoner at Kyoto was not a matter of dispute. In theory the Shogun merely "relieved" him of most of his mundane functions and attended to the affairs of state "by proxy." It is to be noted, however, that the rank of Shogun became hereditary, though not by law. The custom was established by the practices of the Shoguns themselves.

The government under the Shogun became known as *Bakufu*, or "administration from the camp-tent."

Yoritomo Minamoto established his capital at Kamakura—a town near present-day Tokyo, and convenient to



(a) Taira Kiyomori



(b) Minamoto Yoritomo

the area in which the struggle with the Northern tribes was being waged. Having divided the country into a number of regions, he proceeded to place these territorial subdivisions under his trusted lieutenants, or *daimyos*. These *daimyos* were members of the Minamoto family, or of such other houses as Fujiwara, Shimazu and Nambu. Some of these remained in charge of their fiefs for centuries, for these holdings became hereditary, though the supreme authority was centred in the hands of the Shogun himself. Thus the country entered into a long period when the nation lived according to the pleasure of the feudal barons, and the national economy developed all the ills characteristic of the other nations under feudalism.

The word *daimyo* means "great name," and the bearers of this title were warrior-lords of varying rank and wealth, according to their fiefs. Under these were numerous *samurai*, or lesser members of the military nobility, who were originally descendants of the guards of the Imperial Court.⁴ This gentry of Old Japan had a code of honor, based on complete obedience to superiors, and generally not unlike that of European chivalry in the same period, when to be a soldier meant to be a gentleman, and to be a gentleman meant to be a soldier, since his was considered the only occupation worthy those of noble birth. "The samurai's word was his bond, and he was taught to be gentle as well as brave," wrote B. H. Chamberlain in his "Things Japanese." "Doubtless, some well-marked shades of local colour distinguished Japanese chivalry from that of the West. The practice of suicide (*hara-kiri*) as part of the code of honour, when our own ancestors had the duel, at once occurs to the mind as a special feature. Even more so does the absence of gallantry towards the fair sex."

The samurai lived in or near his daimyo's castle, attended him on all occasions, and in exchange received

⁴ Another aristocracy around the Imperial Court consisted of the descendants of the Emperors and their courtiers. These were the so-called *Kuge*.

for himself and family rations calculated at so many *koku*, or bags of rice, annually. These rations differed greatly according to the rank and duties of the particular samurai. The *koku* is approximately 350 pounds, and to gain some idea of the great disparity of the fiefs one need only know that some daimyos possessed lands assessed at one million bags of rice, while others were valued at only ten thousand *koku*.

The first Shogun, Yoritomo Minamoto, is glorified as a successful general and able politician by the text-books used in the schools of Japan, but in point of fact he was a striking example of the cruelty common to that era, and to countries other than Japan. He showed no scruples in attaining his aims; he ordered the assassination of his uncle and of two of his brothers, and was merciless to his adversaries. But he undoubtedly possessed a high degree of administrative talent, and proved his brilliance as an organizer by laying the solid foundation for an entirely new form of government which survived for many generations. The Minamoto family, however, remained at the helm only for a short time, as the two sons of Yoritomo were not the equals of their father. Both were assassinated while still quite young, and the power passed into the hands of their relatives, the House of Hojo (1200-1333).

House of Hojo. The Hojo preferred to rule without occupying the first place in the government, and did so for a long time, acting as *Shikken*, or regents for the Shogun, whom they elected more or less by their own choice from the House of Fujiwara and other princely families. The period of their ascendancy is considered one of the most prosperous in the mediæval history of Japan, even though it was one of tyranny. In order to prevent any attempts to restore the Imperial power, the Hojo preferred to see elevated to the throne infants alternately chosen from rival branches of the Imperial family, and did not allow them to retain their purely titular rôle for more than ten years. At that time, imitating the Chinese custom, the Emperors used to abdicate at a certain age to enter monasteries and devote the rest of their lives to prayer. As

for the Shoguns of that period, they also were merely pompous figureheads obedient to the dictates of the *Shikken*.

The Hojo period was marked by high achievements in various fields of science and art. The Buddhist monk Nichiren (1222–1282), founder of a sect bearing his name, was a great scholar. Another monk, Kenko (1283–1350), wrote poems and essays, among which the *Tsuredzure-Gusa*, or “Weeds of Idleness,” occupies a prominent place in the literature of Japan. *Monogatari*, short stories depicting wars between the great houses of Taira and Minamoto, and written mostly by women of that period, are considered historical romances of high literary value.

During this period Japan was menaced by a foreign invasion. The Chinese, under the mighty Kublai-Khan of the Mongolian Dynasty, dreamed of a Pan-Asiatic Empire, and planned an attack on Japan; but their great fleet was almost annihilated by a storm, and Japan was spared from the humiliation of being subjugated by her then powerful neighbor. The text-book of history used in the elementary schools of Japan, *Shogaku Nihon rekishi*, gives a somewhat different version of this event: it describes this episode as a brilliant victory by the Japanese over the invaders. It is by such naïve distortions that the patriotic ardor of youth is fanned the world over.

The curious arrangement by which the *Shikken*, including one woman, Masa-Ko, usurped the power of the Shoguns, who in their turn had usurped the Imperial power, ended in 1333. In that year the last of the Hojo, being bitterly opposed by the population and having many powerful enemies all over the country, lost their grip upon the Shogunate. The young Emperor Go-Daigo, supported by a number of daimyos, not only ended the rule of the regents from the House of Hojo, but for a short time succeeded in restoring to himself the supreme prestige of the Emperor’s rank.

House of Ashikaga. In 1338 a Generalissimo from the House of Ashikaga (descendants of Minamoto) came to power, establishing a new dynasty of Shoguns, which re-

maintained in ascendancy for more than two hundred years (1338–1573). The new government found it expedient to stay in Kyoto, which became thereby the residence of the Imperial Court and of the *Bakufu* at the same time.

Japan now entered upon another turbulent period of civil wars, revolts, intrigues, and struggle for power between numerous noble families.

The advent of the Ashikaga Shogunate was accompanied by an unusual complication in the life of the Court—namely, the coexistence of two Emperors. This situation, which persisted for half a century, arose when the first of the Ashikaga dethroned the Emperor Go-Daigo, who had dared to challenge the Shogunate, and elevated to the latter's place a child of his own choice. But the dethroned Go-Daigo, still at liberty, was not resigned to this change and continued to claim his rights. So also did his descendants; with the result that Japan witnessed the curious anomaly of having two monarchs at the same time—one in hiding somewhere in the mountains of Yamato, refusing to give up his legitimate rights, and another in the palace of Kyoto, without any rights except such as were allowed under the tutelage of the Shogun.

In 1393, however, the rivals were forced to a reconciliation; and as a result the Emperors were again chosen alternately from one or the other branch of the Imperial family. From that time on the Ashikaga Shoguns were omnipotent, and their power was no longer disputed by the Court; but at the same time their rivalry with other feudal lords developed to such an extent that the entire country soon became involved in civil wars which continued for more than a century. For some eleven years the conflict was waged in and around Kyoto, where palaces and temples were destroyed by fire, and valuable libraries and rich collections of antiques perished.

The people, impoverished by these endless struggles, were in misery; and their discontent enabled the Emperor, Ogimachi, to take action. He entrusted the task of ending this state of affairs to the young scion of the

源義經



(a) Minamoto Yoshitsune

北條政子



(b) Hojo Masa-ko

powerful family of Oda, the daimyos of the province of Owari. The name of this youngster was Oda Nobunaga. One after another he subdued most of the important daimyos, and in 1573 succeeded in defeating the Shogun himself, thus deposing the Ashikaga Dynasty. Nobunaga, who is considered one of the great figures of Japanese history, was assassinated by a traitor in 1582, thus passing away before he had time to finish the work entrusted to him by the Emperor. This task was completed by one of his generals, the famous Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi, whose original name was Kinoshita Tokitsira, was born in a poor family, and had joined Nobunaga when still very young. To start on this adventure he embezzled money entrusted to him by his master for making household purchases, and therefore changed his name to hide his identity. To change one's name again and again was quite customary in the Japan of that period.

It did not take long for Oda Nobunaga to appreciate the very unusual intelligence and varied abilities of this young man, and soon Hideyoshi became one of the leading lieutenants of the great general. He distinguished himself through the campaigns carried on unceasingly by Nobunaga, and rapidly became his foremost military chieftain. As it was customary at that epoch to divide the spoils of military exploits among the participants, Hideyoshi, being rewarded by large grants of land, gradually became one of the wealthiest of the feudal lords. Expanding his authority over the country, he consolidated his position by building castles at Osaka, Kyoto and elsewhere, which served not only to accommodate Hideyoshi and his retinue while visiting this or that place, but were valuable to him as fortresses. Hideyoshi was shockingly fond of splendor and display, and this is reflected on the art of his period, when painting and architecture developed a bold style.

Soon after the death of his master, Oda Nobunaga, Hideyoshi made an attempt to become Shogun, but the House of Oda opposed him as a parvenu, and was ready to

fight, if necessary, to prevent his advent to the coveted post. The powerful House of Tokugawa stood with the Odas. Hideyoshi considered it wiser not to insist; he even gave his sister in marriage to one of the Tokugawa, and retired to the South, well knowing that actual power lies not in honors and offices. Loyal to the Imperial family, Hideyoshi accepted instead the title of *Kwam-paku*, the highest dignitary at the Imperial Court, somewhat like that of the major-domo of ancient France. He rebuilt the Imperial palace, and assured the Imperial Household of sufficient revenues—something rarely enjoyed by the Court before.

The prestige of Hideyoshi, then at its zenith, and the recognition of his authority by most of the daimyos made possible the unification of the country. In 1592, whether to satisfy his ambition or to divert the attention of the bellicose samurai from their own country, Hideyoshi went to war with Korea. He assembled an army of one hundred and thirty thousand, prepared a large fleet, and sent the expedition to conquer the neighboring state. In a short time the whole of Korea was in the hands of the Japanese, and its Emperor fled to China. Having learned that China, as suzerain of Korea, was ready to intervene, Hideyoshi ordered reinforcements to be sent, and an additional army of sixty thousand was prepared. But soon *pourparlers* were started for peace, and Hideyoshi presented a number of demands which included marriage of a daughter of the Chinese Emperor to the Japanese Emperor; renewal of commercial relations with China, and cession to Japan of four southern provinces in Korea. The Chinese Emperor countered with his own demands, which included the immediate recall of the Japanese troops from Korea and recognition of himself as the Lord of Japan. Hideyoshi, furious at such effrontery, decided to renew hostilities, and the following spring a new army, one hundred thousand strong, was sent to Korea. The venture proved a failure, and Hideyoshi, from his death-bed, ordered evacuation of his troops. This ill-fated aggression of Hideyoshi's was accompanied by two unsuccessful at-



Courtesy Consulate-General of Japan, New York, N. Y.
Osaka Castle

tempts to extend the control of Japan over the Philippines and Formosa.

Hideyoshi, or Taiko, as he became known after his resignation, died in 1598. A man of very humble origin, but highly intelligent and cunning, he was an extremely able soldier. Whether or not he deserves the name of the Japanese Napoleon, bestowed on him by certain admirers, he did indeed become a great figure in Japanese history. He restored order from chaos, instituted more healthy national economy on the ruins left by the Ashikagas and their successors, and laid the foundation for the era of peace and prosperity which followed under the Tokugawas.⁵

Tokugawa Period. The House of Tokugawa came from the province of Mikawa, which lies to the east of Owari, the domain of the Oda. The Tokugawas, like the Ashikagas, were descendants of the House of Minamoto.

Ieyasu Tokogawa, the third great man of the famous constellation completed by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, entered the field of politics very early. After the death of Oda Nobunaga he was ready, as we have seen, to fight Hideyoshi; but the latter, considering it wiser not to invite a contest on the battlefield, peacefully retired to the South, and afterwards even became a friend of the Tokugawa. When Hideyoshi died, Ieyasu declared himself willing to support the infant son of the Taiko, but actually, owing to the intrigues of other partisans of this child, as well as his own lust for power, he engaged in the struggle which culminated in a victory at *Sekiga-Hara*. This was the most important battle in the mediæval history of Japan, and his triumph over his rivals in that encounter enabled Ieyasu Tokugawa, who was an able general, clever diplomat and talented administrator, to become the most powerful figure in Japan. In 1603 Ieyasu formally established his government, the *Bakufu*, in Yedo, which later became known under the name of Tokyo.

⁵ In the opinion of H. H. Gowen, "with Hideyoshi begins the history of Modern Japan." ("An Outline of History of Japan," p. 225. New York: 1927.)

Some of the daimyos continued for a while to support Hideiori, the son of Hideyoshi; and only after the defeat of their united forces did Ieyasu become the undisputed master of the country.

A Japanese verse describing the characteristics of the three brilliant generals and statesmen of sixteenth century Japan, runs as follows:

“Nobunaga said: I will kill the cuckoo if it does
not sing!

Hideyoshi said: I will try and make the cuckoo
sing! and

Ieyasu said: I will wait till the cuckoo sings.”

In other words, Nobunaga was impatient, arbitrary and peremptory, Hideyoshi was clever, cunning, persevering and cruel; and Ieyasu was wise, patient and systematic in obtaining results he sought. Dr. Hara, in his “Introduction to the History of Japan,” says that “Nobunaga quarried the stones for the new Japan; Hideyoshi rough-cut them; and Ieyasu gave them the final touch which fitted them for their proper place.”

Among the important contributions of Ieyasu to the annals of his country were the famous “Eighteen Laws.” It was decreed that each and all of his successors must take oath to obey, respect and defend this “Constitution,” which was expected to remain in force forever—the old device to conserve the order favorable to the ruling group at the expense of progress. Furthermore, in order to stiffen Ieyasu’s control over the daimyos, the *Bakufu*, or central government, required their presence at Yedo for a part of the year, while their families remained in that city as hostages. The Imperial Court was still in Kyoto, surrounded by spies and minions of the Shogun; no authority was left to the Emperors, who were expected to devote their lives to the gods.

Despite the occasional tyranny of certain Shoguns who persecuted, spied upon and mercilessly annihilated their opponents, the period of domination of the Tokugawas

is regarded as one of the most peaceful and enlightened eras in the history of Japan. It was an age of artists, poets, literary men and savants, producing such learned writers as Fujiwara and his school of commentators on the Chinese classics. This era brought forth such great authors as Chikamatsu Manzayemon (1653-1724), who is called the Japanese Shakespeare; Jippensha Ikku⁶ (1775-1831), whose "Hiza Kurige" is compared with Rabelais; and Bakin (1767-1848), whose "Hak-Ken-Den," or "Tale of Eight Dogs," is probably the most popular story in Japanese literature. It also brought forth Hokusai (1760-1849), the most celebrated of Japanese painters. The Tokugawa Shogunate lasted from 1603 to 1867, when the Imperial authority was restored and the institution of the Shogunate was itself abolished.

Early in the Tokugawa Era Japan went into complete isolation from the rest of the world. Intercourse with foreigners was limited to the small Deshima Island, near Nagasaki. Even here only Dutch and Chinese merchants were allowed, for these two nations were regarded as interested not in the propagation of religion but merely in commerce.

According to Japanese records the first Westerners to reach their shores were Portuguese traders, who came in 1542. They brought with them various goods, including firearms. Then came the Portuguese and other missionaries. For a short time Christian teaching (which had been introduced by the Jesuit Father Francis Xavier) found a fertile ground in Japan. Oda Nobunaga even erected a church at Kyoto for the "Southern barbarians" (Nan-ban-jin), as Westerners of all nationalities were called by the Japanese. In the time of Hideyoshi, however, this liberal attitude was sharply reversed (by his order twenty-six Christians were crucified) and gradually the new religion came under a strict ban. As was the case with Buddhism, the introduction of which divided the people for a while into two hostile camps, Christianity served as a new cause of discord.

⁶ A nom-de-plume.

The first of the Tokugawa Shoguns continued the policy of Taiko in persecuting the Christians. One of his successors, Iemitsu (1622-1631), went much further and ordered that all intercourse with the outside world should be discontinued; and, as one of the measures designed to prevent overseas trade, he prohibited the construction of vessels larger than an established limit. When a special envoy of the Portuguese arrived to ask for the revocation of this restriction he was assassinated by order of the Shogun. All Japanese embracing the Christian faith were persecuted under the pretext that they formed secret societies and therefore constituted a menace to the country. Forced into an insurrection by this injustice, large numbers of Japanese Christians at Shimabara were massacred in 1638. According to the official version, the Christians started the insurrection, but it is more probable that they merely participated in a revolt of the population at large as the result of discontent with the economic conditions, and were singled out as scapegoats. However, it would be well to remember that at about the same period religious oppression was rife in other countries as well. The Roman Catholics had a bad time in Scotland, and the Huguenots were severely abused in France.

Buddhism, that had been persecuted in Japan in the past, was now declared the official religion, and for a time everybody was expected to profess it.

Under the successor of Iemitsu the wild attack on everything Western was somewhat abated. The desire to protect the country from contamination by foreign ideas was meeting strong opposition among those who realized the penalties of isolation from the rest of the world. This struggle continued for a considerable time with varying favor to the adherents first of one group and then another.

The fifth of the Tokugawa Shoguns, Tsunayoshi (1680-1709), played for a while the rôle of enlightened despot. He laid the foundations for scientific research, established an institution of higher learning at Yedo, and invited a number of scholars, among whom were the celebrated Confucianist, Kinoshita Junan, and the famous historian,

Arai Hakuseki. The latter was also an able statesman who, among other reforms, introduced a new monetary system in Japan.

Under the eighth Shogun, Yoshimune (1716–1745), an agrarian reform was introduced by which the taxation of land was revised to lighten the burden of the husbandmen, and a new codification of the laws was undertaken. The finances of the country were strengthened and numerous other improvements in the government put in practice. At that time the national economy in general underwent an overhauling. Merchants were encouraged; new plans were introduced for cultivation in agriculture. Yoshimune, contrary to others of the Tokugawas, considered it desirable to benefit from Western civilization, and accordingly under his rule European books were imported, and European scientific knowledge was promoted. However, this benevolent reign was followed by a period when graft flourished, and the nation suffered badly from misgovernment and abuse. The extravagance of certain of the Shoguns impaired their credit. And to make the situation still worse crops failed for several consecutive years and a bad famine occurred, followed by peasant uprisings and urban revolts in different parts of the country.

As usual, the decline in prestige of the Shogun brought about an improvement in the Emperor's position. The people, discontented with the *Bakufu*, again turned their eyes toward the Imperial palace at Kyoto. The cult of the Emperor, as divine father and protector of the land, obtained a new impetus. Groups of followers of the Shinto philosopher Takenouchi Shikibu (1716–1771), who advocated a return to the virtues of the ancient Yamato, and to those of Yamagata Daini, the samurai who propagated the idea of Imperial restoration, were discussing the illegality of the *Bakufu*, the usurper of the Imperial authority, and asked for immediate action. But the leaders of that movement paid dearly for their plans: Yamagata was decapitated in 1767, while Takenouchi was impris-

oned and later exiled to a far-away island, only to die en route.

In spite of all this, the cult of the Emperor continued to find ardent promoters, and the power of the Shogun gradually declined. In place of such able and energetic men as the earlier Shoguns of Tokugawa, there now came lesser leaders. Sometimes the post of Shogun was nominally occupied by children, with the actual power in the hands of regents of various ranks. The Court of the Shogun at Yedo was degenerating and becoming effeminate, like the Imperial Court at Kyoto in the past. Now that conditions demanded vigor and resourcefulness, the Shogunate seemed no longer able to cope with new problems. At length, as we have seen, it gave up and was replaced by an Emperor restored to power by adherents especially numerous in the South and West.

Another and possibly more potent factor in deciding the doom of the Shogunate was a change in the Japanese attitude toward the outside world. The policy under the Tokugawa had been one of isolation. But it had never been strict enough to prevent a certain amount of foreign trade and the slow penetration of foreign ideas. Indeed, some of the Shoguns themselves encouraged Western learning, and there were certain exceptional instances of daimyos who sent a few students abroad—as, for example, the Lord of Sendai, who in 1617 dispatched a man to study conditions at Rome. By the early part of the nineteenth century a few daring innovators among the more inquisitive of the country had gone so far as to introduce Western machinery, to build a few factories, and to institute certain industries previously unknown in Japan. Among such industries was the manufacture of firearms. But all this remained on a very small and primitive scale. Real modernization of the country's economic life was impossible so long as Japan cherished her seclusion.

That this seclusion must some day end was inevitable, for the isolationist policy of the Tokugawas not only retarded the economic development of Japan but kept her in an inadequate state of defense. The prohibition of

shipbuilding rendered the Island Empire unprepared to resist outsiders when and if they should choose to threaten an enforced entrance. Few Japanese had the opportunity of foreign travel; only a small fraction of the scientific and technological achievements of the West could be, and were, then borrowed by Japan. Soon, however, the invention of the steam-engine, followed by steamships, made overseas voyages much easier, and naturally served to increase the interest of traders in foreign lands. Therefore, in spite of the restrictions imposed by the Japanese, more and more boats from beyond the seas renewed their visits to the inhospitable shores of the exotic Empire of the Mikado. These included Russians in the North, and British in the South; in 1846 the American Commander Biddle visited Japan on a warship. He asked for leave to trade, and receiving a curt refusal, departed; but seven years later the Americans again appeared, and the new Japan was born.

This historic event occurred in 1853. In this year Commodore Perry with a squadron of warships paid an unexpected visit to Uraga, and delivered a letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan. This letter was actually a threat to the effect that, if Japan chose to remain isolated and purely Oriental, she should not be allowed to remain her own mistress. On leaving Japan without any answer from the Court, Perry warned that he intended to return next year for the reply to the message; and return he did. This second visit of Commodore Perry in 1854 was described by Baron Sannomia, the Chief Master of Ceremonies at the Imperial Court of Japan, as "pouring oil on the fire that was already started in Japan by the struggle between the old and the new"—that is to say, between the decaying Feudalism and the growing forces of Capitalism.

Now the neighboring Empire of China had received an unpleasant lesson from the Westerners, and had been forced by the Nanking Treaty of 1842 to open several of her ports to foreign trade. The Shogun accordingly perceived the futility of resistance, and after some hesitation

decided to satisfy the demands of the Americans by proclaiming two ports, Shimoda and Hakodate, open to them for trade. One result of this concession and decree was to encourage those who were plotting against the Shogunate. A number of daimyos and samurai who were being gradually impoverished under the Shoguns of the Tokugawa family, since their martial virtues were not so much in demand at that epoch, while their vanity prevented most of them from engaging in any productive activity, openly advocated the restoration of the Emperor, and later on the expulsion of the foreign barbarians whom the Shogun dared to admit to the country.

But once started on this road, the Tokugawas continued with more concessions to the Westerners. The agreement with the Americans was followed by the granting of similar privileges to the British, Russians and Dutch. Three more ports of Japan were open to foreign trade. Then, thanks to the efforts of Townsend Harris, the first American Consul-General in Japan, a trade treaty was signed by the *Bakufu* with the United States, and was followed by similar treaties with England, Holland, Russia and France. Japanese embassies were sent abroad and students followed.

These treaties concluded in 1858 were extremely one-sided and contained humiliating clauses providing for extraterritoriality and the restriction of customs duties. About half a century passed before Japan succeeded in obtaining their revision, and meanwhile the immediate consequence of their signature was to strengthen the cause of the advocates of Imperial restoration. By 1860 an open revolt against the Shogunate was under way and an attempt was made to force out the foreigners; and curiously enough the Southern clans, Satsuma, Choshu and Saga, were the first to rise, although they were directly interested in foreign trade and were not opposed to the Tokugawa régime on that score. But these feudal lords of the South had never advocated submission to the foreigners, and the means taken by the outsiders to gain admission to Japan had been extremely distasteful to this

proud military nobility. Unfortunately for them, the resistance staged could only prove abortive, since the Japanese were backward in military technique and in preparedness; and when in 1863 certain foreign boats were fired upon from the forts of Shimonoseki, the outcome was a bombardment of that port by foreign warships, and an indemnity of three million dollars.

Undaunted by this humiliating defeat at Shimonoseki, the rebels started at once with all the energy and ardor of youth to prepare for the next contest. Thus after several years of struggle the Southerners, especially from Choshu, together with Western clans fighting for the restoration, defeated the Easterners who had remained loyal to the Shogun. That was the beginning of the end. Late in 1867 Yoshinobu or Keiko, the fifteenth and the last Shogun of Tokugawa, presented to the Emperor his resignation. The young Emperor Kindjio, who later became known under the name of Mutsuhito, and who had just succeeded Komei-Tenno on the throne, accepted the resignation. The era of the Shogunate was over.

PERIOD AFTER THE RESTORATION

Meiji Era. The new era inaugurated by this restoration of the Emperor's power became known as "Meiji" (1868-1912). After the death of Mutsuhito the name was changed, as the periods of the Japanese calendar are based on the reign of the Emperors, the first year of each new reign being reckoned as the first year of the new period. The Emperor Meiji occupied the throne for forty-five years, and accordingly the last year of his reign was the forty-fifth year Meiji. The next year was the first year of Taisho, or the reign of the Emperor Yoshihito, father of the present Emperor Hirohito, whose period, commencing in 1926, is designated as Showa. In addition, after the restoration the Court was moved from Kyoto, where the Imperial prestige had suffered so much humiliation, to Yedo, which had been the site of the actual government for two hundred and fifty years. By the Emperor's command Yedo was renamed Tokyo, which means

the "Eastern Capital," and since 1869 this city has been the political, cultural and economic centre of the Japanese Empire.

Although the expulsion of the foreigners had been one of the main points of the advocates of restoration, this policy was soon discarded—if not reversed—by the new régime. This was inevitable, for the feudal system of economy was decidedly out of date. As the urban centres increased in size and population, and handicrafts and home industries developed, commerce based on a money economy and wage-earning labor grew and spread, replacing the older forms. The old cities, which had once been fortresses of the feudal barons, with their castles as citadels, were gradually transformed into trade and industrial centres. This process began as early as the seventeenth century and by the eighteenth century such cities as Osaka and Kyoto already had populations estimated at many hundreds of thousands, these growing urban populations having been increased by an influx of peasants who left the land in search of better opportunities in the cities. The extent of this migration may be judged by the report of a certain feudal lord, Matsudaira, to the effect that during the short period from 1781 to 1788 his domain had lost 1,400,000 people to the cities. Small wonder it is then that man-power aplenty was for hire, and that the system of large-scale production for marketing became not only possible but extremely lucrative to those who understood how to exploit the new conditions to their own advantage.

Then again the diminishing returns from the soil forced some of the feudal landowners to seek other sources of revenue, and some of them found it to their advantage to invest in the enterprises of merchants, bankers and manufacturers. Very often this entailed the transfer of title on their lands to the money-owning class of bankers, merchants, and so forth. Thus by the end of the Tokugawa era the process of accumulation of wealth had already reached the stage of accumulation of capital. Yet in spite of the fact that the growing bourgeoisie was

acquiring more and more actual power, the "money-lenders" and merchants continued to be treated by the daimyos and samurai as inferiors. Naturally, this anomaly served to strengthen the ranks of those who desired a change. The merchants were striving for the recognition of their social worth.

In the opinion of a number of Western authorities, Japan's economic position at that time was comparable to that of England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In other words, though the process of her development was retarded by her policy of seclusion, she was slowly but steadily developing on lines not dissimilar to those of Europe. For a long time, of course, commercial capital had been active in Japan and through its initiative there was developed, as we have seen, a "system of industrial production, no longer of the mediæval handicraft type, but definitely capitalist in tendency and structure."⁷

As a consequence of all this, the new régime had no choice but to follow the line which promised more favorable conditions for the development of a new economic system better fitted to cope with the changing situation. Moreover, once diplomatic relations with the foreigners had been established, and the attempt to break them had been proved by the Shimonoseki affair both costly and futile, the Imperial Government continued to cultivate these new relations with the rest of the world to the best advantage of Japan.

In the course of this endeavor Tokyo attempted to restore relations with her neighbor Korea. The latter, however, was coy as a result both of sad experiences in the past and of restraint by China. Hence, some of the Japanese leaders, including that famous Southern hero, Saigo Takamori, who played an unusual rôle in the early years of the new era, and later on led a revolt, insisted on

⁷ Such is the opinion of Dr. K. A. Wittfogel, expressed by him in his very valuable study, "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History," published in the "Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung." Paris, 1935.

sending troops to Korea with the object of forcing the latter to submission. It happened, however, that at about this time a number of Japanese, including Iwakura, Kido, and others, had returned from visits and study abroad, where they had learned of Western life and practices. They advised caution, and the government decided against such an adventure. The hour of reckoning came much later. For the time being, following a naval demonstration by Japan near the Korean coast in 1876, a treaty was concluded, and this was partly prompted by the interest in Korea manifested at that time by certain Americans then looking for commercial advantages in Asia.

These returned students recommended first of all restoring the country to order, reorganization of its administration, attention to crying needs in the field of economics, and the laying of the foundation for the modernization and westernization of Japan. The Government followed this course; and just as centuries earlier it had imitated China, it now started to copy the patterns of Europe. The reforms included the abolition of clans and the re-creation of provinces with most of the former daimyos appointed by the central government as governors of the lands that they controlled before under the *Bakufu*. Now, however, these lands were declared possessions of the Crown. Naturally not all these reforms, and especially such as affected the material interests of the former feudal lords, were welcome to those who thereby lost their privileges. Discontent was brewing, and soon, in 1877, under the convenient pretext of defending the national cultural heritage from the invasion of alien *mores*, a formidable revolt was staged in the South, which for a few months seriously menaced the new régime. But the governmental troops succeeded in smashing their opponents, who centred in Satsuma, and the new order was consolidated and enabled to survive.

From that time on reforms succeeded one another with ever-increasing rapidity. Ministries like those of Europe were founded; to appease the vanquished dignitaries of

the military class a peerage was established; and titles of prince, count, baron, and so forth, were offered to them; an army and navy of European pattern were created; new laws were introduced, suggested by Western ideas in general and the Napoleonic Code in particular; the amazingly successful and prosperous nations beyond the seas inspired a new basis for the economic life of the country; many new industries were started, sometimes by the government itself, sometimes with subsidies to private enterprise; foreign trade was encouraged; the monetary system was reorganized and unified under the central government; studies in Western knowledge were inaugurated; and interest was attracted to Western literature and arts. In short, the country, so long isolated, now plunged enthusiastically into the fascinating race of catching up with and trying to surpass the rest of the world. This period of Japan's life was dominated by the ardor of a vigorous, energetic and able youth, freed after a long incarceration and now enjoying the thrills of liberty, new experiences, and the opportunity to stretch its limbs and express itself more completely. It was a period of reconstruction, of developing the country's latent forces.

It was not to be expected, of course, that this process would be free from obstruction or from conflict with stubborn conservatives. There was plenty of trouble for the new régime; plenty of insurrections such as those of Kumamoto and Hôgi; and several revolts including those of Fushimi, Yedo, Aizu and Hokkaido. But most of these difficulties were overcome, and to the amazement of the entire world the change of a mediæval feudal military country into a modern state was accomplished in a few decades—a record unparalleled in history. The insignificant small island country of 1868 emerged to be one of the great Powers of our day. Thus the new régime, which originally intended to purify Japan from foreign influence, actually embarked on rebuilding it on the foreign pattern, and accomplished this in a manner little short of miraculous.

Not unnaturally a goodly part of the population suffered considerably from the unceremonious operation of modernization. To appease the nation, a Constitution on the Prussian model was drafted by Ito Hirobumi, and promulgated by the Emperor in 1889, so ending, nominally at least, the short period of restored Absolutism. In 1890 the first session of the Parliament or Diet was convoked, and various reforms designed to improve living conditions were undertaken.

The advent of Japan into the arena of international relations soon proved that, having accepted Western ideas of government and economics, this new member of the family of nations must also follow their example in aspiring to more lands. Japan did not delay embarking on the policy of Imperialistic aggression, for as early as 1894 she engaged in a war against China.

This and other events in the modern history of Japan will be discussed in the following chapters.



THE ISLAND EMPIRE EXPANDING

Who are the Japanese?—What was Japan in the Past?—What is Japan Proper Today?—Topography, Climate, Flora and Fauna; Natural Resources—The Japanese People—The growth of Japan—War with China, 1894-5—War with Russia, 1904-5—The World War—Occupation of Manchuria—The Great Empire.

WHO are the Japanese? Who are these Japanese, whose legends are so bizarre, and whose history is so intriguingly unconventional? Whence did they come? To what race do they belong? What, in short, are the origins of the inhabitants of those beautiful islands which serpentine along the eastern edge of Asia? To these questions science, as yet, has not found definite answers acceptable to all scholars; but several hypotheses, reasonably satisfactory to laymen, may be discovered in books designed for general acquaintance with the things of Nippon.

Although the Japanese nation is today considered one of the most homogeneous in the world, there is little doubt that it is really of mixed racial composition. The majority, apparently, are of Malay and Polynesian origin. In addition there is some—and probably considerable—amalgamation of Mongolian and, through the Ainu, a certain amount of Indo-European or Caucasian, with possibly a little American-Indian and even Negro blood. A theory exists that in remote antiquity the Japanese islands were invaded by southern pigmies or negroids, possibly from the Philippines or Formosa; and if that is so, it makes a sufficiently complete representation of all races to convince us of the truth of the famous saying of Confucius that “Within the four seas all men are brothers.” But whatever the origin in the remote past, the comparative isolation of the Japanese through the greater part of their


ancient and early mediæval history—not to mention the almost complete seclusion for over two hundred and fifty years under the Tokugawa Shogunate—naturally served to make an exceedingly homogeneous people. Their claim to being the purest race in the world is not without foundation.

What was Japan in the Past? Territorially the Japan of the mythological period occupied the province of Izumo, in the centre of the western coast of the main island, variously known as Honshu or Hondo. This affords the basis for the speculation that the first inhabitants came from the west and, possibly, the South—in other words, that Malays probably migrated from the islands of the present-day Dutch Indies, while Polynesians arrived from the southern islands, and Mongolians from the mainland of Asia. The presence of the Caucasians, represented by the Ainu (now found in small numbers in the northern island of Hokkaido), is sometimes differently explained. They may, however, have come from the south via the warm seas, or, less probably, from the north via Asia.


Gradually Japan, or Yamato, as she was called at that time, expanded to occupy all the islands of the Japanese archipelago, and later found her way to the mainland of Asia.

What is Japan proper today? Japan proper resembles Great Britain in that she is an island empire; but she differs from England in that she extends her longitudinal curve for over two thousand five hundred miles and occupies over two thousand islands between Kamchatka and Formosa. This archipelago constitutes a veritable barrier against approaches to Asia from the east, and its distance from the mainland shore varies between fifty and upwards of five hundred miles.

Honshu is the largest of the Japanese islands, the distance from end to end by railroad being over one thousand miles, while the average width is approximately seventy-five miles. Politically and economically it is the most important, and boasts the greatest population—



(a) Fuji-yama
From the Lake Kawaguchi



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.
(b) Matsu-shima

forty million souls. In shape Honshu resembles a crescent—or shall we say a bow?—curved outwards toward the Pacific, thus increasing the basin of the Japanese Sea, that separates it from the possessions of Soviet Russia in the Far East.

Shikoku and Kiushu, the two islands to the south of Honshu, are separated from it by the fairylike Inland Sea, and, considered together, come next in size and economic value. The fourth large island, that of Hokkaido, or Yezo, lies to the north of Honshu and is separated from it by the Tsugaru Strait. Though much larger than either of the two to the south, it is less populated and, so far, less developed economically. All the other islands, with the exception of Formosa, which was incorporated in the Empire only after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, are small; many are uninhabited or economically of little value. In other words, while the entire area of Japan proper is only 148,756 square miles, the territory of any real value is actually far less.

In his “*Madam Chrysanthème*”—so superficial, so inaccurate, yet so full of unforgettable pictures—Pierre Loti has written of the beauty of Japan. So has Goncharoff in the “*Frigate Pallada*,” and so has Lafcadio Hearn in such books as “*Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*,” “*Out of the East*,” and “*Kokoro*.” With these and other works accessible it would be superfluous to sing the praises of Nippon, the enchanting. Undoubtedly Japan is one of the most charming lands on the globe. But he who goes there for the first time should be on guard against illusions.

In Japan one can be easily misled by the appearances. Take, for instance, the seeming contentment of the countryside; you get this impression from the cheerfulness of the rural landscape, so full of charm, so picturesque in its scenery, so lovely with its graceful, fragile houses, its gorgeous temples and shrines. There are flowers and flowers again. Early in the year there is the plum blossom; in March and April comes the flowering of the peach, and in the first half of April the celebrated cherry blossom; then follow one after another the peonies, the grace-

ful wistaria, the multicolored azaleas, and irises in the Summer; the exotic lotus through August; and the chrysanthemums in endless varieties during the late Fall.


But Nature is not as kind to Japan as one might imagine from a glance at her charming face. Behind the beauty of the glorious green hills, crowned by the majestic Fujiyama, which may be seen from many parts of the main island of that midget Empire, emerging from the sea, are elements which are now and again merciless to mankind. The unusually developed coastline, with its numerous bays and inlets, hides many ugly aspects of this same Mother Nature. Earthquakes, with the horrors in their wake; devastating floods and fires sweeping away the attractive but highly inflammable wood-and-paper houses by thousands; typhoons demolishing all they meet—all these are as readily to be associated with Japan as Fujiyama itself. Small wonder, then, that the constant visitor to these charming islands feels a touch of pity for the inhabitants, whose lives, surrounded by really beautiful Nature, are at the same time so precarious, unsafe and full of danger.

Topography. To say that Japan is covered with hills is not quite correct, for many of these hills are really mountains of fair size. Two long chains traverse the main island lengthwise. Among the mountains of Japan are numerous volcanoes; some, like Asama-yama, Mihara-San, Aso and Mitake, are active, while others, including the 12,000-foot Fuji, are extinct. Seismic disturbances are of frequent recurrence, but great earthquakes are fortunately rare. The most serious in recent years was that of 1923, when the earthquake was followed by a tidal wave and then a fire, bringing in its wake death to about ten thousand people, injury to a much larger number, and a property loss officially estimated at five billion yen.

The mountainous character of the country affects the life of Japan adversely in still another way: it cuts down the arable area to something like twenty per cent of the total. The numerous rivers—among which Shinano-gawa, Tone-gawa and Kiso-gawa are the largest—add much to



(a) Pagoda in Nara



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.

(b) Temple Kinkaku-ji in Kyoto

the glorious scenery, but they are at the same time another source of destruction. Often enough the abundant rains swell the streams, fill the rivers to overflowing, and result in floods, demolishing roads, dikes and similar structures, and carrying away all sorts of property. But when the elements are not enraged, the streams, mountains and endless waterfalls contribute much to the beauty of the picturesque landscape, while the lakes, from the famous Lake Biva in the central part of the Honshu down to the smallest, attract pilgrims from all over the country.

Among the more magnificent sights are three which have been considered outstanding for many centuries. These are "Matsushima," or the Pine Islands, near Sendai; "Miajima," or the Shrine Island, on the Inland Sea, between Kobe and Shimonoseki; and the "Ama-no-Hashidate," or Heavenly Bridge, a pine-covered sand-bar about two miles long on the Japanese Sea, not far from Kyoto.

Climate. The climate of Japan is generally moderate, but varies, of course, between the extremes of her sub-arctic North and the tropical South. In the Kurile Islands and Karafuto (Sakhalin) the Winter is long, severe, and generally not unlike that of the adjacent Siberia. That of Hokkaido is somewhat milder by reason of the vicinity of the warm ocean current, the "Kuroshio," which is the "Gulf stream" of the Orient.

The three main islands have, generally speaking, a mild climate, with heavy rainfalls, the average annual precipitation being about fifty per cent higher than that of New York. During the month of the so-called *Nyubai*, or rainy period, which generally occurs in June, it is pouring incessantly, and the dampness reaches such a degree that practically everything in the houses grows mouldy. On an average, more than one-third of the year is cloudy, and the percentage of rain is high, though this is less true of the eastern part of Honshu than of the western coast. But when the sun is shining, one quickly forgets the unpleasant gray days; for the sunny ones are glorious indeed. The most delightful season in Japan is the late Fall,

when the heat is over, the rains are few, the chrysanthemums are in bloom, and the countryside with its many gorgeous maples changes its colors through myriad shades of yellow and red. However, even this part of the year is sometimes marred by typhoons, though these are more frequent in early Fall and in the Spring, when the monsoons are changing their direction.

The average temperature of Japan is somewhat lower than in the equivalent latitudes of Europe, and it is higher than in Asia. For Tokyo the annual average is 56.5° Fahrenheit.

Flora and fauna. The flora of Japan proper is very rich and multiform, for her longitudinal extent is so great. Moreover she is surrounded by water, and has a favorable climate. Forests occupy almost one-half of her entire land surface, but not more than fifty per cent are of real industrial value. The great variety of trees found in Japan can be judged by the fact that she has a larger number of different species than the United States, in spite of the fact that Japan is so much smaller in size. There are over six hundred varieties of trees and more than seventeen thousand different species of plants. But the number of plants cultivated in Japan for the definite needs of the population is comparatively limited. Certain of the most useful, too, are conspicuous by their absence. Cotton, for example, is not cultivated at all, partly on account of the scarcity of suitable land; while flax is grown only on a small scale. The main crop in Japan remains rice, which is found all over the three main islands. Then comes tea, chiefly in Honshu; sugar-cane, mostly in the South; mulberry-trees, tobacco, beans, potatoes, pumpkins and turnips.

The northern island of Hokkaido is, of course, much poorer in its flora; Formosa, with its tropical climate, is very rich indeed. In the latter island may be found camphor-trees providing an enviable income to the Empire, and sugar-cane. Bamboo, which grows in the three main islands too, is also characteristic of Formosa, and is utilized for thousands of purposes. When very young it

has food value as a vegetable; later it is employed in the manufacture of paper and water-pipes. It constitutes one of the important materials for building, and is used in endless other industries.

All over the country you see pines of different varieties; some small, crooked and grotesque, others straight and tall, good timber for masts. Then, of course, you will see *Cryptomeria*, *Hinoki* or Cypress, various oaks, magnolia, acacia, willow, chestnut, orange and other fruit bearers, olives, poplars, spruce, fir, cedar, and many other trees. For her rich variety and abundance in vegetation Japan is rightly considered a botanist's paradise.

In contrast to the wealth and variety of her flora, the fauna of Japan is represented by a rather limited number of species, among which black bear, foxes, wolves and monkeys are conspicuous. This paucity in wild beasts can be explained partly by the isolation of the islands, which prevents the migration of animals from the mainland, and partly by the density of population. This same density and the peculiarly intensive character of Japanese agriculture also explain why there are so few domestic animals. Japan is wealthier in her birds, of which there are numerous species.

The comparative scantiness of Japan's fauna is generously compensated for by the abundance and variety of the inhabitants of the waters surrounding the archipelago. Here are found all sorts of fish, lobsters, crabs, octopuses, whales and seals. From the sea Japan receives much of her food and plenty of raw material for her industry and agriculture, for fish and other sea products are used as fertilizers.

Natural resources. The natural resources of Japan are decidedly limited; they are not even adequate for the needs of her large and growing population. Especially are they inadequate to supply the requirements of her rapidly growing industry. To start with the fuels, Japan is very poor in oil. There are some scanty oil deposits in the northwest of the main island, in the Niigata and Akita prefectures, and in Hokkaido. That is all; and the entire

output, about 250,000 tons per year, cannot meet more than ten per cent of the requirements. An additional supply, in a gradually growing volume, is coming from Sakhalin, which now delivers some two hundred thousands tons yearly, and from Formosa, which produces some thirty-five thousand tons. But the balance has to be imported. The coal reserves of Japan, on the other hand, are large: almost one billion tons of proved reserves and some seven billion of possible reserves. There is, however, practically no good coking coal, so important in a number of industries, and this means that yet another indispensable fuel must be imported from elsewhere.

The most satisfying source of energy is found in the waters of Japan, which provide the so-called "white coal" in abundance. Its very extensive and intensive exploitation may be judged from the fact that Japan uses almost ten per cent of the hydroelectric power employed by the entire world, though the total potential water-power of Japan constitutes only some two and a half per cent of the total of the world.

As for her resources in metals, Japan is far from well supplied. Here too she must depend on outside resources. The great bulk of the iron ore used by Japan is imported—partly, as we shall see, from her colonies, partly from abroad. This constitutes one of the weakest links in Japan's national economy, for in our Machine Age iron is the most important factor. The deposits of iron ores in Japan proper are variously estimated between sixty and one hundred million tons of rather high metallic content; but the important thing to know is that her own production cannot meet more than fifteen per cent of her needs in iron. In the non-ferrous metals Japan is much richer, particularly in copper. Lead and zinc, tin and aluminum are there also, but in insufficient quantities. Precious metals, too, are mined in Japan, but not in any considerable amount. Other minerals found in Nippon include the high-grade kaolin, or porcelain-clay, which is there produced in larger quantities than in any other

country; high quality sulphur, arsenic, posphorites, and so forth.

Population. The population of Japan proper was estimated at the end of 1935 as 68,950,000, as compared with 64,450,000 in 1930, and is densest on the main island, with the most congested areas around Tokyo, Osaka-Kyoto and Nagoya. The most sparsely populated parts are Hokkaido, certain prefectures in Shikoku and Kiushu, and numerous small islands, some of which are not inhabited at all.

The average density of population in Japan proper is 463 per square mile, but this figure does not tell the whole story. The important thing is that with this high degree of congestion Japan proper occupies in point of density the fourth place among the countries of the globe; she yields only to Belgium (with over 680 per square mile), Holland and England. The increase of her population, in spite of rather high mortality, is estimated at close to one million per annum, or about the same percentage as in the United States. Naturally this aggravates still further her problem of accommodating her population, though the claim of overcrowding is somewhat exaggerated. Seriously congested areas do exist around the largest cities, but in Hokkaido and elsewhere large tracts of good fertile land still remain underpopulated. Furthermore, not only are certain countries in Europe more congested than Japan proper, but China herself, the present object of Japan's expansion, has many regions which are much more densely peopled. Indeed, the overcrowding in certain parts of southern China is so severe that a great number of people always live on water, in *sampan*s and other floating shelters.

Not only has Japan large tracts of fertile but unused lands in her own domain, but she fails conspicuously to send any impressive number of her nationals to settle either in Korea and other new parts of the Empire, or abroad, though not all foreign countries are opposed to Japanese immigration. In other words, the problem of overpopulation in Japan is not as acute as certain people

maintain; and in any case this problem cannot be accepted either as explanation or justification of Japanese aggression.

The existing difficulties of the agricultural population of the Land of the Rising Sun are the result of appalling injustice in the distribution of land. Farmers must rely on their midget parcels, and even these are heavily in debt; the landlords still keep in their hands a very considerable part of the soil, most of which is cultivated by tenants ground down by exorbitant rent, or by the hired workers paid very little.

As the result of the pauperization of the farmers, along with the growth of industries, the urban population of Japan has been rapidly increasing at the expense of the rural population. Already they are approximately equal, though possibly the slight excess still is on the rural side. Thus Japan now has no less than four large cities with one million or more population—Tokyo, the capital, 5,848,000 on October 1, 1935; Osaka, the largest industrial centre, about three million; Nagoya, an important manufacturing city, and Kyoto, the old capital, which is also an industrial centre. Together with Kobe and Yokohama, the two largest ports engaged in foreign trade, their total population in 1935 was estimated as 12,619,000, as compared with the 10,477,000 in 1930. In other words, the increase in these cities has amounted to over twenty per cent in five years.

This is, undoubtedly, a proof of the growing importance of industry in Japan's economic life. One may well take with a grain of salt Japan's claim to more lands on the grounds of overpopulation; but no one can deny that her growing industries are badly in need of more adequate supply of raw materials. Knowing how poorly endowed Japan is in natural resources, one can easily see why she is so anxious to find reliable and constant sources of supply for these necessities.

Recognition of her needs and sympathy with her predicaments do not imply, of course, a concurrence with the methods used by the rulers of Japan in their attempt

to solve this serious problem. In the following pages we shall examine the policy of Japan in this respect, endeavoring at the same time to discover why she chose these, instead of other more conventional methods.

The Japanese people. The first general impression most foreigners obtain from mingling with the crowds in Japan is one of enchantment. The strangely clad, very polite, ever-smiling inhabitants of this exotic land seem to belong to a different world. The impression is ephemeral; outwardly different though they are, these Japanese gradually take on a reality, and soon appear not so utterly unlike the rest of mankind. And a little longer knowledge will lead to the discovery that the Japanese are a hard-working people, content with very little in the way of earthly goods, patient and obedient to their nominal superiors, to parents, elders, teachers and officials. Some observers, indeed, would claim that this obedience is carried to the point of servility.

In the attempt to make the Japanese more comprehensible to the Western world they are sometimes compared with the British. This is because theirs also is an Island Empire; but here the resemblance ends. Others suggest that the Japanese are not unlike the French in their alertness, but that also is hardly correct: neither the keen brilliance of the French mind, nor its quick witticism, is found in the average Japanese. Comparison of the Italians with the Japanese because both are highly artistic has rather more justification. As for the nicknaming of the Japanese as "the Germans of the Orient," it is decidedly apt, for undoubtedly they possess the German virtues of the methodical approach, systematic and thorough performance, strict discipline, and rude realism in tackling practical matters. But when all is said, it is still better not to overestimate such comparisons; in spite of all the occasional similarities, the Japanese still present a puzzle to the Western mind.

The growth of Japan. With her mere 148,756 square miles of territory Japan proper is not only smaller than England, Scotland and Ireland combined, but smaller

than the state of California. This in itself explains why Japan started her expansion so soon after her advent on the international arena, and why she must still continue to look for more elbow-room.

War with China, 1894-5. The first important act of the new Japanese policy of modern imperialism occurred in 1894, when Japan, whose military forces had been at least partially remodeled on the Western pattern, attacked the practically unarmed China, and easily succeeded in getting all that she asked from the vanquished. By this first in a long series of aggressions Japan acquired Formosa, the Pescadore Islands, and the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula. The interposition of France, Germany and Russia, however, somewhat curtailed these spoils, for Japan was advised to return to the Celestial Empire the tip of the Liaotung, and to accept instead a larger indemnity. This she did, for she was not yet ready to resist the Powers.

The indemnity thus acquired was used by Japan to extend the building of a modern machine of war. When her army and navy were strong enough, Japan proceeded with the next step in Empire-building. This time her adversary was Russia. After entering into prolonged negotiations with the latter, ostensibly to adjust their relations, but with the real prime purpose of inducing Russia to withdraw from Korea and Manchuria, Japan finally decided to strike. The advice of Prince Ito, who was charged with the task of carrying on negotiations with the Tsar's Government and advocated conciliation, was brushed aside. Strengthened by the alliance with Great Britain, signed at London in 1902, and knowing of the friendly attitude of the United States, Japan decided to take the risk, and started her second war for Manchuria.

War with Russia, 1904-5. In consideration of the immensity of Russia, her inexhaustible resources in manpower and raw materials, Japan was particularly anxious to play safe, and so omitted the formal declaration of war. The Imperial Order to start hostilities was issued on February 5, 1904, and the Russian fleet at Port Arthur—

unprepared for an attack—suffered serious losses. Russian warships in Korea were also attacked. Several assaults on Port Arthur followed the first surprise. The Russian fleet was soon practically paralyzed, and the entrance to Port Arthur Bay was blocked by the vessels sunk for that purpose by the Japanese with a display of real heroism. Subsequently the dilapidated remnants of the Russian fleet, sent to the East, were practically wiped out by Admiral Togo in the battle of Tsushima.

Having secured mastery of the seas at the very beginning of the war, Japan next turned her attention to the occupation of Korea as the base for her campaign. Victorious in a series of encounters and battles, the Japanese armies continued their advance into Manchuria. The great battle of Liaoyang was won by the Russians, but the High Command was unaware of the victory. Unduly impressed by the attack of Kuroki's army on the flank, General Kuropatkin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, gave orders to shorten and then to evacuate the position. The Japanese, fatigued and short of ammunition, had themselves been making preparations for retreat; but they immediately grasped the new chance offered by the Russian mistake, and, starting an attack, turned a lost battle into a victory.

After more than one year and a half of struggle, Japan was almost exhausted. Her economic status was shaken, her finances drained, and further financial help from abroad was becoming more and more difficult to obtain. Russia, on the other hand, had already accumulated large forces. She achieved some reorganization of her armies and delivered to the East large stores of supplies. Then President Theodore Roosevelt came out with his suggestion to start negotiations for peace. The suggestion was accepted, with some hesitation and against the advice of the military people of Russia; and finally Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was agreed upon as the place for the conference.

On September 5, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed and the war ended. By that treaty the southern

part of the Sakhalin island was ceded to Japan. The Liaotung Peninsula, leased to Russia in 1898, was transferred to Japan with the "consent" of China, as was also the southern part of the railway built in Manchuria by the Russians. Korea was recognized as a Japanese sphere of paramount interest. Five years later Korea was annexed by Japan, in spite of the fact that only a few years earlier, when starting war against Russia, the Mikado had declared that Japan wanted only to see Korea remain independent. Another, and very large, slice had been added to the Empire, and Japan now had a firm foothold on the mainland of Asia.

The World War. The next step was made in 1914, when Japan entered the World War on the side of the Allied Powers. Having besieged and occupied the German-leased Kiaochow, she attempted to keep it after the war was over. Japan was, however, persuaded in 1922 to return this port to China, only to try to get it back again later on. In 1915 Japan served on China the famous Twenty-one Demands, by which, if legally accepted, China would have become a vassal-state of Japan. Protests were registered by the other Powers, and some of the demands were withdrawn. But not for long.

In 1918-22 Japan assumed a leading rôle in intervention into the domestic affairs of Russia after the 1917 Revolution, and attempted to take advantage of the natural weakness of her neighbor in the throes of the social upheaval. Her plans failed to materialize; the Japanese troops suffered severely from guerilla warfare in Siberia, and were forced to withdraw. The expenses of that adventure were high, and the results obtained practically nil.

Still determined to build up an Empire, Japan continued her expansion at the cost of others, waiting only for an auspicious moment to take the next step. For a time, too, her government was in the hands of the less aggressive elements, the military party being at that time temporarily under shadow. This was partly because the adventure in Siberia had proved so costly and fruitless,

and partly because General Tanaka, the leader of the expansionists and the former Prime Minister, had been involved in a financial scandal which undermined the prestige of the military class. This scandal had occurred when Tanaka was leader of the political party called Seiyu-kai.

Occupation of Manchuria. While the government was out of the control of the jingoes the foreign policy of Japan both in Asia and elsewhere was one of reconciliation with other Powers. When the military again came to the fore, all this was abruptly changed. In September, 1931, Japan embarked on a new aggression. Under the obviously weak pretext that Chinese soldiers had attempted to blow up a part of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railroad, the soldiers of the Land of the Rising Sun occupied Mukden, then the capital city of Manchuria, and thereupon rapidly extended their grip over the whole province.

All the protests of the Chinese, all the diplomatic notes of the Powers, all the admonitions of the League of Nations failed to stop Japan. She declared that a movement for self-determination was on in Manchuria, and that the population wanted independence from China. In 1932 the "independent" state of Manchukuo was declared as the legal heir of the former Manchuria, and Japan hastened to recognize this newcomer. By a treaty, signed by the two, Japan promised "mutual"—meaning military—support. Soon afterwards the former infant Emperor of China, who had lived for several years under the name of Mr. Pu-I in the Japanese city of Dairen, was made Emperor of the new country, under the name of Kang Teh.

Not satisfied with the existing borders of Manchukuo, the Japanese troops took pains to enlarge that "child of the conflict," as a Japanese writer called it in a book designed to explain to the Westerners how all this happened. The adjacent parts of Inner Mongolia, first the province of Jehol and later a part of Chahar, were added to the domain of the Emperor Kang Teh. Embarrassed by the criticism of the League of Nations, and its special Commission of Inquiry, headed by Lord Lytton and sent to

Manchukuo, Japan announced her withdrawal from the Geneva conclave; then, feeling less hampered than before, she passed the Great Wall and invaded China proper. Under this pressure Nanking signed with the Japanese the so-called Tangku truce, creating in Hopei a demilitarized zone under Japanese control, and giving Japan various rights in that province. About a year later China yielded further and restored direct traffic on the railway connecting her with Manchukuo, thereby tacitly recognizing the loss of this part of her former territory.

At the end of 1934 the protracted negotiations for the purchase by Manchukuo—with Japanese money—of the Chinese Eastern Railway were completed. Thus disappeared the last commercial interest of Russia in Manchuria, leaving Japan undisputed master of the enormous territory to the north of the Great Wall of China.

Expanding beyond the Great Wall. With the Tangku truce behind them, the Japanese were well on the road of further expansion beyond the Great Wall. By April, 1934, the Japanese official "spokesman" declared that his country was determined not to tolerate any further interference by other Powers in the life of China. He meant, of course, that this privilege would henceforth be reserved to Japan. There were some very mildly worded protests sent by the Powers in reply, but Japan was in no mood to accept advice. Just as she took advantage of the Powers in 1915 when they were busy on the battlefield, so in 1931, when the whole world was practically paralyzed by the economic crisis, Japan started her aggression in Manchuria, knowing that once again the Powers would be unable to check her. In short, in 1934 Japan did not fail to take advantage of the general uncertainty in the international outlook, and challenged the world with that startling declaration of her intentions in Asia.

In 1935 the Japanese military authorities stationed in various parts of China came into the open for the "independence" of five more provinces of China, and when that was protested by Nanking and some of the Powers, declared again, as in the case of Manchuria, that this

was a spontaneous movement for self-determination. In other words, Japan had nothing to do with it! But when Nanking expressed its readiness to interfere with the separatists of the North, Japan made it known that she was ready to stand by the autonomists with the support of her arms.

The Great Empire. Whether by conquest or annexation as in case of Korea; by protectorate, as in case of Manchukuo; or through special interest supported by bayonets, as in case of the northern provinces of China proper, a large empire has now been built up by Japan. This systematic expansion gives the lie to the assertion that the Land of the Rising Sun is a small island country, deprived of many necessities of life, and deserving the sympathy and helping hand of the rest of the world.

Today Japan is in control of territory many times the size of her original island base. By adding Formosa, the Pescadores, half of Sakhalin, Kwantung, Korea, and the mandated islands in the South Seas, given to her by the League of Nations and retained after her withdrawal from that international body, Japan had almost doubled her territory. By adding Manchukuo—which is to all practical purposes Japanese—and a part of Mongolia, she has almost trebled it again. By adding a few more northern provinces of China she would be in control of territory of little less than a million square miles. Such is the Japanese Empire of today. What it will be in the years to come depends much on the attitude of the other nations, who are already inquiring, "What next is Japan planning to grab?"

The population of this newly created Empire is estimated at between one hundred and twenty-five and two hundred millions, if not more; for the five northern provinces of Shantung, Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan and Ningshia, which have latterly been attracting the special interest of Japan, have a population of about ninety-five millions. Of course, this population is not homogeneous. Japan cannot blindly rely on it in, for example, the case of war. But it is still of untold importance as a new, enormously

enlarged reservoir of man-power, which Japan can consider under her control, and more or less at her disposal.

This newly created Empire is, of course, something very different from the Japan of the Shogunate—very different, indeed, from the Japan of the days when the “Black Ships” of Commodore Perry first arrived to open Nippon for trade and other intercourse with the rest of the world. That little, bizarre Japan came out of her seclusion as the Americans and others desired; but she happened to grow up so rapidly, to such dimensions, and in such a manner, that the same foreigners were first fascinated, then alarmed, and finally almost terrorized. With disapproval and indignation they found out that Japan had become not only a dangerous competitor of Western merchants, but a great menace to the peace of the world.



THE NEW COLONIAL EMPIRE

Formosa—Kwantung and Karafuto—Korea or Chosen—The
Mandated Islands—Manchukuo—What Next?

IT is unfortunate that the enchanting islands of Nippon are not as rich under the ground as they are beautiful on the surface, that the natural resources of Japan are inadequate, and that the extent of the land itself is so limited that it provides no certainty for the material existence of the inhabitants. These things are at the root of the predicament facing this nation, if she is limited to her island possessions. Recognizing this situation, one begins to understand why Japan is struggling for a better lot. But even if one follows with sympathy and interest the spectacular development of modern Japan, and stands amazed at the rapid expansion of her colonial Empire, one begins to wonder if there is not something odd in the methods she applies to achieve it—something old-fashioned, almost archaic. It is true that these aims and methods were practically those used by other imperialist Powers when building their colonial empires. In both instances the aggressors annexed lands that belonged to other nations, and established control over their natural resources for the benefit of financial capital: and in both instances the invaders used force and had little regard for scruples. But Japan acted in an outdated manner. Possibly this can be explained by the fact that she remained too long in seclusion and, being retarded, was not in a position to realize that her international policies were not well synchronized with the realities of our days. One fancies that Japan will eventually encounter penalties for this anachronism.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Japan embarked on an aggressive policy very early in the process

of modernization, and has already succeeded in building an enormous colonial Empire. We have seen the methods applied to achieve this object. Now let us examine more specifically these numerous additions to the old Yamato of the islands. What is the value of these colonies as sources of food supply and of raw materials for the industries of Japan? To what extent can they serve as outlets for the excess population of the archipelago, and as markets for the excess production of her industries? Are these colonies promising as producers of wealth for Japan? And, finally, what is their strategic value to the Empire-builders?

Formosa. The first addition to her territory to be made by Japan after she embarked upon a policy of imperialist aggression was that of Formosa (the name means "beautiful"), or, as it is called by the Chinese and Japanese alike, Taiwan. Japan made an attempt to occupy this "paradise" as early as 1847, but at that time was induced by England to return the island to China. A second attempt to annex Formosa was made in the early years of the Meiji Era, but this venture also was a failure. The third met with success. By the Shimonoseki Treaty, which concluded the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, Japan received Formosa, together with the dozen or so of small islands known as the Pescadores, which separate that prize from the main archipelago of Japan. It should indeed have proved a prize. Dominated by Niitaka, which rises to 12,959 feet and is the highest peak in Japanese territory, the 13,890 square miles of Formosa are two thirds covered by mountains famous for their luxuriant forests, while the balance consists of plains of extremely fertile soil. With its tropical climate and heavy rains the island lavishly rewards the agriculturist. Yet in spite of the efforts made by the government to encourage migration to Formosa during the last forty years, that island had in 1932 a Japanese population of only 248,539 in an estimated total of nearly five millions; and these Nipponese are mostly officials, merchants, middlemen, and foremen of industries, with practically no farmers coming

to settle and till the land. For the rest, the majority of the 4,932,433 inhabitants are Chinese by race, with about 150,000 aborigines of Malay extraction. In other words, up to the present, Formosa has attracted Japanese immigration only to the most microscopic extent.

Formosa was her first colony, and Japan had to learn how to use it. For a number of years the new masters had a very hard time with this new venture. The population, especially the so-called savage tribes of the North, are still bitterly opposed to the civilizing process of the Japanese and offer a difficult problem for the administration. This was partly because the methods applied by the Japanese in the early days of their control were so ruthless and cruel. For years they carried on military campaigns, and developed all those evils of corruption, misgovernment and malpractice which are characteristic of imperialist colonizers. According to Basil H. Chamberlain, "the Japanese officials led shameless lives, soldiers were insolent, and so were the imported coolies, for they got brevet rank as representatives of the conquering race." Since then reforms have been earnestly labored for at Tokyo, and considerable progress, both material and moral, has been made. However, the conquerors have still failed to win the hearts of the natives; and the latter remain unassimilated, now and again demonstrating their discontent with the Japanese. Disturbances were frequent in the early years, and were repeated in 1915, 1929, and as recently as 1931. Nor is the reason far to seek. The Formosans are shamelessly exploited, and the toilers receive very little for the results of their work. To the Japanese masters goes the lion's share.¹

Agriculture supports the overwhelming majority of the population, yet some eighty per cent of the area cultivated is controlled by the Japanese. The main crop, rice, is produced in very large quantities and exported to Japan. Tea, produced on a larger scale than in Japan, and

¹ Forests of Formosa, under pretext of nationalization, actually are given to private Japanese concerns (in particular to the firm of Mitsubishi).

controlled by the great Japanese firm of Mitsui, is marketed chiefly abroad. With a few exceptions the large plantations of sugar, pineapples and tobacco, not to mention the mills and factories using these raw materials, belong to the Japanese. The camphor industry is controlled by the Japanese Government. The mining of gold, copper, sulphur, coal and oil contributes both to the Japanese treasury and to private entrepreneurs. Coal is produced in amounts permitting some small export to China and Japan. The oil industry is not well developed as yet; but the government is planning considerable improvements and increase of production, as the Japanese navy needs this oil, and uses Taiwan as an important base for operations in the South. With such natural wealth it is not surprising that the foreign trade of Formosa is quite considerable,² and usually has a favorable balance (an average of between sixty and seventy million yen annually); but the natives are not allowed to enjoy the results. Most of the trade is with Japan: some seventy per cent of the imports come from Japan proper, and about ninety per cent of the exports go there. The profits, however, go uniformly into Japanese pockets.

The budget of the island³ is usually balanced by considerable amounts of money going into the Japanese treasury, but the taxation is heavy. Expenditures are very high, for they include not only comparatively lavish salaries to the Japanese officials, but also the expenses on defense—recently, for example, some twenty-five million yen were spent on improvements of the ports of Keilun and Takao. But for the education of the natives there is very little. The appropriation for that purpose in 1934–5 was only 4,521,192 yen, or some four per cent of the total; and there are about three times as many schools in Formosa for Japanese children as there are for the natives, though the latter provide practically all the funds. It remains to add that Formosa, like the other colonies

² In 1929, 477,000,000 yen; in 1930, 401,000,000 yen; in 1932, 404,000,000 yen; and in 1933, 434,000,000 yen.

³ 110,737,000 in 1934–5.

of Nippon, has no representation in the Japanese Diet; and though she has since 1935 been granted a kind of home rule on a very restricted basis, even her municipal authorities are partly elected and partly appointed by the colonial administration. The executive function is vested in a Governor-General who has exclusive powers, and can even legislate by ordinances, which, however, require imperial sanction to become law.

From the above sketch of Formosa it is plain that the island, with its rice, tea, sugar and fruits, is first of all a valuable source of food supply for Japan. It is also a source of certain raw materials such as camphor and sulphur, as well as a market for the Japanese goods to the value of some one hundred and fifty million yen annually. But the island has failed, so far, to become an outlet for the excess population, though it offers splendid opportunities. As a producer of wealth for Japan, Formosa is the best of her colonies, having given net profits for many years. Strategically she is very valuable because she constitutes an important link in the barrier against the approaches to the Chinese coast from the Pacific and against the approaches to Japan from the British naval base of Singapore; while at the same time Formosa is a base for the Japanese navy operating against the Philippines and other American possessions in the Pacific, as well as against China. Indeed, in her jealous endeavor to protect an exclusive position in that part of the world, Japan obtained from China, at the time when other Powers were receiving leases and concessions, a pledge of non-alienation of the province of Fukien, which lies opposite Formosa, to any other country. Therefore, when Tokyo learned that an American concern, the Bethlehem Steel Company, had received a contract for building dockyards near Fuchow, Japan protested, and included in her Twenty-one Demands of 1915 one concerning this alleged menace to her interests.

Kwantung and Karafuto. Next to be added to the Japanese Empire, after Formosa and the Pescadores, were the Kwantung or southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula,

and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, which became known under the Japanese as Karafuto. The Kwantung we shall discuss later, together with the Manchukuo, for it is included in that new "independent" state even by the semi-official Japanese Year Book of 1935. Here we shall deal with Karafuto alone. This half of Sakhalin had been exchanged by Japan in 1875 for several islands of the Kurile group, which up to then belonged to Russia; but in 1905, by the Treaty of Portsmouth, it was returned to its former owner. Karafuto added a territory almost equal to that of Formosa, and, although not comparable in wealth with Taiwan, is also valuable for its natural resources.

About one half of Karafuto is covered with forests. Under the ground there is coal; some estimates say possibly five hundred million tons, while others, more optimistic, claim upwards of one billion. The production so far is around seven hundred thousand tons, with only about ten per cent exported. There is also oil, though not as much as in the northern part of the island, which remains under Soviet Russian sovereignty, but is exploited by Japanese concessionaires to the extent of 150,000 tons annually. In the surrounding waters the Japanese have a very rich source of the fish that constitute such an important part of their diet.

The inhabitants of Karafuto numbered only 293,172 in 1932, and of these 290,950 were Japanese, with a few Ainus. Of this population about one fourth is occupied in agriculture, another fourth in commerce, and the balance in mining, fishing and administration. The budget of the island for 1934-5 was 25,929,056 yen.

As a market, Karafuto is not significant, but as a source of fish and such raw materials as oil it is distinctly valuable. However, its chief importance lies in the fact that from this particular colony Japan can easily bring her troops to the mainland across the rather narrow strait erroneously called on some maps "Gulf" of Tartary.

Korea or Chosen. As we have seen in the historical sketch in the first chapter, Korea has attracted the atten-

tion of Japan for many centuries. In the sixteenth century Hideyoshi attempted its conquest, with no better success than the legendary Empress Jingo enjoyed in the second. After the Restoration, it will be remembered, too, that the nobles of the South failed in an attempt to induce the new Imperial régime at Tokyo to embark on an expedition of the same sort. It was only after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 that Japan acquired the recognition of her "special interests" in Korea; and soon afterwards, in 1910, annexed the Country of the Morning Calm, which had been called a "degenerated state" by the American writer George Kennan. But however it may be described, Korea—or Chosen, as it is called by the Japanese—is an important addition to the Empire of Nippon. It has increased the latter's territory by an area.⁴ more than one half as great as that of Japan proper, and added at the time of its annexation a population of some fifteen million persons, which by 1935 had swelled to very nearly twenty-three millions. More important, Korea is a country rich in those natural resources which are most badly needed by Japan. And more important still, its possession solidly established Japan for the first time on the mainland of Asia.

Geographically, the peninsula occupied by Korea is a bridge between the Japanese archipelago and the mainland of Asia, and is separated from Nippon only by the rather narrow Strait of Korea, with the Tsushima Island in between. It is a very mountainous country, with splendid forests on the hills; and though certain parts were deforested by uncontrolled exploitation, the government now is taking pains to remedy this damage. The highest range, the Diamond Mountains, crosses the peninsula from its northeastern corner down to the South, partly following the coast, and forming rather steep slopes facing Japan, and so leaving only a few good harbors on this side of the Japanese Sea. The western slopes, on the other hand, are very smooth and descend gradually toward the

⁴ 85,228 square miles.

Yellow Sea, forming plains with fertile soil inviting to agriculture.

Approximately eighty-five per cent of the population is classified as rural, and lives by tilling the land. The overwhelming majority dwell in extreme poverty; their returns are exceedingly small and cannot pay for any decent standard of existence. The villages are groups of dilapidated earth-huts, roofed with straw; and all this is in spite of the very fertile soil and the favorable climate. The latter is dry, bracing, more continental than that of Japan, and probably comparable with that of Italy. The Japanese say that the Korean poverty is rooted in laziness. But this is hardly the correct explanation. The same Koreans in the Russian Far East are probably the most industrious of all the different nationalities living there. Is it not more likely that they work less diligently in Chosen only because the Japanese deprive them of their land and their earnings?

Land is systematically taken away from the Koreans by the Japanese in a number of ways; more than one half of Chosen—some observers say up to seventy-five per cent—already has been transferred to Japanese land-owners, who usually do not cultivate their land themselves. They prefer to have labor done by Koreans, paying them some thirty sen per day or about one dime in American money, or to receive exorbitant rent, mostly in kind, from their tenants. About forty-five per cent of the Korean peasants have no land of their own at all; and most of those who possess any are so badly in debt ⁵ that their ownership becomes a mere illusion. Furthermore, a considerable number of poor peasants belong in the category of "cadenmin," ⁶ or toilers of the "burned land." These "cadenmin" cultivate the normally non-arable lands high in the mountains, first burning the trees and the bushes, and then trying their best to get some crop from the stony slopes of the hills.

⁵ In 1932 the average indebtedness of the Korean farmers was estimated as high as 250 yen per household.

⁶ Japanese sources estimated them in 1933 as 250,000 families.

Although it has been an integral part of the Japanese Empire for over twenty-five years, Chosen is given no representation in the Japanese Diet. It has no genuine home rule, and like Formosa is ruled by a Japanese Governor-General with very wide powers, not only executive but also legislative, through ordinances requiring imperial sanction. Up to the present, that administration has been headed by high military officials, in spite of the recent reform allowing civil government, and has been characterized by stern and sometimes harsh bureaucracy.

In describing the expansion of his country, a Japanese commentator has said: "While Japan was bent upon the stupendous task of reorganizing her institutions on a Western model, and introducing the important innovations of modern civilization, her two nearest neighbors, Korea and China, were still stubbornly wedded to their effete routine, hating to open the countries to foreign intercourse and generally despising foreign ways. They were too haughty and self-important to perceive how greedily the aggressive Powers of the West were watching them, ready to pounce at the first favorable opportunity" . . . and so Japan came to their rescue! "Japan concluded a treaty of commerce with Korea in 1876, for she wanted the latter to be sufficiently strong to protect herself against foreign aggression." Not against the Japanese good-wishers, oh, no! "In Korea Japan stood for progress, and China for reactionary interest."

Such is the story as presented by this Japanese commentator. But is it in accord with the facts? Again and again Tokyo has launched campaigns of terror in Korea since the latter became a part of the Empire. In 1912 she cruelly suppressed the so-called "Conspiracy," when numerous Koreans arrested on that occasion were "burned with red-hot irons and hung by the thumbs until they confessed their implication in the murder plot." ⁷ In 1919 certain Koreans issued a "Proclamation of Independence," for which many of them paid dearly. At the time of the great earthquake in June, 1923, a considerable

⁷ H. E. Wildes, "Japan in Crisis." New York, 1934, p. 235.

number of Koreans, allegedly plotting against Japan, were summarily arrested and severely dealt with. Again in 1929-30 there was a "mutiny" in Chosen, and late in 1934 another "conspiracy" was put down by force.⁸ To rule in this way, Japan naturally needs large military and police forces in Chosen. So it happens that two full divisions and one air regiment are stationed there, not to mention the large and heavily armed police force, the special gendarmerie, and the widespread spying system which keeps the conquerors in the saddle.

Despite these facts it would be unjust to single out Japan for special reprehension in regard to colonial policy. She has acted in Formosa, Korea and elsewhere just as other imperialists have done in their colonies, and it is even possible that the Japanese have been less cruel than the nationals of many Western countries. Do we not remember Lord Kitchener in India? Need we make special effort to recollect the abundant evidence of horrible methods used by other Western colonizers? Only recently a French writer, Madame Andrée Viollis, gave a tragic picture of inhuman practices in French Indo-China, declaring that "the masses of native peasants there are reduced to starvation by low wages and high taxes." She added that any unauthorized assemblage or attempt to complain or to "redress their grievances is apt to be met with machine-gun fire. Any unrest is savagely suppressed. Tortures that the Spanish Inquisition might have envied are applied, in efforts to wring confessions from the political agitators or to induce them to denounce their accomplices."⁹

In identical circumstances people act in the same way. Yellow or white, there are only minor variations. Conquest by force, subjugation of other people to exploit them, is not in itself an act of humanitarians, and its consequences cannot be expected to satisfy the moralist. It is not Japan that should be blamed for all the atrocities of her colonial administration, but the imperialism which,

⁸ *New York Times*, December 21, 1934.

⁹ William Bird in the *New York Sun*, December 16, 1935.

unfortunately, Japan has had to adopt since joining the procession of "civilized" nations. She imitated all of the main characteristics of the Westerners; she learned from them how to use firearms. From them also she learned the newer methods of exploitation, and exploited others in a way not unlike their own.

Certain American writers, impatient with the "Hermit Nation," as the Koreans were called in the past, have indignantly concluded that they were "the product of a decayed civilization." Other observers hold a different opinion. They claim that patriotism is not dead in Korea. But that Japan has not won the hearts of that people, hardly any one would dispute. "Though the Koreans are silent," writes an American missionary residing in their country,¹⁰ "patriotism burns at fever heat in their veins; and the fact that they have lost their country is a deep grief that eats as a canker to the very souls of the thousands."

In 1919 a group of Korean patriots presented to the Versailles Conference a petition asking for liberation from Japan and for the reconstruction of Korea as an independent state, "to be effected by and through the Peace Conference declaring null and void or otherwise abrogating the treaty concluded at Seoul in 1910, whereby Japan purported to annex the Empire of Korea." The Powers ignored this embarrassing petition, and Japan, of course, found victims for punishment.

Undoubtedly it is true that the Imperial Korean Court was weak and corrupt, that the King and the Queen were merely tools in the hands of foreign intriguers. As an observer said: "The Korean Emperor robbed the nobles; the nobles fleeced the peasants; the governors squeezed their provinces; mayors, their cities, and various officials squeezed the common people." That was why it was so easy for China, Japan and Russia to abuse Korea, and for Japan to annex that country. But did Japan improve the lot of the Korean people? Is the Japanese Government interested in their welfare? That is doubtful, to say the

¹⁰ E. C. Wagner, "Korea, the Old and the New." New York, 1931.

least; else, how can it be explained that the educational facilities offered to Korean children are so ridiculously inadequate? In 1934-5, out of a full budget of Yen 250,-107,331, only Yen 1,406,918 were assigned for education; yet Yen 25,847,111 were set aside for prisons.¹¹

On the whole, the Japanese policy in Korea is efficient, but lacking of sympathy, understanding and conciliation. Modern government has been established, strict order introduced, roads built, and harbors improved, all at considerable expense. Between 1910 and 1930 the Japanese treasury spent some eight hundred million yen for such developments, and still is aiding Chosen by a yearly subsidy of from twelve to fifteen million yen.

Korea, as we have seen, is rich in resources. Her agriculture, with some twelve million acres cultivated, produces, even with the most primitive methods in use, almost one half the output of Japan proper. Rice is the main crop, then millet, barley, wheat, soya beans, cotton, tobacco, mulberries, and so forth. But the Koreans get little of their own produce; they rarely have a chance to taste the high grade rice they cultivate. For although the exporters' demand for Korean rice is growing,¹² and the acreage devoted to that crop has already steadily increased to about one half of that in Japan, the yield is declining on account of archaic and primitive methods of cultivation and harvesting. The result is that there remains less and less rice for the Koreans themselves, who must be content with cheaper grain such as millet, barley and wheat.

No wonder that with the cruel system of exploitation

¹¹ Japan-Manchukuo Year Book, 1935 (Tokyo) gives the appropriation for education in Korea as Yen 3,119,763 for 1931-32. Of the total 3500 schools of all kinds, about 3000 were so-called public schools, the rest being divided between the government and private institutions, with a total enrollment of less than 750,000. That was for a population of over 20,000,000. There is one university, that of Keijo, with only 579 students in it, and 324 in the preparatory school attached to that university.

¹² From 1910 to 1920 exports of rice from Korea increased fifteen-fold.

of Chosen as a colony the Koreans are impoverished. Their country as a whole is economically backward, in spite of its natural wealth, since that wealth is misapplied and the development of Korean industry is deliberately retarded by the Japanese masters. The latter prefer to exploit Chosen as source of raw materials, not to build up an industrial competitor. That is why we still find Korea exporting only raw materials and importing practically all her manufactured goods from Japan.

With a trade amounting to seven or eight hundred million yen yearly ¹³ Korean imports are usually heavier than the exports, with the result that the indebtedness of Chosen is increasing. By 1933 it reached 431,876,306 yen, a figure not alarming in itself, but making the burden of the population quite heavy. The 258,391,605 yen budget of Chosen for 1934-5 may be proportionally modest if compared with that of Japan, but it puts a weighty burden on the population already reduced to the paupers' standard of living.

The Japanese remind us that their treasury is helping Chosen by annual subsidies amounting to some twelve to fifteen million yen. This is certainly true. But it is also true that Chosen is a source of very lucrative profits to certain Japanese individuals who carry on business with her, own land within her borders, and control industries.

The full extent of the natural resources of Chosen is unknown, but it is probable that no great part has as yet been exploited. The coal reserves are, apparently, insignificant in quantity, even if compared with those of Japan, but they are of a higher quality and include a much larger percentage of anthracite. But as its production of about one million tons a year is not sufficient for Chosen's own needs, it naturally is no great help to Japan. More important, though not very large, are the deposits of gold; this industry, a part of which is still owned by Americans, is highly modernized and efficiently run. Quite considerable also are the copper mines, and their production is

¹³ In 1929, Yen 168,757,000; in 1932, 631,710,000, and in 1933, 773,000,000, of which some eighty-five per cent was with Japan.

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ily growing. Iron ores, amounting to some ten or
ve million tons, are neither abundant nor rich. So far
yearly production has not exceeded half a million
and it fell to 151,000 tons in 1932. The production of
ron is around two hundred thousand tons a year. A
iderable part of the iron produced in Chosen is ex-
ed to Japan; in the year 1923, according to Harold
loulton, she imported more iron from Chosen than
produced in her own confines.¹⁴ The deposits of
hite in Korea are among the richest in the world, and
roduction is well developed; the major part is ex-
ed to Japan for her electro-technical and metallurgical
istries.

lost of the industries of Chosen remain undeveloped.
y are largely controlled by Japanese, particularly by
Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests. Only about six per
; of the total investments belong to the Koreans, and
se are chiefly in the brewing and textile industries.

The labor question in Chosen is already becoming seri-
. Wages are as low as twenty or thirty American cents
day, and the working day is twelve hours, in some in-
nces even longer. Both working and living conditions
industrial labor are shockingly bad, and to make the
ation still worse, an unemployment problem has been
ated by the shrinking of production as the result of the
ld economic crisis.¹⁵ In spite of this unemployment,
re remain a large number of children working in vari-
; factories.

So far, labor has been poorly organized in Korea; only
ae thirty thousand, or about fifteen per cent, of the
rkers belong to trade unions. Labor, too, is divided by
; policy of discrimination applied by the Japanese em-
yers. Japanese workers are paid for the same jobs twice

¹⁴ Harold J. Moulton, "Japan: An Economic and Financial Ap-
aisal." New York, 1931, p. 67. In 1923 Japan imported from Korea
,389 tons, and produced only 157,706 tons.

¹⁵ In 1933 there were over 700,000 unemployed, but since the boom
the war industries was started, the number of unemployed has
ened.

as much as natives, work shorter hours, and generally enjoy more privileged positions. So far the workers' struggle for a better lot has not been impressive. Strikes, though growing in number and strength, have been mostly ineffective. But, the discontent is decidedly mounting, and already labor, with some support from the middle class, is making efforts to enlist the coöperation of the peasantry. A crisis in Chosen is at hand, and the Japanese administration is visibly nervous.

Finally, what does Korea mean to Japan? It is a valuable source of food supply and raw materials for Japanese industries, and offers a considerable market to Japanese products. It may become an important source of cotton, for the Japanese administration is anxious to develop "the cultivation of cotton in Korea and in Manchuria to such an extent as to end Japan's dependence for that commodity from India and the United States," according to the Governor-General of Chosen, General Ugaki, and the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army, General Konso, at the Economic Conference held at Dairen in 1933. Korea, however, is hardly a land to absorb any excess of population from Nippon, for the very low standard of living does not make the place attractive to Japanese settlers. Those Japanese now found in Korea mostly belong to the non-productive and non-agricultural groups. Out of approximately half a million in 1932, there were 231,591 in the civil service and the professions. There were also 131,865 merchants, and 59,104 workers and middlemen of various kinds. From 55,806 classified as farmers, a good many were not genuine tillers of the land, but owners and exploiters of Korean farm-lands.

Strategically, Chosen is highly important to Japan as the main springboard for operations on the mainland of Asia, especially in the North. As such it served against Manchuria until the occupation of the latter by the Japanese troops. It leads to the Soviet Far East, whether in the Vladivostock direction, from the ports of Yukki, Rassin and Seisin, and then across the River Tumen, or through Manchukuo via the Hoiren-Tunhua-Kirin-Sink-

ing Railway, and then to Harbin or toward Outer Mongolia. It is on the way to China proper, which leads first across the Yalu River that divides Korea and Manchukuo, and then across the Chinese Great Wall.

Korea already has a considerable network of strategic railways and highways, and she is continuing their construction. At least twenty airdromes have been built. A number of radio stations are active. Some of the war industries are being developed: for instance, a number of chemical factories are already in operation to produce nitrates as fertilizers for Korean agriculture, so long as the same product is not needed for making explosives. Reserves of certain raw materials, for instance pig-iron, are being accumulated and stored in Chosen, as this part of the Empire grows in importance as a military base for the planned expansion of Japan.

The Mandated Islands. To these two most important of her colonies—namely, Formosa and Korea—Japan added in 1918 some six hundred and twenty-eight small islands in the South Seas—not to mention numerous coral reefs—with a total population of only a few hundred thousands. The procedure by which this territory was acquired is decidedly interesting. The Marianne, Caroline and Marshall Islands had belonged to Germany and were awarded to Japan under a mandate of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, she held on to them after her withdrawal from Geneva, and this for illuminating reasons. In area they are not significant, occupying as they do only some 829 square miles; nor does their chief interest lie in the revenue they produce through exporting phosphates, coconut, sugar and copra, and the work they consequently give to about thirty thousand Japanese. The important fact for Japan is that these islands control an immense expanse of sea—no less in truth than 1200 miles from north to south and 2500 miles from east to west—thus increasing immeasurably the area controlled by the Japanese navy in the Pacific Ocean. So today the Japanese islands extending from the vicinity of Kamchatka through the Kuriles, the main archipelago, the Likey

Islands¹⁶ and the Pescadores, to Formosa, have another advanced line of defense, formed by the Bonin Islands, or Ogasawara, and these mandated islands of the South Seas. These constitute a virtually impregnable barrier to the approaches to the east coast of Asia. With these two lines of islands and with their naval and air bases, the Japanese navy and air forces are in an extremely strong position, not only to defend the Empire, but also to oppose actively other Powers coming to Asia.

Manchukuo. Being rather well protected from the side of the Pacific Ocean, even before the addition of the mandated islands, and with a solid foothold on the mainland, in Korea and in the Kwantung, Japan started preparations for further expansion.

In 1914, when entering the World War on the side of the Allies, she occupied the German fortress of Tsingtau, and then extended the occupation of Shantung beyond the German leasehold of Kiaochow. When China asked her to withdraw from this Chinese territory, Japan not only refused to comply, but served on her neighbor the imperious document known to the world as the Twenty-one Demands.

On the declaration of war against Germany the Japanese Prime Minister, Count Okuma, stated that the Empire of the Mikado "neither plans to acquire any territory, nor to deprive China or other nations of any of their possessions." It was the same Count Okuma who advanced the Twenty-one Demands, and later sent an ultimatum to force their acceptance. Yuan Shi-kai, then President of China, yielded and signed the agreement dictated by Tokyo. By this "agreement" China "consented" to extend both the lease of the two Liaotung harbors, Port Arthur and Dairen, and the term of the Japanese possession of the South Manchuria and Mukden-Antung railways to ninety-nine years. Furthermore, Japanese subjects were permitted to lease land in Manchuria, to reside and carry on business therein at liberty, and to enjoy other privileges.

¹⁶ Or Riu-Kiu, or Lu-Chu Islands.

The exclusive status thus created for Japan was never recognized as valid by either China or the Powers. The documents were not ratified by the Peking Parliament and therefore, from the point of view of China, have never become legally valid. At the Versailles Peace Conference Japan declared that Shantung should remain under her jurisdiction, but in 1922, at the time of the Washington Conference, consented to return it to China. As for the Twenty-one Demands, Japan was persuaded to drop some of the demands, to modify her stand on Manchuria, and to revise her attitude toward China in general. She also promised at Washington to end her expedition in Siberia, and soon did withdraw her troops from the Soviet Far East, where she had attempted to acquire some advantages as well. Then followed a period of generally peaceful policy. The enormous damage caused by the Great Earthquake undermined Japanese finances, and the government remained for a time in the hands of civilians who sought friendly relations with other Powers.

In 1931 the aggression was resumed more vigorously than ever before. The swift occupation of Manchuria during that year was followed by the annexation of Jehol in the next. The side-show at Shanghai was designed, apparently, to divert the attention of the Powers, who possessed great interests at that port, from the Manchurian affair. The Japanese in that campaign shocked the entire world by their unprecedented disregard for international obligations, their defiance of the League of Nations, by the general cruelty of methods they applied to subjugate the practically defenseless Manchuria, and specifically by their bombardment on land and in the air of a peaceful population. The outcome, as everybody knows, was the creation of the theoretically "independent" state of Manchukuo, which is actually under the complete control of Japan. Exactly what Japan has gained by this it is too early to judge. But one thing, at least, is obvious. Temporarily or permanently, Japan has obtained the control of that part of China which is richest by the measure of favorable foreign trade. In the period of 1920-9, for in-

stance, the commerce of Manchuria with other countries netted the war-lords and other officials—though certainly not the population as a whole—some half billion dollars. So by adding Manchukuo to the Empire—for to all practical purposes this nominally independent state is her colony—Japan has acquired not only thirty-odd million people, but also immense actual and potential wealth and natural resources. She has also added an enormous new area. Manchukuo, which now consists of the former three eastern provinces of China and the province of Jehol, covers over four hundred and sixty thousand square miles or more than twice the extent of Japan proper and her older colonies. With Manchukuo included, the Japanese Empire is stretched to an area more than five times as large as that of the home archipelago.

Politically Manchukuo is now divided into fourteen provinces, of which four, peopled by Mongols, form a special Mongolian group called Hsingan. Geographically the new “independent state” is separated by a 2175-mile border from the Soviet Union on the north and east, adjoins the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R. on the east, and Korea on the south and east, meets the Yellow Sea and China on the south, and abuts upon the Outer Mongolian People’s Republic on the west. In the centre of this enormous country, larger than Germany and France combined, are wide and very fertile plains, surrounded by mountains. In the west the Great Khingan Range edges the high plateau of Barga, which is in Hsingan, the Mongolian “autonomous” territory of Manchukuo, and so separates Mongolia from Manchuria. High ranges are found also in the northeast; and in these and other mountains rise a number of mighty but muddy rivers, including the Amur, which forms the natural boundary between Manchuria and the Soviet Union, its tributaries the Sungari and Ussuri, the Liao River, and the Yalu which separates Manchukuo from Korea. These rivers, flooded in the Spring and Summer during the period of heavy rainfall, irrigate the plains and produce, particularly in the

north, what is considered some of the richest black soil in the world.

The climate of Manchukuo is variegated, for the country extends twenty degrees from east to west, and covers some fifteen degrees of latitude; and with the exception of the southern part, near the coast, it is typically continental. Manchukuo endures severe cold during the winters, which, in the north, can last from three to five months; her rivers are covered with thick ice for three to five months in the central parts, as the River Liao-he, and even for six if not for seven months in the north, as is the case with the Amur.

In spite of the length and severity of cold during the dry Winter, the number of warm and sunny days, plus the rainy season, which usually lasts for three months, beginning in June, are quite sufficient to produce splendid results from the exceptionally fertile soil. In Jehol millet and kaoliang are chiefly raised, while in the rest of Manchukuo the principal crops are soya beans, which cover some thirty-three per cent of the entire area; millet, which covers some twenty per cent; kaoliang, corn, wheat, rice, tobacco and cotton; and a variety of vegetables. The area already cultivated in Manchukuo under various crops is more than three times as large as that used for agriculture in Japan proper, yet there still remains at least as much of good, fertile soil, inviting to immigrants, in lands not yet cultivated at all. This is particularly true of certain parts of the central portion of the country, and in the north, which is sparsely populated and offers immense possibilities.

Certain other parts of this great granary, however, are not so favored: for the great plains of South Manchuria have a number of swamps, and in the neighborhood of the sea, where the soil emits a saline exudation, the land is sterile. In addition, Southern Manchukuo is threatened by erosion and shifting sands; for, driven by dry winds, the great Mongolian desert of Gobi or Shamo is slowly but menacingly advancing in a southeastern direction. The problem thus created is difficult to solve, particularly

in consideration of the deforestation that was permitted in that part of the country during the years of negligence and misgovernment. Though still very rich in forests of larch, pine, birch, poplar, aspen, linden, oak, and so forth, which cover about twenty-five per cent of her entire area, Manchukuo is nevertheless suffering from rapacious exploitation of this wealth in the regions near her agriculturally most valuable plains.

Rich variety in fauna also characterizes the domain of Pu-I. Among the wild animals of Manchukuo are found the tiger, panther and leopard, deer, boar and bear, the hare, wolf, fox, wildcat, sable and marten. Among the birds the Mongolian lark, crane and eagle are common; and pheasants are met in the fields and forests in amazing numbers. Insects are also abundant and make life in the open during the Summer rather hard in certain parts of the country. Rivers and lakes are rich in fish, providing plenty of food for the population and considerable revenue besides.

The population of Manchukuo, including Jehol and Kwantung, was estimated in 1932 by such an authority as Avarin,¹⁷ as over thirty-two millions, but the semi-official Japan-Manchukuo Year Book for 1935 gave the figure for December 31, 1933, as 30,879,717.¹⁸ The discrepancy is curious, for there has been no unusually large emigration from that part of the world, nor any epidemics that could explain such a decrease. Actually there was hardly any decrease worth considering, though it is true that immigration into Manchukuo was almost stopped by the new rulers.

Manchuria, in the years before the Japanese occupation, used to be a land of opportunity for the Chinese, who flocked there in large numbers. The peak of immigration was reached in 1927, when 1,178,254 men and women entered Manchuria, but only 341,959 departed

¹⁷ Avarin, V. "The Independent Manchuria" in the Russian. Moscow, 1934.

¹⁸ To the end of 1935 that population was estimated as 32,869,000. (China Weekly Review, Shanghai, 16-XII-1935.)

after the period of Summer work, thus leaving 836,295 new settlers. Next year the movement began to slow down, and in 1930, the last year before the country was invaded by the Japanese, it had a net increase by immigration of only 250,000. In 1931 the number of those who remained to settle declined to only six thousand; and in 1932 a re-immigration to China proper began, resulting in a loss to the Manchurian population of 84,749.

The peculiar feature of the shifting Manchurian population is that there are far more males than females: in 1932 there were seventeen million men to less than fourteen million women. The overwhelming majority are Chinese; then follow almost one million Koreans, classified by Japan as her subjects, of course,¹⁹ and who live mostly in the east, near the Korean border; 590,760 Japanese; something less than one hundred and fifty thousand Russians, mostly émigrés, some of whom have become naturalized in Manchukuo; and Mongols, numbering hardly more than half a million, including those of Jehol.

In the list of nationalities inhabiting Manchukuo the name of Manchu is hardly found: these original masters of the land are no longer living there in any considerable numbers. After the descendants of the nomadic Tungus, the Manchus, conquered China, and established a dynasty that ruled the Celestial Empire until it became a republic, most of the Manchus moved to China proper, where they were placed to guard the interests of the Emperor. They were assimilated by living among the Chinese. As for those who remained in Manchuria, they were assimilated by Chinese who migrated northward to the lands of the Manchus, and who by now have left practically no trace of the original inhabitants of that region.

Up to the present the attempts of the Japanese to colo-

¹⁹ Majority of those Koreans migrated to Manchuria after their country was annexed by Japan, for many among them wanted to escape the new order. Now a new group of Koreans is coming to South Manchuria with the encouragement of their Japanese masters.

nize Manchukuo have been futile. Long ago, after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan entertained the hope of obtaining in Manchuria an outlet for her excess of population. This dream was never realized. Immigration is usually to be attracted by better opportunities, but the low standard of living of the hard-working Chinese held out no promise to Japanese farmers. Nor was the rigorous climate an attraction. Hence very few Japanese came to live in Manchuria. Before 1931 there were certain restrictions, but since that time the law has been in hands of the Japanese: now there are no restrictions, yet all the efforts of the government at Tokyo fail to bring results. A few hundreds of Japanese reservists,²⁰ armed and without their families, were sent there and offered certain inducements for settling down, but approximately half of them returned to Japan, unable to stand the strain of constant fear of an attack and the rigors of the land. Other groups sent with their families fared scarcely better, and so far the idea of colonizing Manchukuo with Japanese farmers remains nothing but a project, with no particular prospect of improvement in the near future. Manchukuo, in short, has done little or nothing to solve the overpopulation problem of Japan.

Most of the Japanese in Manchukuo at present are the officials or employees of the Japanese or Manchukuoan governments, or of the South Manchuria Railway; or they are merchants and other middlemen. A negligible number settled on the land, and still fewer are tilling the same. Certain Japanese declared quite frankly after the occupation of Manchuria that their compatriots in that country should be the landlords, and leave labor to be performed by the "inferior race" of Chinese. And as landlords or otherwise, the Japanese are already exploiting the population of Manchukuo with thoroughness. More than one half of the farmers are tenants, paying from forty to sixty per cent of their crops as rent; and about fifteen per cent are altogether landless. It may be possible that, as they claim, the Japanese have intro-

²⁰ In 1932 only 450, and in 1933, 500.

duced more order and cut down graft by the corrupt Chinese authorities; but there are no indications that the people at large have benefited. The population of Manchukuo, predominantly agricultural, do not fare any better under the new allegedly enlightened administration of the Emperor Kang Teh, sponsored by Tokyo, and directed by the Japanese "advisers," than they did in earlier days. And that was bad enough.

If one looks at the imposing charts prepared by the Japanese to explain how the administration of affairs in Manchukuo is organized, one might at first draw the conclusion that an independent state really exists. There is the Emperor at the head, who rules through the Cabinet, presided over by the Prime Minister. There is a Minister of Foreign Affairs to deal with the outside world. But one also learns that there is in Manchukuo a person, a general, who singly represents Japan in two capacities. First of all he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung army—that is to say, of the Japanese force, which is in complete control of every branch of the country's life; and secondly he is the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Emperor of Manchukuo, through whom that monarch is supposed to communicate with the Japanese Emperor. But what is the reality? The reality is that the Japanese Vice-Minister who is assigned to the Manchukuoan Minister of Foreign Affairs, nominally as a convenience, is actually the undisputed master. Moreover, similar arrangements are to be found in practically every department of the government, and in practically every branch of the administration. The identity of the true masters of Manchukuo is obvious to any one acquainted with the situation. There are too many Japanese soldiers on the spot to leave any doubts about the correct answer to this rather rhetorical question.

We have seen already that the natural wealth of Manchukuo would alone have been sufficient to win the attention of Japan. Its soil, though far from being developed to exhaustion, and far from modern in its methods of

tillage, is already producing enormous quantities of various agricultural products. These alone constitute some eighty per cent of the quite considerable foreign trade of the country.²¹ In 1932, for instance, Manchukuo exported more than forty-two million piculs²² of soya beans alone. In 1933 her output of wheat was over a million tons, and that of rice about three hundred thousand tons. Cotton, so far, has been produced only in small quantities and is of rather poor quality; but the government has perceived the importance of this staple commodity and established in 1933 a Raw Cotton Association with the object of studying ways and means to raise large quantities by bringing some 750,000 acres of land under cultivation within the next ten years. It was to realize this plan that the Manchukuo Raw Cotton Company was organized in 1934, and the plan is now in operation, though the prospect of producing high-grade cotton in Manchukuo does not seem too promising. It remains to add that forestry, horticulture and stock-breeding also contribute to the revenues of Manchukuo.

As in the case of Korea, the full extent of the natural resources of Manchukuo have not yet been ascertained, but they are undoubtedly very considerable and diverse. The coal reserves have been estimated at over three billion tons, and possibly even four billion, of which about one per cent is anthracite, some five per cent lignites, and the rest bituminous. Fushun, the largest of the operated collieries, has a deposit on the average 150 feet thick, and of over 1,200,000,000 tons; and already it is producing annually some seven million tons.²³

The reserves of iron ores are estimated at between 350 and 400 million tons of known deposits, and possibly as much more in probable reserves. Of a rather low quality, they are produced at heavy cost. The average yearly production of iron ores is already not far from a million

²¹ Almost one billion yen in 1933.

²² A picul is equal to 132.277 pounds.

²³ Export of coal reached 3,345,743 tons in 1932, of which about two thirds to Japan.

tons.²⁴ The production of pig-iron in Anshan and Pensihu amounted in 1932 to 368,000 tons.

In Fushun there are found oil-shale deposits calculated to contain some six and a half billion tons, with about 5.5 per cent oil yield; of these about thirty per cent are at the depth of one thousand feet, and the balance under two thousand feet. But the cost of oil production is very high, and so far the average annual output has amounted only to about seventy thousand tons. It is hoped eventually to increase this output to one hundred thousand tons, but the high cost necessitates limitation; and most of this oil must be reserved for the use of the navy in case of emergency. Besides the metals and minerals already enumerated, there are in Manchukuo gold to the amount of about 3700 tons, magnetite, steatite, quartzite, silica, limestone, lead, marble, and so forth.

Even from this sketchy account of the natural resources of that country one can see the immense importance of Manchukuo for Japan, suffering as the latter does from scarcity of many raw materials. But this new appendage to the Empire is also of no small importance as a market for Japanese goods. Nippon exported to Manchukuo in 1932 some one hundred and forty-seven million yen worth of goods; in 1933, three hundred and three million, and in 1934, four hundred and three million. At the same time Manchukuo exported to Japan in 1932 one hundred and twenty-eight millions' worth, in 1933 one hundred and sixty-eight million, and in 1934 one hundred and ninety-one million. In other words, Japan had each of these years a favorable balance,²⁵ though in the past that trade had usually been favorable to Manchuria. Is this reversal really a blessing to Japan? One may be permitted to doubt; for the exports from Japan to Manchukuo were unusually large in these years, chiefly because of the extensive construction of new railways, highways, airdromes, and so forth, at that time. For this program Japan supplied the materials and machinery; and besides,

²⁴ In 1932 the production reached 993,000 tons.

²⁵ Namely, 18, 135 and 211 million yen respectively.

many of the imported goods came on consignment or to stock newly established Japanese firms in Manchukuo.

The extent to which the new status of Manchukuo favors Japan in the sense of adding to her revenues and to her national wealth is another story. Already it has cost the state of Japan a great deal, without promising dividends in the immediate future. The military occupation has involved heavy expenses; not less costly has been the process of extermination of the so-called bandits. In short, up to the present the entire Manchurian adventure has not been a financial asset to Japan. On the contrary, it is a heavy liability, still draining the Japanese Treasury; though possibly it may bring handsome profits to a few private Japanese entrepreneurs.

Since the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese that country has become an importer with an unfavorable balance. In 1933 her total imports amounted to 514,540,000 yuan,²⁶ with exports totaling only 423,326,000 yuan, though in 1932 the latter amounted to 549,759,000 yuan. Her exports declined very materially because of slow demand and low prices in the world market on her chief export commodity—namely, bean products. How long this will continue it is hard to say.

As for the industries of Manchukuo, Japanese capital is in control of the railroads, about four fifths of the coal, and over fifty per cent of the lumber. Chinese capital still holds its own in the sugar, hanshin, or Chinese liquor, flour-milling and soya bean business. In 1932, out of 2,428,649,000 yen invested in different industries, 72.3 per cent were Japanese; 24.3 Russian, though since the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo Russian interests have become practically nil; 1.4 British, and one per cent each American and French. Out of 3887 plants in 1932, there were 727 under Japanese management and twelve under joint Sino-Japanese management. Since that time a still larger percentage has probably come under full Japanese control.

If, as we have seen, there are certain doubts to be

²⁶ The yuan is almost equal to the yen.

entertained concerning the political and economic advantages accruing to Japan from the new status of Manchuria, the military and strategic importance of Manchukuo to the Japanese Empire cannot be disputed. With complete control of that "independent" state, where no Cabinet Minister has any authority outside of that granted by the Japanese "assistants" and "advisers," the military elements of Japan stationed there are losing no time in preparing that base for possible wars. These military preparations of the Japanese in Manchukuo consist of the building of fortifications, the construction of additional lines in the already well developed net of strategic railways, and the development of new highways, airdromes and radio stations. Chemicals are being produced at Dairen and elsewhere. Metallurgical industries such as the large Showa steel mill, attached to the Anshan iron-works, are being developed. Arsenals at Mukden and other places are in process of enlargement. And new shops are being opened. It is obvious, of course, that these preparations have reference first of all to the northern neighbor, the Soviet Union; but Manchukuo is also a starting point for military operations against China. It can serve, too, as a base for Japan in the unlikely event of a war with England, or in a far from impossible future conflict with the United States. In this new "state" are to be found the raw materials necessary in such emergencies.

Herein, then, lies the chief importance of this new addition to the Japanese Empire—a "state" as yet recognized by no Power except Japan herself and the republic of Salvador. But how certain can Japan be about this "colony"? Much depends on what the Chinese do. The Nanking régime, under General Chiang Kai-shek, has so far been either unable or unwilling to resist Japan's invasion. The resistance offered by the "volunteers" in Manchuria was efficient only to the extent of making the life of the Japanese occupationary forces there very hard and full of danger. Also it made large new investments in any business in Manchukuo unattractive to Japanese

capitalists. But it is not at all improbable that the Chinese population may rise against the invaders.

The overwhelming majority of that population are farmers, of whom probably eighty-five per cent are extremely poor. They are dependent on their almost feudal landlords, and on money lenders, who are usually usurers; they pay to the former forty to sixty per cent of their crops, and the interest on their indebtedness to the latter is so high that these farmers are paupers, constantly in a state of semi-starvation. They live in a very peculiar way, not unlike that of their prototypes in feudal times. Usually the landlord is the owner of the "*impan*," a sort of a castle or fort surrounded by a wall with turrets for guns. The landlord is usually also the banker, the merchant, and sometimes the owner of a mill, a shop or a factory inside the wall. The peasants may also live behind that wall, tilling the lands of their lord, or renting them, always remaining in debt. This defines their relations. They depend on the landlord for their land; he has the store and may grant credit, and he has the pawnshop and may lend money. As a result, the peasants are, with very rare exceptions, at the complete disposal and mercy of the landlords. The landlord is their master. And if the community is large, there are besides numerous middlemen, to whom the peasant must pay in one way or another.

Before the Japanese came, the population had to pay, and to pay heavily, to various war-lords, to their lieutenants, to magistrates and to endless officials. There were taxes officially authorized, and taxes arbitrarily imposed by the local satraps; there were bribes and other forms of graft levied by the corrupt officialdom. Such was the lot of rich and poor alike; but which suffered more it is not difficult to guess.

With the comparatively rapid development of the industries in Manchuria the number of the industrial workers also increased; there were some 650,000 in 1929.²⁷

²⁷ That number apparently included those working on the transportation system.

These were exploited to the extreme. With no labor laws or other protection, they had to work in some instances up to eighteen hours per day, under indescribably bad working conditions; and the percentage of industrial accidents under such conditions was appallingly high. Just as all over China, children were employed in large numbers. All wages were pathetically low; a skilled worker was paid less than seventy-five sen a day, or a quarter of a dollar in American money.

After the Japanese occupation, the graft of bureaucrats of all ranks was said to be cut down. But neither the income of the farmers, nor the wages of the industrial workers have shown any signs of improvement; the standard of living remains as low as ever. And to low wages is now added humiliation, for the Japanese workers are paid about three times as much as the Chinese.

Naturally the discontent is deep and widespread. So far the workers remain officially unorganized, but that does not prevent them from staging strikes, and even winning them once in a while. The farmers have their secret societies, including the "Boxers," famous for the uprising in 1900, the "Big Knives," the "Big Swords," the "Red Spears" and others, but these amount to little so far as real organization is concerned. Numerous malcontents join the "partisans" and some of them merely form gangs of brigands to rob Japanese and Chinese alike. Others have political and social aims. The Japanese call all of them "bandits," though they know quite well that a considerable number are good patriots fighting against foreign intruders, while many are at least trying to secure better living conditions for themselves and their ilk. Thus already the unrest among the agrarian population is taking a more crystallized form. The urban workers are agitating, and there are certain signs that they will soon be better organized too. There is plenty of dynamite in Manchukuo.

Knowing this, and being not altogether satisfied with the results of their adventure in Manchuria in general, the Japanese decided in 1935 to absorb a few more prov-

inces of China. The prolonged world economic crisis and the example of the Italo-Ethiopian War encouraged them to greater audacity. Realizing that under such conditions the other Powers would again be unable to interfere, Japan began the realization of the plan, worked out, apparently, by the staff of the Kwantung army, of carving out of Northern China a new "independent" state, like that of Manchukuo. Chahar and Ningshia in Inner Mongolia, and Shensi, Hopei and Shantung in China proper, were made the objects of these extended operations, and in two at least of these provinces, Hopei and Chahar, the process of forming "independent" governments has begun.

And now what next? To guess the answer one must consult the so-called Tanaka Memorandum; and there are many objectives included in that famous document. It appears to be the bible of the Japanese Empire-builders, and whether the author was Tanaka or somebody else, its prescriptions have so far been strictly followed.



MODERNIZATION OF THE MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE

Political Structure—Division of Power—The Cult of Mikado—The Administrative System—Political Parties—Beginning of Struggle for Power—Compromise Considered Necessary—Yamamoto Scandal—New Tendencies—First Commoner's Cabinet—Admirals and Bureaucrats—Rising Strength of the Bourgeoisie—General Tanaka—The Party Cabinets—People's Voice Silenced—Advent of the Proletarians—"Dangerous Thoughts"—*Army and Navy*—Their Peculiar Rôle—Empire-Builders—The Super-Patriots—Political Assassinations—Hara-Kiri—Japanese Fascism.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

WHEN in 1868 the Emperor Mutsuhito inaugurated the Meiji Era by accepting the restored prestige of the Throne of Japan, he promulgated to the feudal lords assembled in Kyoto the so-called Charter Oath. That document promised the convocation of an Assembly wherein affairs of state were to be "decided by impartial discussion," on the theory that "all administrative matters of state shall be conducted by the coöperative efforts of the governing and the governed."¹ However, for more than twenty years after that the government was in point of fact under an absolute monarch; for the Council of State, recruited from members of the old samurai class, had a purely consultative function.

The Restoration, as we have seen, was prompted by widespread discontent with the political and economic order of the Shogunate. The samurai, constituting about one tenth of the total population, and even some of the daimyo, had been impoverished by the "stagnation" of a

¹ Count M. Soyeshima, in "The Oriental Interpretations." Chicago, 1925.

comparatively peaceful but economically retarded life. They were heavily in debt, and insisted on a change. Peasants, poor, overtaxed and abused by their lords, frequently revolted and sought better conditions. The newly forming class of capitalists also strove for a more liberal trend, because the *laissez faire* attitude was the *conditio sine qua non* of the new economic order that they were anxious to see inaugurated. But, naturally, the Restoration did not completely end the feudal system. Though it was formally abolished in August, 1871, there are remnants discernible in the structure of Japan even now. If an actual revolution occurred, as some students maintain, it was a revolution from the top, engineered by the feudal lords; it did not go to sufficient lengths, and, so far as the interests of the lower classes were concerned, it brought about no far-reaching changes.

In 1878, under the pressure of popular agitation for more democratic rule, local assemblies were allowed to be formed for discussion of local fiscal matters, and in 1889 a Constitution was granted. In the next year the first Imperial Diet was summoned.

This Constitution, drafted by Ito (Hirobumi) after an extensive study of Western systems, was modelled on the Prussian Fundamental Law, but was even less liberal than its German progenitor. Though more or less satisfactory to the upper classes, it excluded from participation in self-government all those who were poor, by the insertion of a clause requiring a rather high property qualification. As a result, in the early years of the "parliamentary" life of Japan only a little more than one per cent of the population had the right to elect or be elected. This was hardly democracy!

Baron Hozumi, the late President of the Privy Council and a leading jurist, once defined the fundamental principle of the Japanese constitutional system as "theocratico-patriarchal-constitutionalism."

Division of power. The very first paragraph of the Constitution declared: "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for

ages eternal." The Emperor was declared, by Article III, "sacred and inviolable." As head of the Empire he combined in himself the rights of sovereignty; legislative power, though with the consent of the Diet; administrative power, through the appointment of the Ministers who form the government; and judicial power as well, since the courts act in the name of the Emperor. In addition the Mikado is Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, with power to declare war or make peace, and to conclude treaties with other nations.

The actual administration of state affairs is delegated by the Sovereign to his Ministers, who, according to the Constitution, must give their advice, yet take full responsibility for the acts of the government, since the Emperor can do no wrong. In other words, Ministers are responsible to the Emperor, not to the Diet and the people. The Ministers form the Cabinet, which is presided over by the Prime Minister, whose duty is to report to the Throne, to convey Imperial orders, and to control the administration of state affairs. The Constitution also provides a purely consultative body in the Privy Council, composed of twenty-six members, including the Ministers, who serve on it *ex officio*. The remaining members of the Privy Council too are appointed by the Emperor, and their function also is to advise the Monarch whenever he desires counsel on state affairs.

Legislation is "entrusted" by the Constitution to the Diet, but in a peculiarly limited form. As Ito himself stated in his "Commentaries," the Diet takes part in legislation, but has no share in the sovereign power. It has power to deliberate upon laws, but none to determine them. To become a law the bills passed by that body must not only be sanctioned by the Throne, but must receive a government order of promulgation and enforcement. It is interesting to note that this promulgation can be delayed indefinitely, as was the case with the Factory Law passed by the Diet in 1911, but promulgated only in 1916. In special cases of urgency, arising while the Diet is not in session, Imperial Ordinances may be issued;

though, if not subsequently approved by Parliament they become invalid.

The Imperial Diet is composed of two Houses. The upper chamber, the House of Peers, is in part nominated by the Emperor, in part hereditary, and in part elective. The House of Representatives is entirely elective.

The Upper House consists of about four hundred members,² of whom not more than one hundred and twenty-five are nominated by the Monarch for meritorious service to the country. Included are a number of prominent scholars, in addition to the four members that are elected by the Academy of Science from within its own organization. The hereditary part of the House of Peers includes princes of the Imperial Family and other titled noblemen, some by virtue of their rank and some chosen by their equals. The third category is elected by the large taxpayers from among their number. Their nomination must be sanctioned by the Emperor. The House of Peers cannot be dissolved by the government, but is prorogued simultaneously with the dissolution of the Lower House.

The Lower House in 1934 was composed of 466 deputies elected by the people for a term of four years. In 1925 the Electoral Law was liberalized to make the suffrage universal for all males over twenty-five years of age.³ Another liberalization of the status of the Diet was gradually introduced as it became customary, though not obligatory, for the appointment of the government to be made upon the recommendation of the leader of the majority political party in the House of Representatives. It follows from this that if a vote of lack of confidence is passed in the Diet the government is expected to resign or to dissolve the Lower House and ask for new elections; but, as we shall see, this is not always strictly applied in practice.

The Constitution prescribes one regular annual session

² In 1934 there were 397 members in the House of Peers.

³ With a few exceptions, one being "people depending upon others for help or support on account of poverty." In 1925 the voting list included over twelve million names.

of the Diet lasting three months, and also provides that in case of necessity the regular session may be prolonged or an extraordinary one convoked. In any case, the Diet must be called into session by the Emperor and cannot assemble without the Imperial order. Should the government prefer to avoid the public deliberations of the Diet, it can govern "constitutionally" in absolute fashion for an indefinite period by repeated prorogations and dissolutions of that body.

The right to initiate legislation is vested in both Houses; but, as we have seen, to become a law each bill must first be sanctioned by the Crown. The Constitution, having been granted by the Emperor, any changes or amendments may be discussed only on His Majesty's initiative. Matters pertaining to the Imperial Family, defined by special law, are out of the jurisdiction of the Diet.

From all this we can see how limited are the rights of the people's representatives in Japan. The Imperial control over the legislative body is further strengthened by the provision that the President and Vice-President of both Houses are to be nominated by the Emperor; in the case of the Lower House three candidates are presented for His Majesty's choice. Members of the government, on the other hand, may at any time take seats and speak in either House, and even may, at their discretion, insist that the deliberations be secret. In fiscal matters the power of the people is apparently more real, for not only the budget but also all extra-budgetary transactions, such as loans, must be submitted to the Diet, and the House of Representatives has priority in that respect. Of course there is a way out for the bureaucracy, even if the Diet does not approve its demands for appropriations; for in such cases the government has the right to spend monthly one twelfth of what was provided by the preceding budget. The inconvenience is obvious, and this arrangement is usually applied only as the last resort in a parliamentary fight.

No description of the political structure of Japan would

be complete without reference to the survival of an old extralegal institution called Genro, or the Elder Statesmen. Since the inauguration of the Meiji Era the most trusted personal advisers of the Emperor, known under that name, have not only helped him to rule the country and to select the official aids, but have sometimes even been the virtual rulers of Japan, or at least have exerted a determining influence upon issues of national and international policy. At the time of this writing there remains only one surviving member of that inner "sacred and secret" circle, which included in the past a number of illustrious names. The last of the Genro is Prince Saionji, the octogenarian statesman (he was eighty-six in 1935), who was several times the Prime Minister, and still is the great, and apparently rather beneficial, influence behind the Throne. The Genro, of course, functioned apart from the constitutional elements of the government, as does the Imperial Household Ministry, which is usually consulted by the Monarch, and is often of the highest importance.

To round out this brief sketch of the "division" of power in the Land of the Rising Sun, it must be repeated that even the juridical function is delegated by the Emperor to the courts, which act in his name. The administration of justice is conducted through district courts, special courts of administrative litigation, prefectural courts, and courts of appeal, with the Supreme Court above them all. The jury system was introduced in 1928 for criminal cases.

The Cult of Mikado. In framing the new order the adherents of the Emperor placed him above everything else, and built the new state so as to make him not only the sublime emblem of the country, but a real head behind which they, the descendants of great feudal lords, might rule. Thus the Restoration of 1868 was in point of fact a reestablishment of Absolutism, and such it remained at least until the Constitution was granted by the Emperor. The Charter prepared by Ito reflected this attitude toward the Sovereign, and accordingly centred in

him a power hardly enjoyed by any other constitutional monarch.

Both the far-flung powers of the Throne and the so-called Cult of Mikado—as the Japanese Emperor is called by the foreigners, though not by the Japanese themselves—are fairly new developments. Contrary to the commonly accepted notion that the Emperor was always worshiped by the Japanese, the historical fact indicates that this was by no means always the case, even though the Sovereign was called in Japan, as in China, the “Son of Heaven” and the “Heavenly Ruler.” These magnificent names for the descendants of gods came into use at the time when, under strong Chinese influence, Japan favored flowery language, rich in ornamentation, but not necessarily reflecting true thoughts and feelings. Actually, as we have seen from the first chapter, the Emperors were not only disregarded, slighted and maltreated by Shoguns and others, but were often very unceremoniously dethroned, exiled, or even assassinated, in numbers unknown to European history.

In the opinion of such an outstanding authority on things Japanese as the late Professor Basil H. Chamberlain,⁴ the Cult of Mikado is a modern invention, a device of our contemporaries, designed to strengthen the existing form of government, to check the growth of democratic ideas, and to develop patriotism of an ultra-nationalistic variety. Endless examples prove how the ruling classes of Japan are inculcating these ideas, and especially how the army and navy officials cultivate the new religion of patriotism based on loyalty to the Emperor.

This new Japanese faith consists of the worship of the Mikado and his divine ancestors, of blind obedience to him as supreme chief of the army and navy—an idea totally alien to the past, when the Emperor was excused from military affairs—and the belief that Japan is as much superior to other nations as her Mikado is superior to other kings and emperors.

⁴ Basil H. Chamberlain, “The Invention of a New Religion.” London, 1912.

Portraits of the Emperor, his decrees, rescripts and other similar objects have been sacrosanct since the Meiji Era. No Japanese is allowed to lift his head and look at the *Tenno* when the latter is appearing in public. No one, certainly, is allowed to speak lightly about His Majesty. How far the supporters of such a worship can go may be judged from the recent case of a prominent Professor of Constitutional Law, (Tatsukichi) Minobe, who was forced to resign from the Upper House for daring to express the opinion that the Emperor is an organ (agent) of the government. Such sacrilege aroused a storm of protests and almost brought about a Ministerial crisis.

"The adepts of this new religion," wrote Professor Chamberlain, "did not find it extra-difficult to make even the outsiders accept their dogma. Europe and America demonstrated a peculiar liking for things exotic and mysterious. They seem to have discovered a new political and moral Eldorado in the far-away Japan, the land of fabulous antiquity and fantastic virtues. There is no lack of persons with pleasant manners who are willing to help those who desire to be directed on that path. Official and semi-official Japan, be it Ambassadors and Ministers, or the peripatetic counts and barons, consider it their duty to disseminate the fable, as pleasant to the national vanity as it is useful in the diplomatic game." Thus many books and pamphlets have been written and lectures delivered in various languages to make foreigners believe in these stories. The task has not been difficult, for the poor foreigner is usually unable to check the well-presented "facts," the Japanese language being almost taboo. Japanese writing, relying on tens of thousands of ideograms instead of the simple Western alphabet of twenty-six letters, alone presents an almost impregnable barrier. Nevertheless, it is not extravagant to suppose that the magic of the Cult of Mikado is already losing its grip on the imagination of Westerners. Nor is there any foundation for doubt that the Japanese people at large are also no longer under the spell of this Cult, in spite of the

frantic efforts of General Araki and similar contemporary leaders.

The administrative system. After the Restoration and nominal end of the feudal system, the clans were deprived of their former authority and their fiefs were reorganized into provinces. At present Japan is divided into forty-seven provinces or prefectures, each under a governor, appointed by, and locally representing, Tokyo. The provinces have their own self-government in prefectural assemblies composed of delegates elected by the suffrage, and entrusted with legislative functions. Some twelve thousand towns and villages also have municipal and village home rule, nominally independent of the central government, but actually controlled by it through a variety of devices. Centrally, the administration of public affairs is in hands of the Cabinet, consisting of twelve Ministries or Departments—namely, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Oversea or Colonial Affairs, Finances, Army, Navy, Justice, Education, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, Railways and Communications. There is no Department of Labor nor of Public Health.

The administration of colonial affairs has many peculiarities unknown in Japan proper. Such colonies as Korea and Formosa are ruled by Governors-General, and the others by governors with very extensive powers, including the right to legislate by ordinances, subject to sanction by the Emperor in case they are proposed as permanent laws. The colonies have no representation either in the Imperial Diet at Tokyo or locally. Even municipal self-administration is very limited, for every step is controlled by governmental organs that include an elaborate system of police and espionage.

Justice is administered in the colonies by Japanese courts, which are not quite identical with those of Japan proper. In addition to the local courts and the high courts of justice that function in all colonies, there are in Korea separate courts of review, though in other colonies these latter constitute a part of the high courts. As for the way

in which justice functions in the colonies, we know already that in other respects Japan has failed to live up to the high purposes officially declared as leading principles of administration when new additions were incorporated in the Empire. Numerous instances of very grave Japanese excesses were frankly admitted even by the highest authorities of the Japanese colonial administration. The entire system is not constructed to preclude such abuses. Natives are not equals of the Japanese; they are deprived of representation and participation in the popular government. Shadowy as it is even in Japan proper, their rights are not equal to those of the Japanese in their own land. Neither do they share equally with the Japanese in the benefits provided by the government. In this connection the inadequate educational facilities allowed to colonials is very significant.

The land policy in the colonies, favoring the Japanese at the expense of the natives, is most detrimental to the latter. In the courts the colonials are at a disadvantage in any litigation where the other party happens to be Japanese. In other words, the colonial administration of Japan in toto is no better, to say the least, than most of its Western prototypes; but there are few cases in which the Westerners deserve definitely higher credit than their ardent imitators.

Political parties. In the strict sense of the term, party or parliamentary government has not yet existed in Japan, although cabinets are supposed to be formed on party lines. So far, in the struggle between democracy and bureaucracy, the latter has emerged victorious almost without exception.

The use of party organization for political struggle was started in Japan some ten years before the Constitution was granted, by the "liberal" Itagaki and the "progressive" Okuma, whose name is better remembered abroad for his "Twenty-one Demands" to China in 1915. Both of these were clan leaders, but advocated the introduction of a representative system instead.

Beginning of the struggle for power. When the first Diet was convoked, the *Jiyu-to*, or Liberal party of Itagaki, and the *Kaishin-to*, or Progressive party of Okuma, gained the majority of seats, and offered such strong opposition to the government and its supporters that it was soon decided to dissolve the Diet. The two factions then merged for a time, and formed the People's party, which continued to fight the stubbornly persisting clannish character of the government and its use of interference and corruption in elections. The government's counter-tactics were dissolution of the Diet, or disapproval of its bills by the Throne.

At the end of the Sino-Japanese War much popular discontent was aroused by the inability of the government to resist the interference of Germany, France and Russia in the settlement. Thus it happened that by 1896 a concession to the democratic forces was considered necessary, and an attempt at reconciliation with them was made by inviting Itagaki, as the leader of the Liberal party, to join the Cabinet of Ito. This was repeated when Okuma, as leader of the Progressive party, was included in the next Cabinet, that of Matzukata. These attempts, however, failed to produce any stable basis for coöperation, and the government turned once more to the dissolution tactics.

The pressure of public opinion then forced the anti-democratic elements to seek a compromise. The suggestion was made to form a "government party" that could rally the supporters of the clans, but this scheme was abandoned as unconstitutional. Instead, another attempt at a "party Cabinet" was made in 1897 by entrusting responsibility jointly to Itagaki and Okuma, who had again merged their supporters into one so-called Constitutional party. This quasi-party Cabinet was duly formed, but it collapsed even before the Diet had time to assemble, because the Minister of Education, Ozaki, dared to discuss in public the hypothetical case of a republican system in Japan.

On the theory that the ensuing scandal justified a re-

action against liberalism, the new Cabinet was formed under Prince Yamagata. This soldier-statesman was opposed to the party system itself—an attitude common in military and naval circles—and selected his Ministers from among the members of his own Chosu clan, which has played a prominent rôle in the army down to the present day, and from the Satsuma which has been similarly prominent in the navy. To give an appearance of respect for the Constitution, an attempt was made to enlist the support of the new Liberal party, the *Kensei-to*. The method applied to that end was corruption. Very clumsily administered, it was quickly exposed, forcing this short-lived Cabinet to give place to a new Ministry under Ito.

Compromise considered necessary. By then Ito was convinced that political parties were a practical necessity, though he himself opposed the idea of making the government responsible to the people, the power of the government having emanated from the Throne. In 1900 he organized a new liberal party, *Rikken-Seiyu-kai*, to replace the discredited *Kensei-to*, and formed his fourth Cabinet out of its adherents. This new attempt to form a Cabinet on party lines was not very successful either. In spite of strong support from the Throne, Ito was forced out, and in June, 1901, the new Ministry of General Katsura was formed, mostly out of younger men, but again representing Yamagata and his clan of Chosu. This was the War Cabinet that remained in power throughout the conflict with Russia. It fell only on account of popular indignation at the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, which ended that struggle but failed to secure for Japan all the rewards expected.

An interesting illustration of the rôle played by the Diet in that period is found in the incident of the opening session in December, 1903. The Speaker of the Lower House, as if solely on his own initiative, read a reply to the Speech from the Throne. In this he condemned, as too lukewarm, the policy of the government in its negotiations with Russia. The unanimous support of the House

proved a convenient and "popular" excuse for greater audacity. For this unusual procedure of answering at length, and criticizing, the Emperor's speech, instead of merely listening to it with solemn reverence and then replying in a stereotyped and respectfully meaningless form, the Diet was immediately dissolved. One is inclined to believe that there was a well-planned and masterfully executed scheme; at any rate, the government obtained the blessing of the "people" for the war, and for a while was relieved of the embarrassing interpellations of the people's representatives.

After the downfall of Katsura's first Ministry a new young statesman came to the fore in the person of Prince Saionji, now the only surviving *Genro*. Saionji had shortly before become the leader of Seiyu-kai, the new liberal party formed by Ito; and he held the Premiership, in non-party Cabinets, alternately with the militarist and bureaucrat Katsura, over a period of more than five years, from 1906 to 1911. The last Cabinet of Saionji collapsed because it came to a head-on collision with the militarists.

Yamamoto scandal. Next came the day of the naval party, and of the Satsuma clan. In 1912 they succeeded in obtaining a Cabinet under Admiral Yamamoto, only to see its inglorious fall in the following year, after a notorious scandal involving high naval officers and boundless political corruption. This sensation had been followed by riots and popular demonstrations forcing a change of government.

Count Okuma, probably in an attempt to appease the public, whose indignation was at a high pitch, denounced Yamamoto in the following terms: "I cannot but admire the thickness of skin upon Prince Yamamoto's face. He has been called thief, liar, and yet persists in disgracing and polluting the honorable post (of the Premiership). If the present Premier at all knows what shame is, he should have bidden farewell to his public career and hidden his face in abashed contrition."⁵

⁵ Quoted from Amos S. and Susan W. Hershey, "Modern Japan," p. 243.

New tendencies. The speaker of these words may also possibly have had some notion of gaining the Premiership for himself. At any rate, the next Cabinet was that of Okuma. It was not a party Cabinet, for the Premier himself had resigned his leadership of the Progressive party long before and did not join any other. But he invited, nevertheless, leaders of two political parties, Baron Kato of the Doshi-kai, which was the bureaucratic party created by Katsura, and Mr. Ozaki of the Chusei-kai, or Parliamentary Club, a small group formed after the split of the Seiyu-kai (then discredited by its support of Yamamoto). Kato became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Ozaki Minister of Justice in the new Cabinet of Okuma. The third party, the Kokumin-to, or the National party, organized in 1910, stayed out of the Cabinet, but its leader, Mr. Inukai,⁶ a friend of Okuma, promised benevolent neutrality. The fourth and strongest party, the Seiyu-kai, was in opposition, and as it commanded a majority, Okuma dissolved the Lower House and appealed to the nation.

The 1915 election, that followed, was marked by considerable improvement, though it was not free of corruption, and it advanced some practices new to Japan. Okuma himself made a tour of the country, speaking before a number of constituencies, and even his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kato, made a public speech, something previously unheard of in Japan. The result was a Diet favorable to the Okuma Cabinet, though the latter was not built on party lines, and remained the instrument of the Genro. This Cabinet survived the scandal caused by the corruption of which the Minister of the Interior was accused, and did not consider itself compromised by the bad impression created in the country by certain unsavory actions in the handling of Chinese affairs, such as the Twenty-one Demands, and the Ultimatum that followed.

⁶ The same Inukai who became Prime Minister in 1931 and was assassinated next year.

In a lecture delivered at the Harris Institute in Chicago, in 1925, Count Soyeshima, a former member of the House of Peers, called this act of Okuma's "most deplorable," but added, apparently with relief, that of these Twenty-one Demands "nothing remains now but two articles and a bad name." How strangely the second part of the quotation reads today! Not only have the Twenty-one Demands been revived and enforced by the energy of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria and Northern China, but they have been followed by other demands, still more amazing and far-reaching than those presented by Okuma in 1915.

First Commoner's Cabinet. Late in 1916 Okuma resigned, to be succeeded by a typically bureaucratic government formed, at the command of the Genro, by General Count Terauchi, the right hand of Prince Yamagata and representative of the military clan of Chosu. That was the time of the World War, and so a militarist, possibly, was considered in order. Terauchi's main concern was promotion of the purely technical and professional efficiency of the army. But when the war was over, and the fat years of war orders gave place to the lean years of industrial crisis, Terauchi was not the right man to stay. The rice riots forced him out, and late in 1918 Mr. Hara, a commoner and a party man, for he was the leader of the Seiyu-kai, was named Premier.

Undoubtedly this was a victory for the democratic principle, even though Hara was not allowed by the Genro and the militarists to do all he wanted. Whatever his own feelings in the matter may have been, it was during his Premiership that the inglorious intervention in the internal affairs of Russia was carried on. It is true that this was engineered by the militarists. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in certain other instances Hara acted quite as undemocratically as his avowedly undemocratic predecessors, and his own Minister of Home Affairs, Tokonami, was a typical bureaucrat. However, it was Hara who succeeded—under pressure of public opinion—in passing a bill liberalizing the electoral law by reducing

from ten to three yen the minimum annual tax the payment of which was required for admission to the polls.

Admirals and bureaucrats. Late in 1921 Hara was assassinated, and after a short-lived Cabinet headed by that Takahashi who was Minister of Finance in several Cabinets and was assassinated in 1936 by super-patriots, another non-party man was made Prime Minister. This was Admiral Kato, representing the navy stronghold, and it was he who, as Minister of the Navy, represented Japan at the Washington Conference, and signed for his country the agreement providing for limitation of naval forces and other restrictions designed to check her policy of expansion in China and elsewhere. It is difficult to say whether this was a sacrifice on the altar of post-war public opinion, or merely a sober realization of the desirability of cutting down expenses at the time when the country was economically affected by the slump that followed the abnormal and therefore unhealthy boom of wartime orders. Whatever the reasons, Admiral Kato signed the Washington treaties, making in the name of his country many promises by which Japan hardly contemplated abiding, as facts later proved.

After the death of Admiral Kato the Genro recommended to the Throne the appointment of the same Admiral Yamamoto, of whose scandalous Ministry we quoted the words of Count Okuma. In spite of the vigorous opposition of the press, backed by popular indignation and disapproval, Yamamoto was made Premier; and the nation swallowed the appointment, for it came on a day after the great earthquake of 1923. Thus the moment was not opportune for a political struggle, as the nation was absorbed by attempts to repair the damages wrought by that calamity. The Cabinet was short-lived: after a period of terror, the main victims of which were the Koreans, chosen as scapegoats, it was forced to resign when a young fanatic made an attempt to assassinate the Prince Regent. The next Cabinet, headed by an uncompromising bureaucrat, Viscount Kiyoura, was greeted by united condemnation. The Diet was dissolved, but the

new election showed very clearly that the people were against that kind of a government, and Kiyoura resigned.

Rising strength of the bourgeoisie. It began to look as if a continuation of these desperate attempts by the aristocrats and bureaucrats to resist giving power to the representatives of the people would be useless; but the Throne, or rather the Genro, was still unwilling to sanction the formation of a purely party government. Instead, the task was once again entrusted to a bureaucrat, Count Kato, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kato was at the same time the leader of the Kensei-kai, the party born out of the Doshi-kai. This was not a government strictly representing the clans, for its Ministers were drawn from financial and industrial circles; four of them were directly connected with the great firm of Mitsubishi, which supplied the financial backing to the Kensei-kai. It was to a certain extent a liberal Coalition Cabinet, though not yet a party Cabinet. Representing, as it did, the "third element," this Ministry was a step ahead in the parliamentary struggle, for it demonstrated that the remnants of the feudal aristocracy had at last been forced to give cognizance to the bourgeoisie.

For the aristocrats this step ahead was not as difficult to make as might appear. A great part of the bourgeoisie were descendants of the samurai class. Doubtless they had undergone considerable changes in mental and social set-up under pressure of the time, and it is true that the new economic order and progressive ideas promoted by the bourgeoisie were formerly opposed by the courtiers and bureaucrats of noble birth. But these two groups were no longer irreconcilable; their interests coincided again on many points, and now that they were facing growing opposition from the lower classes, they found it not too hard to patch up their differences and act jointly against the common "enemy."

The next Cabinet, that of Wakatsuki, was to a certain extent a party Cabinet, for its Prime Minister was a Kensei-kai man who carried on the struggle for a parliamentary régime. But in 1927, on the crest of the financial

crisis, the militarists returned to power. The World War increased the strength of the bourgeoisie partly because the military, staying out of the war, were reduced to a rather passive rôle, and the former became more important as their activities resulted in a spectacular boom. But when the war was over, an industrial and economic crisis ensued, and the prestige of the bourgeoisie suffered.

General Tanaka. The new Ministry of General Tanaka, a Chosu man and a loyal disciple of Marshal Yamagata, was therefore militaristic and ultra-reactionary. To gain his victory Baron Tanaka resigned from the army to become the leader of the Seiyu-kai; and this he did not on account of party zeal but for the purpose of using a party machine to gain ends designed by the army people themselves. Consequently General Tanaka's Premiership was a time of increased militaristic vigor, paving the way to a resumption of aggression on the Asiatic continent. Indeed, it was during Tanaka's régime that the grave Marshal Chang Tso-lin incident occurred in Manchuria. This former leader of *khonghouzes*, or brigands, who had participated on the Japanese side in the Russian War, and since then had been a protégé of Japan, met "sudden death" on June 4, 1928, below a railroad bridge under Japanese control.⁷ No report of any kind was ever published by either the Tanaka or the Hamaguchi Cabinet, and the episode remains a blot on Japan's record in Manchuria.

Two party Cabinets. The Chang Tso-lin incident, the failure of the Shantung adventure, and a scandal concerning party funds, combined to force the resignation of Tanaka's Cabinet. It was followed by two "party" governments headed successively by Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi. Both were leaders of the Kensei-kai, now renamed Minsei-to, and their accession to power created a distinctly erroneous impression of the strength and policy of Japanese liberalism, both abroad and at home. The fact was that the name of Liberalism was being used as a

⁷ Takeuchi, Tatsuji, "War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire." New York, 1935, pp. 281-7.

screen, necessitated by the first years of the world economic crisis, while the most aggressive elements were engaged in hatching the Manchurian adventure. When the latter was started in September, 1931, the liberal party men were unceremoniously relieved of power, which was again given to "the more resolute people." Hama-guchi, however, did not live to see this turn of events. He had been shot in November, 1930, and died of his wounds shortly afterwards, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shidehara, having acted as Premier during Hama-guchi's illness.

People's voice silenced. Inukai, the former leader of the Kokumin-to, or National party, and once almost a radical, was now the leader of the Seiyu-kai. He became Prime Minister in December, 1931. Nominally his Cabinet represented the Seiyu-kai, but for all practical purposes there was hardly a trace of party government; this Ministry was the obedient servant of militarists and jingoes.

At about this time certain super-patriotic secret societies made a dramatic entrance into the political arena. On May 15, 1932, Inukai was assassinated by a gang of this kind on the grounds that this civilian, with a radical reputation, was too mild in handling affairs of the state at the hour of its rising glory, and was hindering the more audacious descendants of the samurai. However, the *coup d'état*, planned by advocates of complete abolition of the parliamentary system and of other Fascist-like reforms, was frustrated by the vigilance of the police; and a new Ministry on "national lines" was formed, by advice of the Genro Prince Saionji, under the mildly liberal Admiral Saito.

When Saito asked the Emperor to relieve him from the Premiership on account of the exposure of a scandal in connection with the Bank of Taiwan, in which some of his colleagues were involved, his resignation was accepted. Another Cabinet, on similar lines, was then formed under the retired Admiral Okada, and continued the same policy without the slightest pretense of being a party government. Perhaps this was just as well, for

the disregard of the party system was no real loss to the people. Japanese political parties have been characterized as "aggregations of job-seekers, avaricious and corrupt. They play the political game for selfish purposes and are utterly devoid of principles. . . . Today they are tools of the oligarchs, paid for their coöperation, and working the vengeance of refusal to vote right when not paid."⁸ This sounds a somewhat too sweeping generalization, as if such characteristics are specifically Japanese, which is not exactly so. But still it conveys the idea that the parliamentary system does not work satisfactorily in Japan either.

Advent of the proletarians. In this discussion of the history of political alignments in Japan no mention has yet been made of those new parties which represent labor and the farmers. A great number of such organizations already exist, and they will be discussed more fully in the chapter devoted to the social questions. Their rôle in the parliamentary struggle has so far been mostly indirect, though in 1927, after the introduction of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, eight delegates of these proletarian labor and farmer parties were sent to the Diet. Immediately the ruling classes provided various devices to prevent, or at least to check, the encroachment upon the Parliament by these "undesirable elements," and after the 1930 election the "radicals" retained only five seats in the Lower House. One of these devices was the Public Safety Law, introduced by Tanaka, and the other the famous law against "Dangerous Thoughts," the application of which by the ever-obliging police has contributed not a few stains on the reputation of Japan as a modern state.

Dangerous thoughts. The phrase "dangerous thoughts" is defined in an amazingly arbitrary way by the police,⁹

⁸ Harold Scott Quigley, *Proceedings of the Institute of Charlotteville*, 1935.

⁹ "A communist is anyone who seeks to change the Constitution, so also are all Koreans and Formosans who seek independence, all labor leaders who stir up strikes, all students who peruse Karl

and what happens to those unfortunate enough to be suspected of entertaining such thoughts may be illustrated by the really shocking experience of an Englishman who had taught for ten years in one of the colleges of Tokyo. This Englishman, according to the unimpeachable *Manchester Guardian*,¹⁰ was arrested, imprisoned and tortured for his "radicalism," the accusation being based on his alleged contribution of a small amount of money to help a certain radical cause. The man was "examined" for two months by the Japanese police, who early informed him that "he would see for himself that tales of police torture were untrue, as he would never be forced to say anything." Here is one passage, from among many given by the *Manchester Guardian*, telling how Mr. B. saw for himself that tales of Japanese brutality and police torture were untrue:

"My continued silence caused him to start kicking me on the leg, smacking my face, and punching my ear. . . . Finally, turning to the examiner, he said: 'It is no use being gentle with this beast,' and going out of the room soon returned with a baseball bat. . . . He made me sit straight on the chair, asked the question once more, and when I did not answer gave me a crack across both legs above the knees with the bat. The question was repeated again and again, each time with a blow on the legs or thigh. . . . This process continued from 11 A.M. till about 8:30 P.M. Two days later. . . . the detectives came with a bamboo fencing stick and. . . started whacking me with the stick across both legs, asking 'From whom did you get them?' [the radical newspapers]. The question was repeated without any variation by both of them so many times that I thought something would snap in my mind. . . . The next day came the assistant chief of police. . . and. . . gave me two ringing smacks across the face. . . got the baseball bat and just hammered me on right leg and thigh. He got me by hair and banged my head again and again against a cupboard."

Marx. And so is anyone, no matter on what continent he may reside, who gives food, shelter or encouragement to any of these communists," writes H. E. Wildes in his "Japan in Crisis," New York, 1934, p. 99.

¹⁰ July 26, 1934.

This was by no means an isolated case for which individual sadistic detectives might be held responsible. Arrests for alleged radicalism have been daily occurrences in the recent years of red-baiting hysteria in Japan, though, naturally, most of the accused are the Japanese "reds" and not foreigners. The victims include a large percentage of professors, teachers, and students of all social strata, including the scions of aristocratic families, and people close to the government and even to the Court. From the frequency of such cases one is justified in concluding that the government is doing little, if anything to stop these abuses. The police in Japan have extraordinarily broad powers, and are too unrestricted in their methods, making quite unadvisable any interference by politicians. The members of the Cabinet and minor bureaucrats usually prefer to refrain from reprimanding this omnipotent arm of the government.

ARMY AND NAVY

Their peculiar rôle. One of the important individualities of the Japanese government is the right of the Ministers of the Army and the Navy to make direct reports to the Emperor, without previously consulting the rest of the Cabinet. This arrangement, similar to that which existed in pre-war Germany, was secured in 1895 by Prince Yamagata, the most powerful Genro and leader of the military clan of Chosû. Another provision, that Ministers of these two departments must be selected from the highest-ranking officers of these respective services, makes the rôle of these branches of the government paramount. From this it may be seen that by simply declining to participate in a new Cabinet, or by resigning from the existing one, military people can virtually control the very life of the government. Count Kiyoura, for example, failed to organize a Cabinet because he was unable to persuade any admiral to take office after his refusal to accept the navy's demands for large construction appropriations. Similar experience came to Mr. Hirota, when forming his Cabinet after the ghastly series

of assassinations on February 26, 1936, of which we shall say more in another chapter.

Besides this peculiar rôle of the Ministers of the Army and the Navy there are the Supreme Military Council (*Gunji-Sangi-in*) and the Council of Marshals and Admirals (*Gensui-fu*), which are a sort of a military counterpart of the Privy Council. The policies of national defense are formed by them and presented to the Throne by the Ministers of the Army and the Navy.

Empire-builders. Surviving from the old days of the Shogunate, when military chieftains were omnipotent, there is still much of the feudal atmosphere left in Japan. As we have seen, the military people have navigated the ship of state, with a few exceptions, ever since the Restoration nominally ended the predominance of the clans. These modernized samurai started their country on the road of aggression almost immediately after bringing about the change they had planned, and instituted themselves not only defenders of the Throne, but Empire-builders. It cannot be denied that they succeeded in acquiring more lands for their country; and their military exploits served to advance their nation to the position of a great Power. But they also were responsible for creating numerous enemies to the régime, both among their own people and among the foreigners, whom, after a period of years of polite diplomacy bordering on humility, they decided to defy in a most unprecedented way. Not only did they abandon any pretense of courtesy, but they have ignored all established rules of international intercourse, defying the League of Nations, of which Japan was a charter member, and unilaterally repudiating international obligations contracted in treaties on which the ink of the Japanese signatures has hardly had time to dry.

The super-patriots. As the army is not supposed to mix in politics, the military statesmen have been forced, in furthering their policy of domination, to rely on the aid of secret organizations, and to coöperate with various super-patriotic groups. Of these there has never been a scarcity in Japan.

In the early years of her parliamentary life the elections in Japan were marked by violence and disorder. The use of brutal force by the supporters of candidates for election was, possibly, the least of its objectionable characteristics. Not unusual in other countries in their early histories, this was quite natural in Japan, where the two-sworded samurai were always ready to abuse these emblems of their pride. Thus a special kind of "political workers," a class of rowdy youth or hooligans, named *soshi*, came into existence. "Taking all politics to be their province, they used to obtrude their views and their pressure on Ministers of state, and to waylay, bludgeon and knife in hand, those whose opinions on matters of public interest happened to differ from their own."¹¹

Far from disappearing from the scene of modern Japan, these *soshi* and the *ronin* (masterless-men in the past; political adventurers prone to violence in the present) are active even today, though in disguise. Now they act as super-patriots, members of numerous secret societies, such as *Kokurui-kai*, or the "Black Dragon," and the *Kokuhon-shia*, or "National Foundation," led by such "super-gangsters," to use the definition of Upton Close,¹² as Toyama (Mitsuru), or Uchida (Ryohei) and their like; or the Association of the Retired Officers, the Veterans' Association and others, led by such distinguished officers of high rank as the former Minister of War, General Araki, the leader of the aggressive elements and idol of the young officers of Japan. Most of these organizations are supported financially by patriotic millionaires, and encouraged by certain aristocrats occupying high positions. One such is the President of the Privy Council, Baron Hiranuma, elevated to this high post after the mutiny of February 26, 1936, and who is considered among the possibilities for the rôle of a Japanese Hitler.

Some of these organizations have contacts with the political parties, or at least with their individual mem-

¹¹ Basil H. Chamberlain, "Things Japanese," p. 135.

¹² Upton Close, "Challenge: Behind the Face of Japan." New York, 1934, pp. 128-142.

bers; but as a rule they are opposed to anything identified with the Diet or with democratic ideas in general. They use, as a matter of demagoguery, certain slogans that sound not only democratic but sometimes even radical and revolutionary, but for no other purpose than to attract wider support to their "noble" aims.

Political assassinations. As in the past, when assassination of rivals was an accepted method, even though otherwise violence was frowned upon, political murders have been common in modern Japan. But recently, as the struggle between classes has intensified and the use of force has become the main argument in the foreign policy of the country, political assassinations have become more frequent than before. Taking the law into their own hands, the modern *soshi* have in the years between 1930 and 1936 eliminated by that method a number of politically important figures, including the Prime Ministers Hamaguchi and Inukai, the former Premier Admiral Saito, the former Ministers of Finance Inouye and Takahashi, a prominent banker, Baron Dana, and many more, while numerous other plots for assassination were discovered and frustrated. In practically every one of these crimes army and navy men participated, but their genesis was traceable to the super-patriotic secret societies. The startling murder of General Nagata by his subordinate, a colonel with a personal grudge as well as political motive, and the still more sensational killing of General Watanabe by the rebellious soldiers on February 26, 1936, indicated that this scourge has already penetrated into the life of the army to the extent of undermining discipline and demoralizing the personnel.

Hara-kiri. A word should here be said in reference to the act of ceremonial self-destruction famous to foreigners under the name of *hara-kiri*, though *seppuku* is the term more generally heard in Japan. This method of suicide by slitting the belly to the accompaniment of an established ritual originated in the ancient code of honor of the military caste of Japan, and was obligatory upon persons of noble birth when the alternative was the common

executioner. It could also be a voluntary deed, to be performed when trouble made life hopeless or honor was gone, and it was sometimes employed as a heroic protest—when other means of protest were unavailing—against the erroneous conduct of a living chief. And yet again *seppuku* was a means of demonstrating loyalty to a dead superior, as in the cases of General Nogi and his wife after the death of the Emperor Meiji, or of Baron Ikeda after that of Yoshihito. Obligatory *seppuku* is now quite extinct, while voluntary *seppuku* is rapidly dying out, though now and again a good deal of attention is attracted by the occasional exceptions. But political assassination is definitely on the increase!

Japanese Fascism. The struggle of the military and their supporters with the political parties gradually developed into a pre-Fascist movement. For a quarter of a century political life had been controlled by Marshal Prince Yamagata, the régimes of Generals Katsura and Terauchi being typical of this state of affairs. But the other Ministers of that period were hardly less completely directed by the old Marshal and his followers representing the military and monarchist elements. The short intervals of the quasi-party and non-military Cabinets of Hara, Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi were used, as we have seen, only to accumulate more forces to support the militarists in newly developing situations.

The Russo-Japanese War and the growth of the army naturally added new elements, from outside of the Chosu clan, to the military establishments.¹³ The descendants of the feudal aristocracy were no longer numerous enough to retain their monopoly; other classes had to be admitted, and the army became less exclusive in composition. Commoners came into it, and clan interests no longer had decisive importance. New times, new participants, dictated new tactics.

General Tanaka, as we have seen, gained the Premiership by joining a political party. He became leader of

¹³ By now there are about 300,000 men in the army at its peace footing. With reserves a field army of about three million is possible.

the Seiyu-kai. Thus the military started to learn new methods and to apply new tactics. Participating in parliamentary life, they soon discovered not only that many politicians were corrupt, and that parliamentary practices were abused, but that the Diet itself had degenerated into little more than a platform for endless and fruitless discussion. Brought up for action, not for discussion, the military people resented this condition. Being for years devotees of Germany, as exemplified by an army of which their own was a replica, they embraced the Prussian ideal of "Might is Right." And the Japanese military soon became disciples of the new political philosophy of Nazism too.

Because it is by nature ultra-nationalist, Fascism cannot be merely transplanted from one country to another. Nazified for Germany, it must be Nipponized for Japan, and this process of Nipponization is apparently taking place now. The fundamental credo of every brand of Fascism that one's own nation is the best, the chosen of the gods, with a Messianic aim to realize, fits perfectly the Japanese idea—not shared by all Japanese, of course,—that their nation is blessed by the deities and governed by the descendants of Heaven. For many years General Araki and other super-patriots have been busily engaged in propagating the Mikado Cult, and inculcating into the credulous minds that their divine duty is to extend the benevolent and righteous rule of their Sovereign all over the world. Among the numerous writings of General Araki, incidentally, is one entitled "The Problems of Japan in the Showa Era," in which he solemnly but unconvincingly elaborates upon the idea of the so-called Tanaka Memorandum.

General Araki was for several years the director of the Military School, so it is not surprising that many young officers who have been his pupils are also the earnest disciples of his political doctrines. These are in alignment with the tenets of various super-patriotic societies. Consequently many among these young officers show definite inclination toward a Japanese brand of Fascism, and

constitute the basic material liberally used by the builders of a movement that has already begun to show its ugly face in the Land of the Rising Sun.

If this movement is not yet in control of the country, it is partly because the financial capital in Japan still enjoys almost unrestricted *laissez faire*, and does not feel inclined to allow those demagogues, who are shouting anti-capitalist slogans for expediency's sake, to get control of the government even "by proxy." On the other hand, apparently, the Court is not at present inclined to allow now such a sweeping change as the extremists among the military men recommend, for there is no certainty of the results.

The main political parties are not irreconcilable antagonists of the militarists, even though they irritate the latter by excessive talking; they support the army and navy, even though they occasionally make fruitless attempts to cut down the unduly swollen budgets for these branches of the government. Of course, one notable rivalry still persists. The Seiyu-kai, financed by the firm of Mitsui, theoretically represents the army and the Chosu clan and is supported by the majority of the agrarian landlords; while the Minsei-to, financed by the rival house of Mitsubishi, still to some extent represents the navy, the Satsuma clan and the industrialists. But the rivalry of these two parties is waning under pressure of new political forces which both must fight. Thus more and more party people are joining various new political formations with pro-Fascist leanings; and thus too the erstwhile political opponents of the clansmen find it easy to align with the modernized, and partially democratized, descendants of the same clansmen who wear army or navy uniforms, and participate in political life on a new plan. This process of amalgamation is on, and—like the influence of Prince Saionji—is obviously one of the chief factors to retard the coming of Fascism to Nippon.

The present program of the militarists of Japan is based on the assertion that the army is the most advanced element in the nation, and must control the life of the

country. In other words, they argue that the chief task of today is the creation of a great colonial empire, and that to this aim the entire life of Nippon must be subordinated. To achieve this the rôle of the state in controlling the nation's economic life must be increased; the agrarian crisis must be overcome, for otherwise it may develop into a revolution; and above all, the "red" menace must be liquidated at any cost. The non-military pro-Fascist groups, with their chief exponent (Kenzo) Adachi, go even further. They elaborate this crudely reactionary and chauvinistic policy by urging still more uncompromisingly the ascendancy of the ruling classes, and resistance to the revolutionary tendencies gaining force among workers and farmers.

They too approve the aggressive imperialistic policy abroad, sanction colonial expansion in general and the Pan-Asiatic movement in particular; and they stand strongly for the monarchical régime in its unlimited, absolutist form, therefore opposing parliamentarism and relying on the army as the real basis for the military monarchy.

Sometimes people ask if the present political situation is not one of actual military Fascism. The answer is, Not exactly. As yet the militarists are merely the strongest forces in a government whose power is nominally divided between the Crown, the Genro, the Privy Council, the Army and Navy, the Cabinet, and the Diet. The latter, at least nominally, represents the political parties and through them the people.¹⁴ With the arrival of full-blown Fascism the army, with certain outsiders participating, would become the sole power. In that event, probably neither the living conditions of the people nor the policy

¹⁴ The 1936 elections were marked by a swing against militarism. The Seiyu-kai lost 68 seats, leaving it with 174 out of the 466; the Minsei-to gained 78, giving it 205 members. Two groups with Fascist inclinations dropped ten seats. The "proletarians" increased their membership from three in the old Diet to 23 in the new; and the "independents" increased from 8 to 29.

The results of these elections, apparently, precipitated the abortive *coup d'état* staged by the militarists on February 26, 1936.

of Japan abroad would be greatly changed. The former could hardly be made worse, and, judging by the Italian and German experiments, would not be improved by Fascist methods; while the latter would be affected only if, to the aggression in China, the militarists added a major war with the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. But it would most probably precipitate a social revolution by making the existing contradictions sharper and the general crisis in Japan more acute.

CHAPTER V



THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION

The Rapidly Growing Industry—The Dwindling Agriculture—
The Unstable Finances—The Highly Developed Transportation System—Governmental Subsidies, and the Control of Economic Life—The Extremely Aggressive Trade.

IT was upon a weak economic foundation that Japan started her ambitious plan of building a colonial empire, for she relied upon an antiquated agrarian system and upon handicrafts and home industries on a small scale. Soon after the Restoration of 1868 she entered an extremely difficult period of her economic history. Energetically reshaping her national policy to stress on rapid industrialization, she soon discovered that her own resources were inadequate for a large-scale modern industry designed for foreign trade. Her area was limited, precluding any real extension of agriculture, and the domestic market was narrowly restricted. Hence it was obviously imperative, in spite of all obstacles, to look to exports, and even large-scale exports, to absorb the products of growing industry.

The rapidly growing industry. By incorporating Formosa, Korea, Kwantung and Southern Sakhalin into the Empire, Japan acquired not only the much larger sources of food and raw materials that she needed for her industries but also control over the production of many new millions of workers. As a result, Japan was able to accumulate, between the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894 and the beginning of the World War, a large capital in money and industrial equipment. By the latter part of 1916 Japan was already producing annually over one billion five hundred million yen worth of manufactured goods, and so was able to offer her industrial

facilities to help the Allies, and to provide various goods that the latter urgently needed.

Accepting numerous large orders for war materials and other commodities, Japan expanded her industries to cope with these new demands. By the end of the war she was producing 7,387,000,000 yen worth of goods, or almost five times as much as she did at its outbreak. But with the signing of the Armistice the war boom abruptly ended. The hastily enlarged, and therefore unhealthy, industrial structure of Japan was left without adequate orders, and collapsed, causing an acute crisis.

It is true that Japan's financial strength by that time had been materially increased. During the war the large banks had more than doubled their capital,¹ and deposits were four times larger;² but there was no market to dispose of the manufactured goods of the unduly expanded industrial machine. More than ever before it became obvious to what extent modern Japan must rely on foreign countries for her economic welfare. In her case the interdependence of the economic units of the present-day world was probably more evident than in any other. Japan had, and still has, to import large quantities of the basic raw materials indispensable to modern industries, yet scarce in her own domain.³ She also depends on foreign markets for exports to a much larger degree than other countries. Her population, poor and therefore with a low standard of living, is not a good customer for the large-scale industry that Japan has developed. That is why the percentage of production for export is so abnormally high in Japan; for instance, more than a quarter of the textiles and over eighty-five per cent of the total raw silk produced in the country was exported in 1929;

¹ From Y. 615,000,000 up to Y. 1,276,000,000.

² From Y. 2,200,000,000 up to Y. 9,300,000,000.

³ Japan has to import 100 per cent of wool that she consumes; 100 per cent of cotton (10 per cent of it comes from Korea); 100 per cent of nickel; 95 per cent of aluminum; 87 per cent of oil; 88 per cent of lead; 62 per cent of zinc; 69 per cent of iron ores; 48 per cent of pig-iron, and 25 per cent of steel. (Yujini, "Japan," p. 11.)

while the export of cotton fabrics, according to Miss Utley,⁴ rose from forty-one per cent of the total production in 1931 to over sixty per cent in 1932. In general, much more than twenty per cent of the total production goes abroad, as compared with less than ten per cent exported from the United States in normal times.

As for the extent to which industrial production of Japan has grown in recent years, it may be judged by the fact that in 1894 her exports amounted to hardly more than fifty million dollars' worth; while in 1913 they came to over three hundred millions, and in 1919 to more than a billion dollars, with a correspondingly spectacular rise in imports. The peak was reached in 1925, when her total foreign trade was almost two billion and a half dollars.

It was the constant concern of Japan in the past that she must depend on foreign countries for the bulk of her raw materials. Most of her cotton came from the United States, Egypt, or India; her oil from North America and the Dutch Indies; her wool from Australia; and her rice from Burma or Siam. After annexing Formosa and Korea she succeeded in reducing her enslavement to the foreign markets, especially so far as foodstuffs were concerned.⁵ Now, with the growth of her control over the economic life of China, Japan is planning to increase her imports of cotton from that country, and is already encouraging by various means the further cultivation in China of this staple commodity. Apparently she contemplates reducing, if not ending, her dependence on the United States and other foreign sources for this important raw material. There is also a marked improvement in Japan's position regarding oil; for now, in case of emergency, she could place considerable reliance on the shale-oil deposits of Manchukuo, besides those of Sakhalin and Formosa. The wool from Australia may be soon replaced by that from Inner Mongolia. But while the dependence of Japan on the outside world for food and raw materials has already

⁴ F. Utley, "Lancashire and the Far East," London, 1931.

⁵ From Korea Japan also imports about 10 per cent of the cotton. From Sakhalin and Formosa she receives some 10 per cent of oil.

been much decreased by the extension of her colonial possessions, her markets are a different matter.

The new additions to her Empire gave Japan an extended market, but one with very limited purchasing capacity. The standard of living of the colonials being even lower than that of the Japanese themselves, they were far from capable of absorbing all that Japan wanted to sell. She still needed more foreign markets; but in embarking upon an aggressive trade policy she encountered stubborn competitors, and soon found herself at economic war with older exporting nations.

After the post-war crisis of 1919-21 Japan resumed her industrial development, but in 1923 the Great Earthquake wrought havoc to all her policies. All plans had now to be reshaped so as to meet the emergency. Much was needed for the reconstruction of ruined and badly damaged cities and villages, and plenty of energy was directed to that end. Nevertheless, Japanese industry continued to grow rapidly up to 1929, when the world-wide economic crisis hit Japan and other countries alike. But the expansion of Japanese industry was merely temporarily retarded. It soon renewed its advance to meet the extraordinary situation born of the Manchukuoan affair.

If before 1894 Japan had very little that was comparable with the modern industries of the Western countries, there were by 1900 some seven thousand factories in Nippon employing almost four hundred thousand workers. In 1920 the number of industrial enterprises, not including those that employed less than five workers each, had risen to forty-six thousand, and the number of workers, excluding those in mining and government enterprises, had increased to 1,742,000. In 1932 the number of large and medium-sized enterprises had risen to 67,318 but with about the same number of operatives as in 1920. The years that followed were marked by the continuance of industrial activity, stimulated by a munitions boom and by aggressive foreign trade. Naturally, the process of further industrial expansion was not checked. The tempo, indeed, was remarkable, and the results quite imposing.

However, a number of unfavorable characteristics were permitted to remain in the structure of that young industrial country. These we shall consider now.

One of these peculiarities of Japan's economic structure is the unusually high percentage of so-called "light" industry, or that producing consumers' goods; the textile and food industries account for sixty per cent of the total number of workers employed, and represent over fifty-five per cent of the total value. The result is that heavy industries, such as metallurgy and machine-building, have a secondary rôle in the national economy, caring for only eighteen per cent of the workers and contributing less than sixteen per cent of the total value. This leaves the country greatly dependent on foreign markets for many important items, including some that are indispensable in case of such an emergency as war.

The textile industry of Japan alone employs some forty-two per cent of workers that are classified as industrial, or almost three times as much as England's eighteen per cent, and more than four times Germany's eleven. The metallurgical industry is, however, rapidly growing, as illustrated by the fact that the production of pig-iron more than doubled between 1913 and 1925, while the production of steel in the same period made a twenty-five-fold jump, which is really gigantic. All the same, it has not yet reached even the level demanded by the peacetime requirements of the country, except in the matter of copper. The latter is already produced in quantities enough to meet Japan's domestic requirements, and sometimes even with an excess allowing export. For several years, though, it was imported in larger quantities than were exported. This was on consideration of world prices.

Machine-building in Japan is also unable as yet to satisfy domestic demand, even though a certain amount is exported to the Japanese colonies and to foreign lands, especially China. Japanese ship-building, on the other hand, is highly developed, thanks to direct and generous assistance from the government, and is able not only to care for home requirements, but also has a reserve ca-

capacity to meet various emergencies. Motors are produced in Japan in quantity, but automobiles are still imported to the extent of ninety-five per cent. Electro-technical machinery, apparatus and equipment are produced in excess and offered on foreign markets. The electric and power industry, started in Japan as early as 1888, developed very rapidly, and, with a large number of hydroelectrical installations, is among the best in the country. Many engines and tools are produced, so that even in quantities allowing considerable exports. Others, the more complicated, as certain automatic machines, still have to be imported. As for the chemical industry, including paper, rubber, rayon, drugs, fertilizers and explosives, it now occupies third place in the world in the number of production and fourth place in the number of workers employed, while the investment therein amounts to more than a billion. Many of the chemical plants were established during the World War, have the latest equipment and are incidentally well prepared for future military requirements.

Despite these developments the textile industry remains the most important of the Mikado's Empire. Japan is the world's principal source of raw silk—she is, in fact, far ahead of all competitors—and silk-reeling is one of the major occupations. In her continuously expanding production of cotton goods Japan is causing great concern to Lancashire and other cotton-manufacturing centres in England, for the Japanese product now competes successfully world over with the most amazing success. The mass production of cotton goods is not, however, an innovation in Japan. Actually it is one of the oldest forms of Japanese enterprise, and in the past was carried on in households from home-grown material; and after the Restoration, with the introduction of the spinning machine, it started to develop quite rapidly. Since the World War, too, Japan has more than doubled her capacity in that field. The number of cotton mills increased from 170 in 1917 to 350 in 1930, while the number of spindles rose from 3,060,000 in 1917 to 6,910,000 in 1930, and the looms from 36,100

1917 to 73,700 in 1930.⁶ In 1933 there were 8,173,994 ring-spindles; 35,320 mules; 833,016 doublings, and 81,552 looms.⁷

With newer and therefore more modern equipment than that of England, and with lower wages, higher efficiency, and generally lower cost of production, Japan is making competition very difficult for the former mistress of the cotton textile markets of the world. Since 1933 Japan's share in the export of cotton goods has already become larger than that of England,⁸ and she has not only extended her field over such foreign markets as that of China, in which she used to compete with England, but she has invaded the home market of Great Britain. Aside from her exports, Japan controls in China itself a number of mills. These were equipped with 2,018,248 spindles and 18,447 looms in 1933.

A few years ago Japan exported more cotton yarn than cotton goods. Today the reverse is true, for she greatly expanded her cotton weaving and knitting industries too, and thereby has not only increased the number of people employed at home, but has materially increased her export revenue.

To complete our survey of the industrial situation of Japan we must add a few words on the utilization of her subsoil natural resources. In spite of the imposing strides made by mining and metallurgy of Japan, they are still lagging. The production of her mining industry is not adequate to meet all the demands of industries, and she continues to depend on imports. Even the largest item, coal, which constitutes over two thirds of the total value of her mineral output, falls short of meeting the domestic demands, and Japan is compelled to import a considerable

⁶ Cotton Spinners Association of Japan. Reference Book.

⁷ Japan and Manchukuo Year Book, 1935. Tokyo.

⁸ The following table illustrates the development of that struggle:

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
	<i>in million yards.</i>				
From Japan	1,791	1,572	1,414	2,033	2,088
From Great Britain	3,672	2,407	1,716	2,197	2,031

amount of the black fuel, the Manchurian coking coal being of particular importance. Japan must also import, as we have seen, lead, zinc, aluminum, gold, silver, oil, and numerous minerals. Her production of iron ores is below ten per cent of her consumption, and as only ten per cent more is derived from her colonies, the balance must be purchased abroad.⁹

Rapid as it was, the transformation of the mediæval Japan of the Tokugawa period into the modern industrial state she has striven to become since the Restoration of 1868 has not been accomplished with a thoroughness able to guarantee economic stability and undisturbed development. For years the industries of Japan were not on the same footing with those of America, England, and other industrially more advanced countries. Even today Japan is not strong as an industrial nation. Japanese products were, and in many instances still are, decidedly inferior to certain others, and they are apt to have a very poor reputation for quality abroad. Even today we find in Japan side by side with the efficient up-to-date large-scale industries, sometimes run with the support from the state, numerous small businesses that are nothing but surviving handicrafts and home industries. Such are the numerous small shops which produce cloth,¹⁰ ceramics, silk goods, lacquer wares, and other typically Japanese art products. Between these two extremes, there are numerous industrial enterprises, mostly small, employing very often less than five workers each, and using equip-

⁹ The mineral output of Japan proper was:

	1932	1933	1934
Gold (klg)	12,487	13,729	15,072
Silver (klg)	163,000	185,000	215,300
Copper (tons)	71,900	68,000	68,000
Coal	28,053,000	32,000,000	37,000,000
Pig-iron	1,037,000	1,457,000	1,763,000
Steel ingots	2,441,000	3,527,000	3,810,000
Sulphur	85,000	114,000	128,000

¹⁰ A considerable part of the cloth is still manufactured by small producers, working at their homes, weaving and dyeing by contract for jobbers, converters, etc.

ment and methods, if not necessarily archaic, at least not always quite modern.

Another evil attending rapid growth of the Japanese industrial structure was in the survival of certain remnants of the feudal system. Even now one finds various traces of the old order, with its paternalism and uncereemonious exploitation of the employees. This is especially true in the textile and to some extent in the coal industries. One still finds young girls working in the textile mills on a basis more akin to the old-time serfdom, if not to slavery, than to the modern Western system. These girls are usually hired by recruiting agents of the manufacturers through special contracts with their parents. In consideration of one hundred yen or so, paid to the parents as an advance, to be later deducted from wages, the girls become attached to a definite mill. There they live like soldiers in barracks, work and spend all their time for the period defined by a contract which usually runs for two years. They receive ridiculously low pay, with generally inadequate lodging and board. To be more specific, the average girl of that type is paid some seventy sen, or about twenty-two cents in American money, per day. Part of this is deducted for board and part to pay off the advance given to the parents. Part of the balance usually goes for whatever the girl "buys" at the factory stores. For the entire industry of Japan in 1934 the average wage was twelve sen or less per hour, or less than four cents in American money; and the lowest scale prevails in the textile industry, which employs, as we have seen, over fifty per cent of the total. Here the rate is seven sen per hour. The maximum of twenty-two sen is found in the power and light industry.¹¹

Low as they are, even such "earnings" attract plenty of people to the factories and mills. Not only the unemployed in the cities, but boys and girls from the countryside flock to the industrial centres because the living on the farms offers a still lower standard, pointing quite often toward starvation.

¹¹ Japan and Manchukuo Year Book, 1935, p. 406. Tokyo.

The dwindling agriculture. In the past, agriculture was the dominant economic activity of Japan, with no less than eighty per cent of the entire population sustained by cultivation of the land. The economically inelastic feudal system that prevailed for long centuries, and imposed numerous hampering restrictions that made rational farming difficult, eventually ruined it. Kept down to a subsistence level, it could not realize its productive capacity. Moreover, as the result of archaic methods of production, as well as maladministration under the Tokugawas, there were numerous famines. In the years between 1690 and 1840 there were, according to Professor J. E. Orchard, twenty-two famines, of which eleven were very destructive of life.¹² The scarcity of food supply naturally affected adversely the growth of her population, and therefore Japan's difficulties in that period could not legitimately be accounted for by overcrowding. Yet, under the old system she was unable to expand. There was no way out but through a radical change in her economic structure, and particularly in agrarian methods.

After the Restoration the feudal system was eventually abolished and the Western pattern of civilization adopted. Modern methods of production were introduced, modern transportation facilities provided. The agrarian population too felt the general change. Toilers of the soil were benefited to a certain extent by the redistribution and more efficient use of land. More modern methods of cultivation were introduced, resulting in considerable increase in the food-producing capacity. In order to concentrate on more profitable cultures, various changes in the crops were advocated. For instance cotton-raising was discontinued and more mulberry-trees and tea were planted. The consumption of rice, fish, vegetables, and so forth, considerably increased, and the standard of living in general materially improved.

Such benefits, however, were accompanied by various ills innate in the new system. Emancipated from the landlords, the farmers soon became prey to numerous new

¹² J. E. Orchard, "Japan's Economic Position," pp. 9-13.

exploiters. The scarcity of land in particular was a boon to usurers. More land came by numberless means into the hands of the new type large landowners. Less remained for the farmers' ownership, and subsequently the latter had to rent more land from the new masters, with the consequence that their indebtedness increased.

The overwhelming majority of the Japanese farmers who now possess any land own only one acre or less. In 1933 twenty-seven per cent of the total had no land at all, and forty-two per cent rented additional soil from the landowners, paying fifty and even sixty per cent of their crops. Some seventy per cent of the farmers depended, partly or completely, on the landowners and paid them exorbitant rentals.

Nature, generally unkind to the Japanese, has helped to push the farmer back into virtual slavery. Droughts, typhoons, floods, all are visited upon these hard-working and good-natured but consistently exploited people, keeping them constantly exposed to misfortunes. Irrigation and drainage, under the control of the government, have been unable to provide enough new land for cultivation, and the possibilities of mechanizing agriculture are very limited in Japan. Fertilizers, introduced by the government and widely recommended for use, soon became too expensive for the pauperized farmers, and since 1929 their use has been steadily decreasing. Furthermore, with the fall of prices of agricultural products consequent on the world economic crisis of 1929, costs of production soon became higher than prices obtainable for products. Thus in 1933 the cost of producing one *koku* of rice was Yen 22.17, while the market price in September of that year was only Yen 20.80. Once again an increase in farmers' indebtedness has been the inevitable result. At present it is over seven billion yen, or an average of over Yen 1200 per farming family.

Attempts of the government to regulate the prices of silk by limiting production, and of rice by imposing tariffs on products imported even from Korea and Formosa, has proved harmful to both the rural and the urban popula-

tion, as the only result has been higher prices for everybody, with no compensating benefit. Losses of the Japanese farmers on silk alone were over three hundred and fifty million yen in 1930, when the price broke forty per cent of that of 1929, and continued to stay at the lower level for several years. In 1934-5 prices went somewhat higher, but the damage already done was such that one or two years of better prices could not restore any degree of prosperity to the farmers, if, indeed, they had ever experienced such a thing.

Under such circumstances one would expect a migration of farmers to the cities; but there was hardly a chance to find work for the industrially inexperienced man from the country. Therefore the townward migration has remained unimpressive. It is true that the percentage of the rural population is gradually decreasing, but at an extremely slow tempo. If in 1930 there were classified as rural 46.03 per cent of the total inhabitants, in 1932 there were still 45.7 under the same rubric.¹³ In short, the crisis of agriculture in Japan is already acute. It constitutes a serious problem, which hardly can be solved by colonial expansion, as the main evil lies not in the scarcity of land but in the appalling injustice of its distribution. In 1933 almost one half of the entire arable land area belonged to the few big landowners, many of whom were absentees exploiting their holdings by renting them to the tenants. No wonder that under the burden of heavy taxation¹⁴ and debts, and with illusory, if any, earnings for their hard labor, the Japanese farmers are beginning to rebel. So-called rice riots and conflicts with the landlords, sometimes even with violence committed, are becoming more and more frequent.

For several consecutive years the Diet has made feeble attempts to relieve the agrarian population, but all in vain. In 1934 farm relief was again one of the main issues

¹³ This is, of course, considerably more than in such industrial countries as Belgium, or even Germany, with only 30.05 per cent of her population classified as farmers.

¹⁴ A large percentage of the farmers are in arrears in taxes.

of the session, but the results, as before, were disappointing. Militarists insisted on larger and still larger appropriations for the war machine. Some even cynically advocated further cuts in the food rations of the people, appealing to patriotic sentiments, but without inquiring if there was really much left to cut from.

About eighty per cent of the Japanese farmers are now trying to earn money from secondary occupations. Most important among these is the production of silkworms, but for years this has not paid. Prices of raw silk have been falling catastrophically, and the government has introduced certain restrictions designed to discourage large production in that field. Export of tea also declined, owing to the competition of India, Ceylon and China. There remains, of course, fishing, the industry in which Japan occupies the first place in the world; and many of the farmers, if blessed by proximity to the sea or other water, get some part of their meagre diet by this means. Horticulture also helps. Home industries and handicrafts may bring additional earnings. But such earnings are usually miserable, for the prices paid for farmers' work are much lower than those paid to the townsfolk.

Forestry, also an important item in Japan's national economy, is controlled by the rich, and few peasants can claim forest land as their own. Besides, the enormous consumption of wood for construction and so forth makes it necessary for Japan to import a certain amount of lumber and pulp.

We have seen that Japan depends to a certain extent on the agricultural products of her colonies. In 1929 Korea and Formosa jointly raised a little over thirty per cent of the amount of rice produced by Japan proper, and though their population also is about one third of that of Japan, they exported a large part of their rice to the latter. Already Japan gets three quarters of all imported foodstuffs from her colonies, and this can, and undoubtedly will, be greatly augmented through an increase of acreage under cultivation and the improvement of methods applied by the colonials; for without very

considerable additions to the output of her dwindling agriculture, Japan cannot exist. It seems inevitable that the rôle played by agriculture in the national economy will continue to diminish, giving a more and more prominent place to industry.

The unstable finances. When one learns how the revenues of the state budgets of Japan have mounted from seventy-eight million yen in 1895 to two billion two hundred seventy-two million in 1936,¹⁵ one is naturally impressed by these steadily mounting figures. But, knowing how poor the population of that country is, one cannot fail at the same time to ask how it is possible for that population to endure such a burden.

The official budgets require the approval of the population through its representatives in the Diet.¹⁶ But in addition there are in Japan certain so-called "special" or extraordinary accounts, which are not scrutinized by the parliamentary machine. Such are various colonial accounts—under the pretext that colonies have independent finances—and state enterprises and monopolies, which, taken together, represent much larger sums than those included in the ordinary budget. Generally speaking, Japanese official figures, purporting to show the conditions of national finances, are quite misleading, in the opinion of Dr. H. Moulton.¹⁷ But in that respect, perhaps, they are not very different from those of other countries. To visualize what this burden means to the population one should realize that the Japanese are paying in taxes alone almost twenty per cent of the entire national in-

¹⁵ In 1895, 78,000,000; in 1900, 254,000,000; in 1910, 532,000,000; in 1920, 1,172,000,000; in 1930, 1,736,000,000; in 1936, 2,272,000,000; of which Y. 1,059,000,000 is for defense.

¹⁶ The final figures, after passing the Diet, are verified and confirmed by the Board of Audits, and then again pass the Diet. The fiscal year in Japan begins on April 1.

¹⁷ Moulton, *ibid.*, pp. 202-210. These accounts are not regularly published. For 1927-8 they amounted to Y. 3,426,500,000 on the revenue side, with expenditures listed at Y. 2,810,900,000, leaving a balance of Y. 615,600,000 available for such uses as the government prefers to keep secret.

come, or about twice the average for other countries. Taxes bring in almost sixty per cent of the state revenues, with indirect levies and profits from state monopolies constituting about two thirds, and direct taxes some twenty-six per cent.

The rapid industrialization of the country and her expansionist policy required more and more funds, and those funds were found by the resort to credits. In the early years of the Meiji Era the financial system of Japan was not yet properly settled, but after the introduction of the Constitution it was considerably improved, and from then on until the early Nineties the condition of the governmental finances was rather satisfactory. The Chinese and Russian wars that followed resulted in deficits and necessitated heavy borrowing. Most of the foreign borrowing of Japan was done in England—namely, about sixty-three per cent of the total by 1931; then comes the United States with some twenty-five per cent, and France with ten per cent. The first issue of Japanese government bonds was floated in 1870 in London for railway construction; the latest, in 1930, was for seventy-one million dollars in New York, and for twelve and a half million pounds sterling in London. By 1935 the total of debts, foreign and domestic, was around ten billion yen.¹⁸

During the World War Japan's finances experienced a skyrocket leap. She became a creditor nation to the extent of Yen 1,398,723,000. Her gold reserve mounted; her financial reserves and investments accumulated. But with the end of the war boom the reverse tendency was started, and soon the reserves were dissipated, the value of the yen was depreciated, and again Japan became a debtor nation.

It is true that her total indebtedness is not large if compared with many other countries; but it is still a

¹⁸ At the end of 1930 the domestic debt was Y. 4,651,837,000 and the foreign Y. 1,567,325,000. But since then annual deficits have been met by new issues of bonds to the amount of almost a billion per year. Besides, Korea and Formosa are also in debt to the amount of almost one half billion yen.

heavy burden for a population as poor as that of Nippon. The per capita indebtedness of Japan is much lower than that of other countries; for her it was Yen 35.10 in 1913, rising to Yen 66.45 in 1928, though for the U.S.A. the respective figures were Yen 60.61 in 1913 and Yen 296.01 in 1928. The case of Great Britain was still worse, the figures being Yen 150.82 in 1913 and Yen 1411.00 in 1928. Even when we consider these figures in relation to the per capita national wealth, we find that Japan's indebtedness is still lower than that of others. But the foreign part of the public debt of Japan is rather high, and its burden considerably heavier than in the cases of several other nations. This is quite important, because to liquidate a foreign obligation or to meet the interest on it the total national wealth must be reduced. That may be considered as a cause impairing Japan's credit abroad.

To this it seems pertinent to add that owing to the continued unfavorable balances of her foreign trade Japan has lost in recent years a considerable part of her gold reserve. In 1917 Tokyo prohibited export of the yellow metal,¹⁹ and only in 1930, in an attempt to strengthen her currency, did she lift that embargo.²⁰ But when Great Britain went off the gold standard, Japan was forced to follow her lead, and again restricted the export of gold. During the World War she accumulated much of the yellow metal, raising her total reserves to Yen 1,900,000,000 by 1919. But by 1929 she had lost almost forty per cent of that amount, and by 1932 there remained only Yen 350,000,000.²¹ In these circumstances the problem of

¹⁹ She adopted the gold standard in 1897, having till then a bi-metallic system. Silver and copper coins were introduced in Japan late in the seventh century. Throughout the early years of the Shogunate their circulation was rather negligible. The modern currency system was introduced under the Tokugawas and gradually money, as a medium of exchange, became prevalent from the end of the seventeenth century.

²⁰ With the result that the exchange of the yen improved some 13 per cent, from 43.75 to 49.37 cents in American money.

²¹ Yujni, "Japan," p. 52. Since then the gold reserve has been increased again, and in 1935 reached 480 million yen.

maintaining the financial stability of Japan became quite complicated.

For several years no budget was balanced without resort to credit, which, on consideration of the international situation, was limited to the issues of bonds at home. The population at large is unable to buy bonds, and therefore most of them were placed with the banks.

In spite of revisions of the taxation system in 1910, 1926 and 1927, for the purpose of providing "for more equitable distribution of the tax burden in the interests of social welfare," that weight remains most unequally placed. The rich are taxed much more lightly than the poor. The latter, in large numbers, are unable even to pay their share and are heavily in arrears; though the former still have plenty left for luxuries after they pay the "exorbitant taxes," of which they constantly and loudly complain.²²

When examining the official list of expenditures of the Japanese Government one cannot fail to be shocked by the percentage of the budget assigned for "defense." The demands of the militarists have mounted steadily since 1922, and by 1936 resulted in the slicing of more than forty-seven per cent of the total for their needs, in addition to the appropriations from the secret "special" accounts, of which the public has no idea whatever.²³

To pay the multiform taxes is not all, of course, that the population of Japan has to worry about: there are also local, municipal and other taxes, though these are generally designed to promote the public welfare. Most of these imposts provide for education and other public needs.

The official statistics of Japan show an imposing number of accounts held in the savings banks. From these

²² If the taxes were increased in Japan proper from 1910 to 1924 a little over 100 per cent, in the colonies they increased in the same period 233 per cent.

²³ Out of the total budget for 1936-7 of Y. 2,311,517,000 the appropriations for the army and the navy respectively were: Y. 508,316,000 and Y. 550,393,000.

figures alone one might suppose that every family in Japan had at least one savings account, but undoubtedly such a conclusion would be misleading, if not simply false. The entire amount of these deposits reached only Yen 3,706,000,000 in 1932, with an average of only Yen 55.37 per account. It seems likely that a considerable part of this money belonged to those who deposited sums nearer the maximum limit of two thousand yen, while the number of accounts is swollen by those who deposit just a few pennies, as the minimum for opening an account is only ten sen.

The inequality in distribution of wealth and the concentration of capital in Japan are extreme. So far as the banking capital is concerned, over half of it is concentrated in five banks only, the so-called Big Five. These are Dai-ichi; Mitsui, the oldest banking firm, founded in 1683; Mitsubishi; Yasuda; and Sumitomo, which is the oldest house, and which has been engaged in general business since 1591. Furthermore, the total number of banks is limited and further declining.²⁴ During the financial crisis of 1927 some eighty-five banks were badly hit; thirty-eight of them were forced to close their doors, though twenty-five reopened in the following year; and 134 merged with other institutions. The casualties were comparatively small, thanks to the timely help rendered by the government in checking the panic. A three-day moratorium was ordered, and from five to six hundred million yen were allowed in credits to the banks for meeting withdrawals.

In 1931, when Dr. H. Moulton wrote his book "Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal," it was his opinion²⁵ that there was no imminent danger of financial instability, because, in spite of the depression and collapse

²⁴ The total number of commercial banks in Japan in 1930 was 897, with a large number of branches. (Yujni, *ibid.*, p. 53.) As for the banks in the colonies of Japan, most of them are controlled by the Japanese—in Korea over 70 per cent, and in Kwantung about 65 per cent.

²⁵ H. Moulton, *ibid.*, pp. 419-20.

of values that resulted in many losses and frozen credits, the reserves of the Bank of Japan were ample.²⁶ At present there are discernible numerous signs of uncertainty and weakness in Japan's finances. The primary source of that weakness is the government budget. Japan, under the irresistible pressure of her military elements, carrying on the very costly policy of expansion, and demanding more and more funds, is forced to balance these growing budgets by constant resorts to bond issues. The result is inflation, still under control. But how long can it last? The country is living beyond her resources, and a serious financial crisis seems near at hand.

The highly developed transportation system. From the early days of the Meiji Era the Japanese Government has made efforts to develop modern means of communication and transportation, realizing their importance to economic progress. In 1872 the first railway, covering the eighteen miles between the capital city of Tokyo and the port of Yokohama, was completed with money borrowed in England on the government's guarantee. Then followed other lines built by private companies, also encouraged by the government, and for a while calling upon foreign skill. By 1890 there were already more than one thousand miles of lines; by 1900 over three thousand; by 1910 over five thousand, and twenty-five years later 13,734 miles, most of which have belonged to the state since 1907, and less than two thousand miles remaining in private hands. The well developed telegraph and telephone systems also belong to the state.²⁷

On the other hand, the shipbuilding and the shipping industries, though started by the state, were later on transferred to individual concerns, and continue in pri-

²⁶ The Bank of Japan is a privately owned commercial bank, serving as the emergency reservoir of credit.

²⁷ Telegraphs were started in Japan in 1869; by 1880 she had almost ten thousand miles of lines; by 1900 over sixty thousand; by 1910 almost one hundred thousand, and now over two hundred thousand miles of telegraph lines. Telephones were first introduced in 1891 and by now there are about one million instruments with over two million miles of lines.

vate hands, with generous support from the government through subsidies,²⁸ premiums and special contracts. At present the merchant marine of Japan accounts for over four millions gross tonnage, and gives her third place among the seagoing nations of the world, besides providing a good "invisible revenue."²⁹

Governmental subsidies and the control of economic life. It was one of the peculiarities of the capitalistic development of Japan that the industrial capital did not develop there independently, as had been the case in Europe and America. The function of industrial development was taken over by the state. Only later did it pass into private hands, and at that without the creation of a new class of industrialists, but through the strengthening of a few big merchants and money-lenders, together with the former feudal lords.³⁰

For a number of years after the Restoration of 1868 such capital as had accumulated by that time preferred commerce and money-lending in different forms. A great part of the investments went to the banks, and only a rather insignificant balance to industrial enterprise. Not until some ten years before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 did industry start to attract money.

The House of Mitsui, who were the bankers of the Imperial Court at Kyoto, continued in that rôle after the Emperor moved to Tokyo, and since then have financed various enterprises of the new régime. In particular, Mitsui became interested in financing the expenditures on the national defense, for at that time the country was building her army and navy.

Among the first factories built in Japan were the arsenals at Tokyo and Osaka, shipyards, ammunition factories and gunpowder plants. This kind of industrial

²⁸ From 1920 up to the present annual subsidies run from six to over ten million yen.

²⁹ Some 73 per cent of Japanese exports and over 65 per cent of her imports are carried on her own boats.

³⁰ N. Weinzwieg, "The Origin and Development of Monopoly Capital in Japan." In "Contemporary Japan" (in Russian), Moscow, 1934, p. 199.

development was first carried on by the state and financed primarily by the taxation of land. The landowning nobility did not like this, and after the Rebellion led by Saigo (Takamori) in 1877 these taxes were reduced under pressure. The policy of the government was then changed from that of direct supervision to one of encouraging private initiative, with subsidies from the treasury and a governmental guarantee against losses. A further step transferred most of the government enterprises to private custody. Many state-owned factories were handed over to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Kawasaki and other houses. Even steamships purchased by the government abroad were taken over by Mitsubishi.

It goes without saying that, thanks to this policy, the privileged few made enormous fortunes out of the people's money. But to become rich one had to have "pull"—to have such powerful friends as Mitsui had in Marquis Inouye, or Iwasaki had in Marquis Okuma.³¹ Corruption was inevitable under such an arrangement, and corruption there was on a grand scale indeed.

The result of this system of protection and privilege was the extraordinary concentration of the control over the economic life of Japan in a very few hands. Of these Mitsui and Mitsubishi are the most powerful, and with Yasuda, Sumitomo, Furukawa, Kuhara, Okura and a few others they dominate practically every money-making enterprise in the country. The House of Mitsui in 1930 were in control of 127 large corporations, a quarter of the entire export trade and over a third of the domestic trade. Most of the war industry was divided between this house and Mitsubishi. Mitsui controlled over sixty per cent of the total production of iron ores in Japan, over fifteen per cent of the pig-iron, most of the zinc output, part of the aviation business, and several factories of explosives. Mitsubishi remained omnipotent in shipbuilding and had large interest in the metallurgy, chemical and aviation industries. Yasuda acquired the largest number of shares

³¹ Uichi Iwasaki, "The Working Forces in Japanese Politics," p. 102.

in the South Manchuria Railway, an empire in itself. Sumitomo, who are related to Prince Saionji, are among the biggest concerns in steel, copper and shipbuilding.

As for the government, it has gradually abandoned most of its enterprises, and since 1927, according to Professor Orchard, has been considering withdrawal even from the iron and steel industry.³² Possibly the explanation can be found in the past history of Japan, when under the later Tokugawas she experienced a marked decline in her national economy traceable in part to the attempts of that Shogunate to control very strictly the economic life of the country. But the new militaristic forces now instrumental in shaping the destiny of Japan seem to advocate more rather than less governmental interference. They would centralize control over the economic life so as to suit their plans of further expansion for the Land of the Rising Sun.

Realizing the fact that the results of modern wars are greatly influenced by the economic capacity of the country to supply the requirements of a mass army, and that this task can be best met by militarization of national economy and its regulation by the state, Nippon is systematically working on such military organization of her national economy. According to Tanin and Yohan,³³ by 1925 the state directly commanded one fifth of the total number of workers and one third of the total capital in the industries employing five persons and over. According to some calculations, the capital invested in state enterprises amounted to a sum equal to one half of the total capital of the four largest concerns of the country.

Already in peace time a large number of military and naval officers, on the active list or retired, serve as connecting links between various enterprises engaged on war production and the War and Navy Departments. This system enables the latter to be informed on the activities of the important manufacturing companies, to study

³² Orchard, *ibid.*, p. 107.

³³ O. Tanin and E. Yohan, "When Japan Goes to War," p. 104. The Vanguard Press, New York, 1936.

them in detail and prepare to use all their productive capacities.

The extremely aggressive trade. As we have seen, the economic weakness of Japan lies first of all in the meagreness of her natural resources. Scarcity in basic raw materials required by her modernized industry causes her to depend on heavy imports, and although by now about twenty per cent of these raw materials come from her colonies, a much more considerable part still has to be purchased abroad.

The other point of Japan's economic weakness is also the result of her general poverty. It lies in the limitation of her domestic market. This forces her to look for markets abroad, and, as we have seen, the dependence of Japan on export trade is abnormally great.

Until recently the variety of her export goods has been limited to a few items such as raw silk, cotton goods, tea, lacquer wares, pottery, and so forth; while the number of her steady customers has been limited too. Of these the United States has been the best, with Great Britain and China following. This has made Japan extremely sensitive to changes in the markets; nevertheless, she seeks markets with eagerness, and has developed her foreign trade with rapidity, if not always with caution. In 1868 her total foreign trade amounted to twenty-six million yen, with a favorable balance of four million. In 1917 it had grown to Yen 2,639,000,000, with a favorable balance of 567 million; and in the peak year of 1925 it rose to Yen 4,878,000,000, though at that time there was an unfavorable balance of 268 million. Japan's foreign trade shrank quite materially at the time of the depression, but on the whole it has been very large. Invariably, too, there has been an adverse balance. In 1934 her foreign trade amounted to Yen 4,454,526,000, but in depreciated yen, and the unfavorable balance was over one hundred and ten millions.

Since the World War Japan has extended the scope of her export to include machinery, metal and straw goods, toys, hats, glass, china, sugar, paper, electric bulbs, bi-

cycles, umbrellas, sea foods, canned food, and so forth, all of which are offered in a rapidly expanding number of markets all over the world. This constitutes a marked improvement, for it means that Japan is becoming less dependent on one or two big customers, and is therefore less sensitive to the fluctuations of prices on only a few commodities. As for the extent to which Japanese trade has been expanding, especially since 1932, it can be judged not only from the fact that Japanese goods have penetrated into such new markets as Abyssinia, Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, and a number of South American republics, but also by the fact that they were sold in larger quantities than British products in Britain's own dominions and colonies. In 1933 Japan sold certain goods in larger amounts than England not only in China, Dutch India and Siam, but to British India, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt and the Straits Settlements.

If the world crisis forced Japan's exports from Yen 2,148,618,652 in 1929 down to Yen 1,469,852,000 in the next year, she started to regain this loss by 1933. In that year she exported Yen 1,861,046,000 worth of various goods, and in 1934 the figures rose to 2,172,000,000.³⁴ Such rapid expansion of foreign trade naturally intensified considerably the conflict of Japanese interests with those of the other countries, and a number of Japan's rivals became seriously alarmed by the aggressiveness of their competitor.

To increase her foreign trade at such a tempo during a world-wide crisis reflected in a catastrophic decline in trade, Japan had no choice but to apply "dumping" and other trade practices characterized in 1933 by the British President of the Board of Trade, Sir Walter Runciman, as unfair. The result for Japan was trade war with some

³⁴ In 1933 alone she increased her exports to Europe by 29.3 per cent, as compared with 1932; to Asia by 59.3 per cent, in spite of the fact that her export to China somewhat declined as the result of the Manchurian occupation and the Shanghai affair; to Australia by 76.9 per cent; to Africa by 90.7 per cent; to North America by 28.5 per cent; to South America by 221 per cent and to Central America even 241.3 per cent.

nations, tariff war with more, increased friction with others, and all kinds of unpleasantness in her intercourse with the most of the world.

Dumping was made possible for Japan by three factors—first, by the extreme exploitation of labor, and a further reduction of the already low wages; then by the high degree of “rationalization” of industry, which meant a general speeding-up and a longer working day of fifteen hours or more in some instances; and, finally, by the devaluation of the yen. This came after Japan abandoned the gold standard and had been forced into inflation by a variety of factors, including the annual deficits in her budget covered by new domestic issues of bonds.

In order to check this aggressiveness England, the United States, France, Italy, Holland, Turkey and others introduced anti-dumping tariffs and established quotas for certain goods coming from Japan. France was anxious about her own colonial trade, and Holland was badly hit in the Dutch Indies. England, especially the Lancashire textile industry, of course suffered worst of all.

Practically every increase of import duty on her goods sent abroad was followed by a compensating cut in the wages paid to the workers of Nippon, though Japanese industrialists and merchants continued to receive attractive profits, and even rising dividends.³⁵ Takahashi, while Minister of Finance of Japan, himself admitted in one of his speeches that Japan is enabled to export so cheaply because she is exporting “cheap labor.”³⁶

As she expands into new markets, Japan is getting deeper and deeper into the dangers inherent in a disproportion between foreign and domestic trade; and this is especially true because of her dependence on others for

³⁵ In some instances, according to the Mitsubishi Monthly Circulars, they were 15 per cent in 1932 and 18 per cent in 1933.

³⁶ According to Mitsubishi Monthly Circulars, a Japanese weaver was paid Y. 5.8 per week, against Y. 17 in Germany and Y. 18 in England, and Y. 35 in the U.S.A., though the Japanese delegates at the 1933 session of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Banff insisted that the standard of living of the labor in Japan is not lower than in England.

the raw materials. Japan had one painful experience when she lost her markets after the "boom" of the World War was over. Similarly, she may find it extremely difficult to handle her unduly swollen industry if world conditions, or any collective action by the Powers, should deprive her of even a part of these markets.

Under the pressure of her military elements, relentlessly pushing ahead with their plans for further expansion in Asia, and defiance of the rest of the world, Japan has been forced to hasten her preparations for a possible "crisis." Therefore, by 1932 her war industries started to work at full blast. Their feverish activity, jointly with the revival of industry resulting from the aggressive trade policy, created a new "boom." To keep her industries running under such unusual circumstances, Japan has naturally required more than the normal supply of raw materials. But to get this she had only one way open—namely, to increase her sales at any price.

With a continuously unfavorable balance of foreign trade,³⁷ accompanied by a decline in such "invisible revenues" as that produced by the tourist trade and money drafts from Japanese emigrants, and with no market abroad to float loans, Japan has had practically no choice but to dump. But though her foreign trade has considerably increased in volume, it has not brought correspondingly higher figures in value, for the prices prevailing on the world markets were generally low, and in order to undersell her competitors Japan had to sell for still less. It looks as if the "vicious circle" were complete. To keep industry running, Japan had to buy with her depreciated money more raw materials abroad; to buy more she has to sell more of her goods at any price; to sell more goods she must manufacture more out of these expensive im-

³⁷ Though the adverse balance gradually was decreasing; if in 1924, the peak year, the unfavorable balance amounted to 646 million yen, and for a number of years since they averaged two hundred million, in 1930 it was only 76, in 1931 87; in 1932 only 21; in 1933 56 million, and in 1934 again Y. 109 million.

ported raw materials; and all this at a loss to the national wealth.

How long can this kind of national economy continue? What if the goods offered for export find insufficient demand? In the opinion of Professor Orchard, neither Japan nor any other nation in the future "can safely place so great a dependence upon manufacturing and trade, as England has done in the past. It seems certain that no nation can ever hope to hold again the same dominant position in the manufacturing and trade of the world, or even of a continent."³⁸

What is the price the Japanese people are paying for the present policy? Who makes good the losses involved by dumping? Do not the populace pay this and the dividends of the capitalists too? Is not the domestic market of Japan becoming more and more anæmic, as the nation bleeds from that kind of policy and its purchasing power declines still further? Are not the rulers of Japan "cutting the branch on which they are sitting"? Are they not aggravating the crisis? Is not their aggressive policy in foreign markets endangering the entire economic structure of Japan? Those are the questions we shall endeavor to answer later, after a study of social conditions and other problems confronting the Japan of today.

³⁸ Orchard, *ibid.*, p. 3.



SOCIAL QUESTIONS

Classes—Great Fortunes of the Few and the Poverty of the Masses—The Agrarian Situation—Capital and Labor—Labor Movement in Japan—Conclusion.

IN any discussion of the present-day social structure of Japan it must always be remembered that less than a hundred years ago the country was a feudal state, mediæval in spirit but with its own deep-rooted and unique characteristics. Now, in a phenomenally short space of time, she has been modernized on Western lines. But although the coming of capitalism affected her social structure profoundly, the country still presents a peculiar and often contradictory mixture of the old and the new, and there are many important changes yet to come under the irresistible pressure of economics.

Classes. Under the old order, the Japanese population had been divided into four classes or castes. At the head were the landlords, the samurai of various ranks, with daimyos and other warrior gentry. Next came the peasants, cultivating the land of their lords and constituting the bulwark of the entire economic system. The third class was represented by the artisans; and the lowest place in the scale of feudal society belonged to the despised tradespeople. Below all these were the outcasts, the Eta. These pariahs were, probably, descendants of Korean and other prisoners of war; though another opinion maintains that they had been merely outcasts engaged in such disdainful occupations as cattle-slaughtering, which is against the teachings of Buddhism, and the digging of graves.

That the warrior's virtues were highest in esteem is not surprising; originally they were the chief guarantee of material well-being. Tilling of the land was of great im-

portance, of course, and especially to those who were entitled to enjoy life in the intervals between their martial exploits, for the land provided the wealth. Commerce occupied a low place of esteem in the old days, chiefly because there were not as yet any rich merchants or bankers who had attained prominence by virtue of wealth; their financial transactions were mostly confined to petty usury, and aspired not to those grand-scale "patriotic" operations wherein money in larger sums is lent to prominent people or even to rulers themselves. When that time arrived the social status of the money-lenders changed accordingly.

After the Restoration a new division of classes was introduced. The highest among the landed nobility, the warriors, the daimyos and some samurai, the most prominent among the dignitaries of various religious bodies, and the *Kuge* or courtiers of higher ranks, formed the class of *Kwazoku*, or the "Flowery Family." This aristocracy numbered altogether 478 families.¹ Next were the *Shizoku* or gentry, composed of the remainder of the samurai; and the rest, some ninety-five per cent of the total population, became the *Heimin*, or commoners, that included peasants, artisans, merchants, and even the Eta and vagrants.

However, as capitalist relationships developed and industry grew, these classes were shuffled, and at present it is more appropriate to consider the Japanese population as divided, like that of other modern nations, into three groups according to their relation to production. These groups, of course, are the capitalists, the middle class and the proletariat. The first, including the aristocracy and the grand bourgeoisie, living from dividends, interest, and the exploitation of labor on a large scale, may be subdivided into bankers, manufacturers, merchants and big landowners, plus most of the courtiers and certain officials who usually belong to one or more of

¹ In 1884 the Kwazoku were subdivided into five ranks of titled nobility: princes (*koshaku*), marquesses (*kooshaku*), counts (*haku-shaku*), viscounts (*shishaku*) and barons (*danshaku*).

these subdivisions by virtue of their property interests. The more fluctuating middle class, or petty bourgeoisie, lives from salaries, fees, and profits from medium-size and small enterprises, and includes most of the officials and professionals, merchants, certain tradesmen, and small landowners. The overwhelming majority of the population belong to the proletariat, or those who live by selling their labor. These include the industrial and other manual workers and the pauperized and landless peasantry.

Great fortunes of the few and the poverty of the masses. There is some truth in the notion that since the Restoration the former semi-serfs of feudal times who had no right to appeal against unlawfulness, inhumanity, and tyranny of classes higher in the social scale, acquired a new status as "free" men. No longer did they need to kneel or bow on meeting their lords, unless by their own volition. Through the Constitution they even acquired the illusion of participating in the government through the right of electing delegates to the Diet, provided they had enough property or money to be eligible. But actually, even after the franchise was expanded by the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, the majority of the people remained very far not only from the control of their own destinies, but even from any chance of effectively influencing the legislature and obtaining reforms commensurate with their needs. Of course, that was not the way to obtain justice in respect to their livelihood. The economic inequality, appalling as it had been in the closing years of the Shogunate, soon became even worse through the merciless deepening of the abyss between the classes, wrought by the capitalist system of making labor a commodity and bound to a machine owned by the rich.

This illusion of democracy, though pleasing to the few who benefited therefrom, failed signally to protect the right of the common man to receive his share in the national economy. In older days the peasant at least expected to be fed by his landlord. Now he was left to depend on his own wits. But he was not provided with an

economic basis allowing any kind of decent living; he had to struggle for survival against uncounted odds. Thus if he remained a farmer he was handicapped, first of all, by scarcity of land, of which most Japanese husbandmen never possessed enough to sustain their families. The natural result was that the majority incurred debts with no chance to pay them off. They were in the blind-alley of poverty with no ray of hope ahead. Those who turned to the new opportunities opened up by industrial development in the cities soon learned the evils of the new system even more thoroughly than their brethren who remained on the land.

In the cities they discovered that it was not enough to be strong and anxious to work, since one might not be able to find employment. Now that work was dependent on machinery, it demanded complicated and expensive tools that no poor worker could afford to buy. They had to apply for work to those who were rich enough to possess these means of production, and in so doing they learned that the new system meant economic insecurity, since the demand for help fluctuated, and obtainable work became irregular. No plan coördinated production; no agency existed to take care of those who wanted work, and were unable to find any. Thus they came to know what unemployment means; though probably most of them did not realize as yet that unemployment must constitute a part of any system under which the employer, manufacturing for profit, is interested in lessening the cost of production; for otherwise he cannot stand competition, and therefore wants to pay for labor as little as possible. Gradually it became obvious, to some of them at least, that when there were plenty of those who had no work and badly wanted it, the employers would pay lower and lower wages, since the recipients would accept whatever was offered in order to survive. The law of supply and demand, at least in that sense, obviously was no boon for the workers. They learned that this unemployment periodically was even aggravated by the cyclic crises which occurred in Japan as everywhere else.

In the early years of the Meiji Era the population learned of these unpleasant characteristics of the new system by a slow accumulation of experience. The tempo has been now accelerated. Whatever remained of good in the paternalism that characterized smaller Japanese enterprises in the early years of her industrialization has now evaporated and given place to the ruthless exploitation.

There is no lack of good recent surveys of the industrial life in Japan, published in English and other languages, and from these one can get a comprehensive and reliable picture of this phase of Nippon. In addition, abundant statistical data on wages, hours of work, cost of living, and so forth, provide the material for thorough study of this extremely important side of Japanese life. Here we can give only a brief account, listing a few of the more important characteristics. Already we have seen to what an unhealthy extent wealth is concentrated in Japan. We have seen how a few very large concerns actually control the entire economic life of that Empire. We have also seen that the distribution of land is far beyond the safety limit of injustice. Now let us examine a few more details which contribute to this situation.

The agrarian situation. Economically, at least, the Restoration did not make the farmer free, since almost immediately he was forced to rent land and to pay an exorbitant price for it; however, his burden did become stabilized in the sense that rent was fixed in advance. Now, at any rate, the farmer understood the amount due, even if he also knew that it was beyond his capacity to pay; while under the old order payments were arbitrarily defined by the landlord, and the peasant could hardly ever foresee the limit.

The pitifully small slice of land that the average farmer of Japan cultivates at present certainly cannot sustain him and his family, even with one or more secondary occupations. In 1933 twenty-seven per cent of the peasants were landless; and of those who possessed any land

at all, 49.7 per cent held varying small amounts up to a little over one acre, and representing only nine per cent of the total arable area; 42.12 per cent had from one to eight acres each; while the remaining eight per cent of the total number of the landowners held over one half of the entire area under cultivation. Of that half, besides, almost fifty per cent was controlled by a small group representing one per cent of the total number of the landlords.

For a number of years the cost of production, including of course rent, taxes and interest on mortgages, was actually higher than the market price obtainable for agricultural products. Yet taxes, already heavy, continued to mount; and as usual the farmers were hit by the heavier imposts more severely than the rest of the population. They paid for the industrialization that required subsidies from the state. They paid for the Imperialist wars. They paid for enriching the upper classes. They had to pay for the losses consequent on dumping, because they were paid less for their products. And for all this the farmers obtained the least of the benefits offered by the state. Heavily in debt, with no relief from the treasury, the pauperized husbandmen, unable to find any other way of earnings, long ago began selling their daughters by "contracts" to the textile mills and into prostitution in large and mounting numbers.

By 1930 there were fifty-three thousand licensed prostitutes in Japan, with a much larger number of unlicensed,² and it may be said at once that most of the tales of these girls going to town to earn their dowry, to get married after their contract is over, are false. In some instances, of course, that may be true, but in most it is not. A large number of farmers depend on their daugh-

² According to official statistics, there were 55,000 prostitutes, 80,000 geisha and 50,000 waitresses in Japan...the latter always classed together with prostitutes and geisha. The figures of the prostitutes only take account of those in licensed houses. Freda Utley, *ibid.*, p. 109, English edition.

ters' earnings, and they send them to make money as best they can, though there can be no doubt that many among these parents are conscious of the tragedy involved.

Commenting on this situation, two American authors,³ after admitting that conditions in respect of prostitution were equally bad, if not worse, in Western countries, added:

"The most shameful feature in the Japanese system, as has been indicated, is that of parents practically selling their daughters into such bondage and entering into contracts with the government for such a privilege, both parties sharing in the profits of this infamous exploitation.

"And it must be acknowledged that a people who tolerate such conditions, with so little public protest against them and with so little social stigma upon the families who engage in such practices, may not lay claim to being highly civilized, even though they have acquired beautiful manners, artistic standards of conduct, and make lofty claims of social and family superiority."

It is hardly justifiable to condemn in such a wholesale manner the unhappy peasants degraded by indescribable misery and endless injustice, who no doubt suffer deeply from the ugly tragedy of selling their own children into houses of vice. The blame should be placed upon the system under which such things are possible, and on the government that lives by that system, and is responsible not only for selling licences to the houses of bad repute and to their inmates, but for all the other ills emanating from such conditions.

To what extent the farmers, even those who are organized, are naïve and unenlightened may be judged by the proclamation issued in 1933 by the Japanese Farmers' Union—*Nihon Nomin Kumiai*—on the anniversary of the foundation of the Empire (*Kigensetsu*). This proclamation contained the following demands:⁴

³ Amos S. and Suzanne W. Hershey, "Modern Japan," p. 196.

⁴ Article by Hamadan and Smolianinov in the Symposium "Japan," p. 122. (In the Russian.)

1. The landlords must return their lands to the Emperor.⁵
2. Away with capitalism, and the bourgeois political parties.
3. Punish the rapacious landlords.
4. Annihilate the rebellious Communists.
5. Nationalize the revenues from Manchukuo.
6. Withdraw from the League of Nations, and form a Pan-Asiatic League free from exploitation.
7. All farmers unite in one Peasant League under the Monarch.

These demands are repeated again and again in other similar documents. Naïve and inconsistent as they are, they indicate some of the main troubles of those unfortunates.

The present acute agrarian crisis has affected not only the poor farmers but also the owners of middle-size properties, and to a certain extent even the big landlords. With the decline in prices for agricultural products the price of land has slumped also.⁶ But the government claimed inability to relieve the poor, though it did find it possible to grant loans at low interest to the more prosperous farmers. From 1930 to 1933 such loans were made to the amount of Y. 1,677,000,000. This sum was not sufficient to satisfy even the owners of medium-size properties, with the result that envy and struggle arose in the ranks of the latter. This increased the already large number of malcontents, and still further hastened the crisis.

In spite of their extremely low requirements, of living quarters more restricted than any known in the Western world, of the simplest, scantiest and cheapest sort of clothing, and of fantastically inadequate diet, most of the Japanese farmers are now on the verge of starvation. No wonder they are becoming increasingly restless and ready for revolt. Under pressure of these intolerable conditions, and with no relief from above, the farmers are turning more and more toward the organization of their own

⁵ Nominally all lands belong to the Emperor.

⁶ The price of one tan, or about one-sixteenth of one acre, was in 1927 Y. 546; in 1930, 489; in 1931, 411, and in 1932, 399. "Japan," the Russian Symposium, p. 80.

forces. A number of farmers' associations or unions have been formed since 1918, when there occurred very serious rice riots all over the country. The tenant-farmers are organizing for more effective bargaining with the landlords. But the landlords have also started organizing for the purpose of collectively resisting the demands of the former. Their efforts apparently were more successful, for if the tenants mustered by 1929 some three hundred thousand members in their almost four thousand associations, the landlords formed over five hundred associations of their own with almost fifty thousand members, which shows, undoubtedly, a much higher percentage of organization.

The class struggle is on in the countryside of Japan, and there can be no doubt that the farmers and, above all, the tenants will be brought by increasingly hard times to a realization of the importance of organizing to a much higher degree than hitherto. They must soon take a much more vigorous stand against a system menacing their very existence.

Capital and labor. In Japan, as elsewhere, the farmers often believe that their brethren working in the factories or mills, in the mines, or on the transportation system, have a better lot in life. The workers are earning their living, they declare; little as it may be, they receive pay, and see passing through their hands more money than the farmer ever dreams of. By that comparison these farmers may be right to a certain extent, though other husbandmen disagree, and point to the advantages of their own lives, independent of bosses, with the illusion of being their own masters, and at least the freedom to enjoy a life close to Nature.

When, forced by hunger and debts and hopeless misery in the countryside, these optimists go to the city, they are apt to change their opinions. If, after long waiting, they are lucky enough to find some employment, they quickly learn more of the actual life of industry. Not only this, but they learn more of the life of the privileged as contrasted with that of the rest of the people; and then

they begin to make other comparisons, and to realize that something is wrong in the cities too. Then, if certain of them continue to say that the workers are in a better position than the farmers, it is most likely because they realize that the workers, living together in larger groups than the farmers, have better opportunities for organizing to protect their common interests. Besides, they probably see that it is easier for the workers to discover both their common interests and their common enemies, because they are free from the jealousies and suspicions usual among petty owners, whatever the size of their real or illusory possessions.

In towns and cities they discover that wages, averaging about twelve sen per hour, or four cents in American money, are pitifully low; and that the working hours are long.⁷ At present they also find a variety of devices, under all sorts of long names like "rationalization of labor," which are designed to increase production and serve to speed the workers up to produce more for the same wages.

They find that working conditions are very often unsanitary; that the lighting is poor and ventilation, if any, insufficient; and that the space allotted per worker is sometimes limited in the extreme. They learn that the lack of safety provisions in many shops is responsible for the high percentage of industrial diseases and accidents. Of course, if they move from job to job, they also discover that working conditions in the large modern factories and the small establishments are not alike. The former demonstrate the conditions of work under high rationalization, and that, naturally, requires higher hygienic standards, better safety provisions, and generally more favorable surroundings for obtaining more efficient work.

They learn that living quarters, if provided by the employers, are very often far from satisfactory. Undoubtedly there are certain factories and mills that pride themselves

⁷ Up to fourteen hours per day, and in some instances even longer. Such hours are legally proscribed, but laws of this kind are not strictly enforced.

on modern housing facilities, clean, well-ventilated, pleasing in appearance, with hospitals and schools attached, and with very imposing auditoriums and other places for recreation. Such are the conditions at the well-known Kanegafuchi textile mills. But these instances are not numerous, and even among these few one will find some that merely maintain "show-places" with limited facilities inadequate to accommodate all the employees. "Casual visitors to such modern mills easily may be misled by appearances," says Miss F. Utley.⁸

Girls working in these mills are usually isolated from the rest of the world, for fear that they may try to escape before the end of the term of their contract and before they have paid off the advance given to their parents. If they are trusted, the girls are allowed from two to four days a month's absence from dormitories with iron bars on the windows and locks on the doors. However, though in many instances the girls living in these clean and well-run "prisons" are herded ten together in rooms eighteen feet by fifteen, it is very likely that most of them live there in circumstances better than those at home. When you visit the slums of such industrial centres as Tokyo or Osaka you see workers living under most detestable conditions. People are herded together in the lowest degree of degradation. Not only are these congested quarters inadequate and indecent, but very often they are utterly devoid of sanitation and constitute a grave danger to the public health.

When you investigate the diet of the working people—for instance, of the girls employed in the mills—you find that their daily food usually consists of three meals of rice, vegetables and pickles, with fish twice a week, an occasional tiny piece of meat, and invariably tea.⁹ With this inadequate diet and the constant exposure to cold—

⁸ Utley, *ibid.*, p. 85.

⁹ Most of the factories and mills have their canteens or stores, where the employees are expected to buy whatever they need. By allowing credit in these stores the latter become sometimes a means of enslavement.

for usually the dormitories are not heated, though the shops are—there are always a number of employees, especially girls, absent from work on account of various ailments. When sick for a short time they continue to receive sixty per cent of their wages; but if the disease is more serious and keeps them longer away from the mill, they are likely to be discharged and sent home.

In most of the mills the management sees to it that the girls do not join the trade union. If they do, the employers will very often appeal to the parents to intervene, intimating that otherwise their daughters will be dismissed and they themselves lose a monthly income from the girl's earnings. It is not rare that under parental pressure girls withdraw from the union.¹⁰ In case of the threat of a strike some managers simply lock the girls in their dormitories to prevent them from meeting the labor organizers.

If we have drawn most of our examples from the textile business it is because that industry has more recently been made the subject of thorough study. It was the first Japanese industry to offer severe competition to the foreigners, and the latter have therefore made special efforts to learn as much as possible about it in order to understand how it has been possible for Japan to undersell her rivals. Besides, the examples of the textile trade bring to the fore the fact that an unusually large percentage of industrial workers in Japan are women. Indeed, in Japanese industry as a whole more than one half are women, but in the textile mills they predominate to a much larger extent—from eighty in the cotton mills to eighty-five per cent in the silk filatures. This emphasis on the situation prevailing in the textile industries is also

¹⁰ Miss Utley gives a typical case of how the girl's earnings are allocated. For instance, if the monthly wage amounts to Y. 30.00, 4.50 is deducted for board; 0.60 for social insurance; 5.00 allowed to the girl as petty cash; 12.50 is sent to the parents; 2.00 is deducted to pay off the advance; and the balance of about six yen is deposited with the company as the "savings." But these savings sometimes cannot be withdrawn before the end of the contract, under the pretext that then the girl would need her savings more than ever.

justified by the fact that they employ more than half the total number of operatives. Moreover, the conditions under which the employees of other industries work closely resemble those described above. It is true that many work without a contract like that of the girls in the textile mills, live where they please, are more independent and less subject to terrorization, and that they do not always experience the kind of supervision from which the textile operatives suffer. But as a rule, there are "stool-pigeons" in every place of work, and surveillance is strict enough to be annoying. Instances where gangsters are employed by the management to curb strikes are not rare exceptions, neither is intimidation of employees.

Generally speaking, labor is not adequately protected by the law. In the past there were no labor laws at all; but under the growing pressure of conflicts between labor and capital, and to some extent under pressure from Western competitors acting partly through Geneva, such laws were introduced and promulgated. Since 1900 there have been laws designed to restrict labor organizations, but not to help the workers. The law of 1900 made strikes practically impossible by prohibiting "intimidation," violence or insult in trying to enlist new members into associations concerned with improving labor conditions by collective action. It was also made illegal to persuade others to stop work.

The first Factory Act became law in 1916; in 1926 it was modified and amended. In 1922 workers' health insurance was declared compulsory for certain branches of industry, but was put into operation only in 1927. The Factory Act is applicable only to shops employing ten operatives or more, or engaged in work of a dangerous character. It limits the working day to eleven hours, but this, like other provisions, is not enforced, and the fourteen-hour day is no rarity.¹¹ It prohibits night work, but there are certain exceptions, and these are elastic enough to allow abuses. Even women, whose employment

¹¹ The average is over nine hours. Overtime work is practiced quite extensively.

for night shifts is expressly prohibited, can be found working at night. Children under fourteen years of age are not supposed to work at all, but plenty of much younger children are actually employed, thanks to a variety of excuses; and although certain provisions for the protection of motherhood and childhood exist, these too are not always strictly enforced. An institute of factory inspectors exists in Japan, but a number of these officials belong at the same time to the police force, which is hardly to the advantage of the workers; and most of the rest are decidedly more friendly to the employers than to the employees.

As yet there is no genuine social insurance. Health insurance of workers is compulsory, as we have seen, only in certain industries, and is designed to provide part payment of wages in case of illness or temporary disability resulting from industrial accidents, and medical care for not more than 180 days. For this purpose there are employers' insurance associations, and when the factory in question is not covered by any such association, the insurance is undertaken by the government. Expenses are shared equally by employers and the employees, with a governmental allowance from the treasury amounting to ten per cent of the total insurance involved. This source also provides for part of the wages paid to expectant mothers and for the special allowance to mothers after childbirth. The responsibility of the employer for disability resulting from work in his establishment is fixed by the law, but there are numerous exceptions that materially decrease the number of actual payments of compensation.

Unemployment has spread rapidly in recent years—in 1932 there were almost three million unemployed out of a total of eight million and a half, which included not only industrial workers, miners and transport workers, but fishermen, unskilled labor and workers in various handicrafts.¹² Consequently the question of unemployment insurance has arisen, but so far there is no such thing in

¹² Yujni, *ibid.*, p. 89.

Japan. If a worker needs relief it must come from some charitable organization, unless he belongs to certain workers' mutual associations. These are few and very poor in resources.

Labor movement in Japan. Effective organization of labor may be considered a fairly recent development in Japan, for though certain attempts along this line were made before the end of the nineteenth century, they were quite ineffective.¹³ At that time a few working-class leaders visited Europe and America to accumulate knowledge about the life and laboring conditions of the working classes. But the government was stubbornly opposed to the introduction of any innovations of this kind, and so the law of 1900 designed to restrict labor organizations was promulgated. Early in the twentieth century, however, the Japanese labor movement was put on a more systematic basis under the leadership of Sen Katayama and Fukuda. The latter subsequently donned respectability and an Academician's robe and lost interest in the working class; but Sen Katayama later became a Communist and died in Moscow in 1934 while serving as a Japanese delegate to the Third International. It is more than interesting in this connection to note that at the time of the Russo-Japanese conflict a goodly section of Japanese labor, under the influence of the socialistically inclined intelligentsia, was opposed to the war; and that Sen Katayama, as their leader, demonstrated this in a spectacular way by shaking hands with the famous Russian revolutionary and scholar of Marxism, Plekhanov, when the two met in Amsterdam while the war still was on.

After the Russo-Japanese War the labor movement in Japan continued to grow, but the activities of the Anarchists, led by Kotoku, and the discovery of graft and

¹³ Oi Kentaro, editor of the *Adzuma Shimbun*, was probably the first ideologist of the labor movement in Japan, and the first labor leader. Atobe, Sakuma and Ikeda were the first organizers. In the '90's a party of "Eastern Freedom" was formed under the slogan, "To feed the people as the national finances allow."

the raw materials. Japan had one painful experience when she lost her markets after the "boom" of the World War was over. Similarly, she may find it extremely difficult to handle her unduly swollen industry if world conditions, or any collective action by the Powers, should deprive her of even a part of these markets.

Under the pressure of her military elements, relentlessly pushing ahead with their plans for further expansion in Asia, and defiance of the rest of the world, Japan has been forced to hasten her preparations for a possible "crisis." Therefore, by 1932 her war industries started to work at full blast. Their feverish activity, jointly with the revival of industry resulting from the aggressive trade policy, created a new "boom." To keep her industries running under such unusual circumstances, Japan has naturally required more than the normal supply of raw materials. But to get this she had only one way open—namely, to increase her sales at any price.

With a continuously unfavorable balance of foreign trade,³⁷ accompanied by a decline in such "invisible revenues" as that produced by the tourist trade and money drafts from Japanese emigrants, and with no market abroad to float loans, Japan has had practically no choice but to dump. But though her foreign trade has considerably increased in volume, it has not brought correspondingly higher figures in value, for the prices prevailing on the world markets were generally low, and in order to undersell her competitors Japan had to sell for still less. It looks as if the "vicious circle" were complete. To keep industry running, Japan had to buy with her depreciated money more raw materials abroad; to buy more she has to sell more of her goods at any price; to sell more goods she must manufacture more out of these expensive im-

³⁷ Though the adverse balance gradually was decreasing; if in 1924, the peak year, the unfavorable balance amounted to 646 million yen, and for a number of years since they averaged two hundred million, in 1930 it was only 76, in 1931 87; in 1932 only 21; in 1933 56 million, and in 1934 again Y. 109 million.

Nationalist brand. They stand, some eighty-five per cent of these organizations, with the so-called Social-Democratic party (*Shakai Taishu-to*, or *Shakai-Minshu-to*), which is of a decidedly rightist nature, opposing strikes, seeking compromise with the bourgeoisie, and supporting it to the extent even of approving the Manchurian adventure of 1931. The *Zenkoku-Rodo-Taishu-to*, or Labor-Farmer party, is a centrist organization and less popular. The Communist party of Japan is outlawed, and working underground.

The employers are promoting different labor organizations, more suitable to them, and encourage the formation of labor mutual assistance and similar organizations. The government is always interested in such organizations. There are even trade unions controlled by naval officers, such as the so-called *Kaigun-Rodo-Kumiai*, formed of the workers in the naval arsenals. In addition there exist, with police permission, two "anarchist" trade unions with small membership; but actually their policy is that of the Social-Fascist reformism.¹⁶

In 1924, under pressure of the Westerners, Japan participated in the International Labor Conference, sending to Geneva a very mild "defender" of labor. This was Bunkichi Suzuki, better known in Japan for his close cooperation with the government. As a result of his mission, the Anti-Labor Act of 1900 was repealed, and in 1926 the Labor Dispute Arbitration Law was enacted.¹⁷ But the government continued to frown on labor activities and did much to curb them. The Peace Preservation Bill is a good example of that attitude, for it "provides for from one to six months' prison for those who seduce or incite workmen to strike."¹⁸

Nevertheless, labor in Japan has developed better organization, and the number of strikes and other collective

¹⁶ "The Class Trade-Union of Japan." Workers Library. New York.

¹⁷ It is applicable to a number of industries, but the Board of Conciliation provided by that act has so far been extremely ineffective in settling disputes.

¹⁸ Count Soyeshima, *ibid.*, p. 36.

actions has steadily increased since the World War, reaching a peak in the years of the recent crisis. If there were recorded in 1914 only fifty disputes between labor and capital, involving less than eight thousand workers, in 1919 there were almost five hundred disputes involving over sixty thousand workers. During the first three years of the economic crisis (1929-31) there were over six thousand conflicts involving five hundred thousand workers, and a marked change was to be noted in the character of these disputes.¹⁹ In the earlier years most of the disputes were concerned with demands for higher wages; now the struggles are mostly against reduction of wages. They are moreover becoming much more militant, for latterly reduction of wages has become the chief weapon of the manufacturers and exporters in their attempts to conquer markets by underselling competitors.

If until recently political demands have played little part in these disputes, it is not because labor is satisfied with the existing order; one reason is that the leadership of the Japanese labor organizations is keeping or trying to keep the rank and file of the membership out of politics. This is partly because of governmental vigilance, not to mention the law enacted in 1928 by which every one advocating change in the existing order is liable to ten years' imprisonment. As we have seen, the Communists are outlawed, and to be accused, or even suspected, of Communist sympathies means not only imprisonment but sometimes even execution. Because such accusations are often based on very dubious evidence, or on hearsay, the number of those arrested for harboring "dangerous thoughts" is quite large. Eight thousand such arrests were reported in 1932 and over ten thousand in 1933. Those figures included a considerable number of professionals,—teachers, lawyers, doctors and students.

Socialism penetrated Japan as long ago as 1876,²⁰ when

¹⁹ In 1933-4 the number of strikes somewhat declined.

²⁰ Professor Kuwada maintained that ideas similar to those of Karl Marx had been explored even earlier by a Japanese scholar, Sato Shinen, in his work "Shuto Hiroku." Sato Shinen died in 1850.

Karl Marx was interesting and comprehensible only to the few. In 1881 the first Socialist group was founded by Sen Katayama, and by 1886 the new ideas were already finding mention in the periodicals, though mostly as matters of academic interest. A Japanese delegate was present at the Second Congress of the International in 1891, and after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 a distinct influence of Socialist ideas on Japanese labor was noticeable. By 1897 a labor magazine had been started by Sen Katayama. In 1901 the railroad workers staged a strike. In the same year was formed the first Socialist party in Japan, the *Shakai Minshu-to*. By 1906 a new Socialist party, *Nippon Shakai-to*, was organized; this, however, quickly split and an Anarchist group, under Kotoku and Sakaya, was formed. About that time the police started their merciless persecution of all radicals. In 1910 Kotoku was executed, and the radical labor movement receded, only to be revived by the Russian Revolution of 1917. In 1918 the rural population was involved in a revolutionary movement; 180 rice riots occurred in 144 places in 44 days. In 1920 Japanese workers celebrated May Day for the first time; and in the same year a Socialist League, the *Shakai Shiugi Domei*, was formed, only to be dissolved by the police. In 1923 the Communist party of Japan came into existence.

Native or imported, these new ideas are penetrating deeper and deeper into the social structure of Japan. There can be no doubt that the labor movement in the rest of the world and the post-war revolutions in Russia and other countries have played their part in accentuating the consciousness of the class struggle in the Land of the Rising Sun. The growing social unrest in Japan, where not long ago many believed that the paternalism of the "haves" was enough to mollify the "have-nots," is no passing phenomenon; it can hardly be eradicated by intimidation and laws against "dangerous thoughts." These thoughts may seem dangerous to some; at the same time they may appear to many others the only ray of hope for the betterment of their miserable lives. Keeping in

jail those who happen to fall into the hands of the law does not prevent others who live under intolerable conditions from thinking and revolting against their enslavement and pauperization. This truth has been brought home to other countries by the all-sweeping blows of revolution, and it looks as if many Japanese are now coming to the realization of that stubborn fact.

Those at the helm, apparently, still hope to stay the rising indignation of their people. They cultivate chauvinism to arouse enthusiasm for the adventures abroad, patriotism to make increasing hardships seem better worth enduring, and nationalism to divert the ire of the discontented from the real enemies at home to far-away foreigners whose identity is vague and further befogged by flights of imagination induced by propaganda. But the pressing problems of Japan are not the offspring of irresponsible agitation and seductive ideas. They are home-made, and the products of prevailing conditions.

Conclusion. To recapitulate, these conditions have produced a growing discontent and restlessness in the working class, who are dissatisfied with declining wages, accompanied by an increase in working hours and the speeding-up of production. Their standard of living has been lowered because real wages have fallen with the devaluation of the currency, and as retail prices rose and earnings declined;²¹ nor is it any consolation to the Japanese worker to be reminded that working and living conditions in India and China are even worse. The agricultural crisis, structural in its nature, since it is bound up with the remnants of the feudal system, demands radical revision of the agrarian situation; the condition of heavy indebtedness among the farmers, and of diminishing returns, is now being aggravated by low and declining prices for agricultural products. This crisis is already quite acute and fraught with greater danger still.

The middle classes of Japan are far from satisfied. The exceptionally numerous petty merchants of that country

²¹ A new evil is found in the mounting number of the so-called "casual" workers, who are paid less than the regular ones.

cannot compete with the department stores and large concerns. Small landlords, badly hit by the decline of land and agricultural prices, are dissatisfied with the meagre help rendered by the government. Among professionals radicalism is growing, especially among students who face unemployment, since the number of people with diplomas is far larger than the existing opportunities for work. However, these groups of dissatisfied, numerous though they are, have not yet been linked by any visible ties. They are neither well organized nor united on program and tactics.

The industrial workers and farmers of Japan are only beginning to come together. Up to very recent times they were divided, partly by the conflict of their economic interests, or rather by the misunderstanding of the unity of their broader interests, partly by the policy of disruption adopted by those who would prefer to see them disunited. In Japan, as elsewhere, "red baiting" serves to prevent the formation of a united front of the proletarian elements; and the Labor-Farmer party organized in 1926 has had no salutary effect.

On the other hand, the forces of conservatism and reaction are trying to unite their ranks. The disintegrating major political parties are attempting to reconstruct their phalanxes and revise their platforms; and it may be only a matter of time before the numerous heterogeneous pro-Fascist and semi-Fascist groups are able to unite and act in a coördinated way.

In other words, though the widespread and multiform crisis in Japan is too obvious to allow of doubt, the alignment of the contending social forces is not yet fully crystallized. But this process is well advanced, and there hardly can be much doubt that an explosion will occur before long. What will be the character of that explosion? Will it be a revolution or a *coup d'état*? It is hard to foresee, because the elements that will play the decisive rôles in that mass-drama are not yet ready for performance.

CHAPTER VII



CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF JAPAN

Heritage of the Past—Bushido as the Ethical System of Japan—
—Folklore—Literature, Art and Science of Old Japan—
Present-Day Status—Education—Press, Radio, Cinema,
Theatre—Literature—Plastic and Decorative Arts—Mu-
sic—Philosophy—Religion.

NOTWITHSTANDING the celebrated dictum of the late Rudyard Kipling, there are certain instances in which East and West may meet, and of this the Land of the Rising Sun offers a striking example. In her everyday life, arts, and thought, modern Nippon mixes Occidental patterns with a specific traditional culture which in its turn is a Japanized combination of the Chinese philosophy of life and the religious thought of India. Once upon a time—and not so very long ago—these elements would have seemed hopelessly heterogeneous; today they have not only met but are blending under the irresistible pressure of economics. Already the result is something far more homogeneous than any prophet of a century ago could have dreamed possible, and the blend is a real blend and not a supplanting of one civilization by another.

HERITAGE OF THE PAST

That this is so is largely due to the tenacity with which modern Nippon has clung to many of her ancient institutions, for when Japan entered upon a new stage of industrial civilization she continued to preserve much of her national historical tradition. Nay more, in the seventy-odd years that have gone by since the beginning of Westernization, numerous attempts have been made to induce Japan to return to her own ideas and forswear all “alien and evil innovations.” Nationalistically inclined romantics

have wished to see their country preserve and develop its own civilization independently of the rest of the world. They have preached return to the ancient "Yamato-damashi," or the virtues of Old Japan. But, reactionary in its nature, this appeal has not seriously affected the normal trend, and at this juncture hardly can do more than aid the ultra-nationalism so assiduously fostered by the Fascistically inclined elements of the country. Reactionary in its nature, this advocacy of escape from reality can hardly hypnotize the nation for any length of time; and if Nipponism, as the Japanese brand of Fascism is called, should ever be installed, it will scarcely long survive, because it will solve neither economic nor any other vital problems. All it can do is alienate Japan from other countries and make her still less comprehensible to the outside world.

Bushido as the ethical system of Japan. Although it is difficult to understand a nation as different from ourselves as is Japan, there is no justification for the assumption that a mutual understanding is impossible. Indeed, this nonsensical conclusion is nothing more than the result of the impatience of those who, having no adequate knowledge of this exotic state, refuse calmly to consider the fact that acquisition of knowledge takes time. Japan was opened for study only recently. In the past there was not enough intercourse with her. Even today a knowledge of the Japanese language is extremely rare among Westerners. On the other hand, the Japanese, who remained in seclusion for more than two centuries, have not yet fully adjusted themselves to dealing with the rest of the world. They are not by nature communicative and frank, owing, no doubt, to their geographic environment and their peculiar history. This, too, constitutes a serious handicap to mutual understanding. But there is no reason to suppose that the unfortunate situation will last forever, in spite of the fact, well known to every one who has lived in Japan, that it is extremely difficult to break the barrier separating the Japanese from the Westerners. Even such Occidentals as Lafcadio Hearn, and the numerous foreign

missionaries—including the late Russian Archbishop Nicholai, who had devoted to Japan over fifty years of his life—never came to the point where they really were able to say: “Now we understand the Japanese perfectly, and they consider us a part of them.”

If such was the predicament of those who have lived among the Japanese and commanded their language, how much more difficult it must be to understand Japan merely from books. A great majority of English-speaking people have learned at least a part of what they know from the often reprinted “Bushido,” written almost forty years ago by an Americanized Japanese Christian, the late Dr. Inazo Nitobe. This book still is, supposedly, among the best sources of understanding of Nippon. The name Bushido means “the Way of Samurai,” and was coined by Dr. Nitobe to define the “soul of Japan” and so to acquaint foreigners with Japan’s ethics. One of the greatest Western authorities of things Japanese, the late Professor Basil H. Chamberlain, was very skeptical, however, about the value of that little volume, and expressed amusement over the excessive patriotic enthusiasm of its author in giving a picture that was in such a contrast with most of the books written by other Japanese, though not for foreign consumption. “Chivalry,” declared Dr. Nitobe in the opening lines of his pamphlet “is a flower no less indigenous to the soil of Japan than its emblem the cherry blossom, nor is it a dried-up specimen of an antique virtue preserved in the herbarium of our history.” Bushido was not a written code, but consisted of a few maxims handed down from mouth to mouth; and Dr. Nitobe brought these in romanticized form to the attention of Westerners for the purpose of helping them to understand his people.

Among the sources of Bushido, Dr. Nitobe listed Buddhism as furnishing “a sense of calm trust in Fate, a quiet submission to the inevitable, that stoic composure, in sight of danger and calamity, that disdain of life and friendliness of death.”¹ Shintoism, that teaches the innate

¹ Nitobe Inazo, “Bushido,” p. 9. New York, 1919.

goodness and God-like purity of the human soul, inculcated "such loyalty to the sovereign, such reverence for ancestral memory, and such filial piety as are not taught by any other creed," and its doctrines "imparted passivity to the otherwise arrogant character of the samurai." In other words, Shintoism cultivated Patriotism and Loyalty to the Monarch and the superiors, and these virtues were also fostered by Confucianism with its "five moral relations"—namely, between master and servant, including the governing and the governed; father and son; husband and wife; older and younger brother; and between friend and friend. Dr. Nitobe also included the teachings of Mencius as having exercised "an immense authority over Bushido." But it is hard to reconcile this assertion with the Doctor's own admission that "the democratic theories of that Chinese philosopher were considered dangerous and subversive of the existing social order." Not less dubious seems his assertion that all these philosophical systems, so difficult of comprehension, were followed by the average samurai, who were notoriously innocent of learning, and used to call the savants "book-smelling fools."

"The chief characteristics of a samurai were 'rectitude and justice,'" wrote Dr. Nitobe, and added that "nothing was more loathsome to him than underhand dealings and crooked undertakings.... In times when cunning artifice was liable to pass for military tact, and downright falsehood for *ruse-de-guerre*... rectitude... was a jewel that shone the brightest and was most highly prized." Then, continuing his list, he added "courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity, honor (implying a vivid consciousness of personal dignity and worth, for samurai were bred to value the duties and privileges of their profession), and, finally, duty and loyalty."

In the opinion of Dr. Nitobe, "what Japan was she owed to samurai. They were not only the flower of the nation, but its root as well."² In manifold ways, he declares, has "Bushido filtered down from the social class

² Nitobe, *ibid.*, p. 146.

where it originated, and acted as leaven among the masses, furnishing a moral standard for the whole people."³ Bushido, however, was decidedly a class spirit, and naturally was not acceptable *in toto* to the people as a whole, even though it functioned as an inspiration. Nitobe himself recognized this, though he expressed it in a somewhat different way when he wrote that "the populace could not attain the moral height of those loftier souls."

There is undoubtedly much in the writings of Dr. Nitobe that cannot be disputed; and this is particularly true of what he says in description of the loyalty of the Japanese, and especially of the universal politeness so characteristic of his country.⁴ But it sounded somewhat awkward when in his summation, in answering the question, "Is there any nation more loyal and patriotic?" he declared "there is not." It is hardly justifiable to make such extravagant claims, even under the spell of patriotic ardor. The Japanese are much like other folk, with certain virtues of their own, and certain shortcomings. The unsophisticated people at large, in Japan as elsewhere, probably remain morally better than those who are open to temptations of office and privilege; and it is even possible that, having remained isolated and "provincial" longer than other nations, the Japanese as a whole have remained morally somewhat better in proportionately larger numbers. But this scarcely justifies Nitobe's sweeping assertion; neither can we agree that "rectitude and veracity" and the "aversion to underhand dealings" or "falsehood as *ruse-de-guerre*" were typical of the Japanese warriors, because this assertion is in complete disagreement with what the Japanese folklore discloses, being more frank and having no foreign readers in mind.

Folklore. When perusing collections of legends, tales and other similar expressions of the national genius of

³ Nitobe, *ibid.*, p. 150.

⁴ Quite new and un-Japanese are the directness and rudeness of such "diplomats" of the new school as the American-reared Matsuoka Yosuke or the famous official spokesman, Amau Eiji.

Japan,⁵ one is amazed by the constant appearance therein of ruse, cunning, guile and deceit as methods of attaining a goal. For the Japanese, no less than for the Jesuits, the end justifies the means. That was the method ascribed even to the deities of Yamato, as one learns from the tale of "The Eight-headed Dragon," relating the exploits of Susano, the brother of the Sun-goddess Amaterasu. Strong and mighty, that god still preferred not to risk fighting in the open, but assured his victory by ruse. He first made the Dragon tipsy, and slew it only after the latter had fallen asleep. Predilection for guile is also demonstrated by the myth of "The Hare and the Crocodiles," for the Hare uses an interesting ruse in crossing the sea on the crocodiles' backs.

Striking examples of constant use of trickery and chicanery, not to mention disguise, are to be found in the tales and legends of the early historical period. There is, for instance, the famous story of "Momotaro," the boy found by an old couple in a peach they picked floating down the river. The heroic exploits of that boy in defeating numerous evil forces, and so preserving his country, were invariably accompanied by sharp practices. The most popular hero, Raiko, or Minamoto Yorimitsu, achieved similar success by using disguise and other tricks. From the "Tale of Oeyama" we learn that he applied the same method as did the God Susano, by getting his enemy drunk and killing him in sleep. Again, certain of the ethical and religious principles of old Japan are reflected in "The Monkey and the Crab," wherein vengeance is accomplished not without resort to foul play. To see that blood was paid with blood was a duty dictated by honor. Accordingly the Crab attacked the Monkey, but did so only with the support of others and at a moment when his adversary was alone and unprepared.

Does not this remind us of the way in which twentieth century Japan has started her wars? And is it not all very

⁵ For example, the very popular Sazanami's selection, called "Nihon Mukashi Banashi," or "The ancient tales of Japan," or Mitford's "Tales of Old Japan."

far from the noble virtues so eloquently described by Dr. Nitobe in "Bushido"?

It remains to add that a number of these comparatively early popular tales are based on the ethical teachings of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism. Such are "the Mirror of Matsuyama," "The Sparrow with the Slit Tongue," and "The Rat's Wedding," which stress such virtues as loyalty, submission, endurance, modesty, moderation, and satisfaction with the existing status. But these are virtues for the lower classes, in whom they work to the advantage of the rulers and the privileged at large; and it is to be noted that in these tales Buddhism, the religion of meekness, charity and humanitarianism, often was ridiculed or at least treated humorously, for these qualities seemed inappropriate to the bully warriors, the samurai. There are, of course, other kinds of legends and tales, such as the beautiful poetic story of "Urashima Taro," and numerous narratives depicting details of the life of Japan. Those have preserved for posterity the modes of living, the peculiarities of various parts of the country, and the characteristics of different classes in various epochs of the long history of Nippon.

Comparison of Dr. Nitobe's testimony with the folklore of Japan is offered here not to minimize the positive qualities of the Japanese people, but to show the reverse of the medal as well. In the words of Lafcadio Hearn, whose friendship for Japan was never questioned: "Where Japan has remained true to her old moral ideals she has done nobly and well; where she has needlessly departed from them, sorrow and trouble have been the natural consequences."⁶

Literature, Art and Science of Old Japan. In the beginning the art of letters in Japan was practiced exclusively by and for the upper classes; works with popular appeal came into existence there only with the seventeenth century.

The history of Japanese literature is usually divided

⁶ Lafcadio Hearn, "Japan: An Interpretation," p. 478. New York, 1904.

into periods corresponding to the various political epochs. From the ancient period, ending with the eighth century, there remain only songs. The next period, that of Nara, lasted to the beginning of the ninth century, and is notable for a number of *tanka*, or short poems of five lines and thirty-one syllables, as well as two historical works, written not only under the influence of China but in the Chinese style. These were *Kojiki*, or the Record of Ancient Matters, and *Nihongi*, or Chronicles of Japan.

The Heian or Kyoto period (800–1186) was an age of classical poetry and outstanding prose, the latter ranging from collections of essays such as *Makura-no-Soshi* or “Notes Kept Under the Pillow,” and travel diaries like *Tosa Niki*, to the so-called *monogatari*, tales or stories. A number of these tales are historical, such as the *Genji Monogatari*, possibly the most celebrated abroad of all Japanese literary works—which deals with the military exploits of the House of Minamoto; and it is to be noted that most of the writers of this period were women, and that many of them were attached to the Imperial Court. *Genji Monogatari* itself is the work of a woman, having been written by the authoress known to Westerners as Lady Murasaki. The Heian period was one of deep appreciation of art in general. Many of the finest shrines, temples, and other examples of Japanese architecture date from these centuries. To the thirteenth century belong such masterpieces of sculpture as the *Daibutsu*, the colossal stone figure of Buddha, the *Bonten* statue in dry lacquer, and the *Shitenno* or God of Heaven, all at Nara. But all these masterpieces of statuary were imported from China, as were also the six-armed *Kwannon* at Kwaichi and the eleven-faced *Kwannon* in bronze at Nara. Numerous paintings were also imported from China, and others of Japanese imitation were added to these collections.

The advent of the Shogunate was marked by a decline in learning and by decadence in the arts. The Kamakura period (1186–1332) left some historical works, and some *monogatari*, poems and essays, among which the work of



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.

(a) Toshogu Shrine in Nikko



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.

(b) Itsukushima Shrine, Miyajima

the monk Kenko, called *Tsuredzure Gusa*, or "Weeds of Idleness," is considered one of the outstanding adornments of earlier Japanese literature. The two periods that followed, known under the names of *Nambakuchō* (1332–1392) and *Muromachi* (1392–1603) are jointly described as the "Dark Ages"; but the Tokugawa epoch, known as the Yedo period, and lasting from 1603 to 1867, witnessed a revival of learning and the arts. Printing, which had been introduced into Japan in the eighth century, now became more widely used; and, following the example of Ibara Saikaku, who lived from 1642 to 1693, authors began to address their works to the people at large rather than to the *élite* alone.

The Tokugawa period is noteworthy for its outstanding novels, and for much excellent drama, including, in addition to the old *No* plays originally performed at Court and pieces for the *Ayazurishibai*, or puppet playhouses, many contributions to the *Kabuki*, or popular theatre. Among the most celebrated playwrights of this age were Monzaemon Chikamatsu, sometimes called the Shakespeare of Japan, and Izumo Takeda, the author of the celebrated play "Chushingura," depicting the story of the forty-seven Ronin, who revenged their master.⁷ Takeda's plays have been acted and admired abroad under the titles of "Bushido" and "The Pine Tree." Among the great Tokugawa novelists are Kiokutchi Bakin, who lived from 1767 to 1848 and wrote more than one hundred volumes, including *Hakkenden*, or "The Tale of Eight Dogs," one of the most popular works in Japan; Ikku, who was compared with Rabelais for his work *Hiza Kurige*; Kyoden Santo; and Tanehiko or Ryutei, whose ninety volumes of satirical works *Inaka Genji* were especially widely read. The historians of that period include Norinaga Motoori, author of *Kojiki-den*, the Japanese commentaries on *Kojiki*; and Sanyo Rai, author of the *Nihon-seiki* and *Nihon-gaishi*, the great history of the Shogunate. Motoori lived from 1730 to 1801, and Rai

⁷ Takeda lived from 1646 to 1726, and Chikamatsu from 1653 to 1724.

from 1780 to 1832. But the Yedo period is particularly to be associated with a revival of purely Japanese literature. This began with the movement of *Wagakusha*, or Japanese scholars, as contrasted with the *Kangakusha*, or Chinese scholars, which was started by Keitchu (1640-1701), but gradually developed into the monarchist movement that later on advocated the restoration of the Emperor's prestige.

Fairy tales too received wide attention and popularity in the Tokugawa era, which was rich also in scholars and artists. Seikwa Fujiwara, who lived from 1560 to 1619, and Doshun Hayashi, or Razan (1583-1657), were great scholars in Chinese learning. Ekiken Kaibara, the disciple of the famous Confucian sage Junan Kinoshita, was a philosopher of the Chinese school; while Shigehide Itakura was an outstanding jurist. Hokusai (1760-1849), whose real name was Tetsujiro Nakajima, was one of the greatest artists of Japan.⁸

In summarizing his comments on the literature of Japan, Professor Basil H. Chamberlain declared that "what Japanese literature most lacks is genius. It lacks thought, logical grasp, depth, breadth, and many-sidedness.... If Japan has given us no music, so also has she given us no immortal verse, neither do her authors atone for lack of substance by any special beauties of form. But Japanese literature has occasional graces, and is full of incidental scientific interest."⁹

It may be well to close this brief account of classical Japanese literature and art by quoting at least one little gem of poetry. It is in the form of the *hai-kai* or *hokka*, a new type of short poem of seventeen syllables introduced in the Yedo period, and is by Lady Chiyo. The graceful piece runs as follows:

⁸ The above outline of the Japanese literature is based on W. G. Aston's "History of Japanese Literature," New York, 1899. Spelling of the names and chronological data were checked with Papinot's "Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie du Japon," 1906.

⁹ Basil H. Chamberlain, "Things Japanese," pp. 295-296. London, 1905.



(a) Image of Buddha
(Kamakura)



(b) A Dance

Asagao ni

Tsurube torarete

Morai mizu.

It has been translated by Frère Champney in his "Romance of Old Japan," as:

The morning glory's fragile tendrils twine
 Around the rope with such bewitching spell,
 I cannot bear to break the tender vine:
 But draw my water from my neighbor's well.

PRESENT-DAY STATUS

With the reshaping of her political structure and the reconstruction of her industrial system, Japan was forced to revise and readjust her entire civilization. This she proceeded to do, and naturally enough the educational system was one of the first to invite a new orientation and radical reorganizing.

Education. Under the Shogunate educational facilities, with the exception of those offered by the monasteries and temples that were the centres of education since the introduction of Buddhism, were almost exclusively reserved for the class of samurai. Schools were privately owned and controlled. Thus the common people had practically no access to formal instruction; and if they learned anything in addition to the rudiments of letters acquired from the elders of the families, it would be the history of their country as distorted by story-tellers, singers and theatrical performances. If the monks and the priests offered commentaries of Buddhist sutra and Confucian philosophy, it was only for a selected few.

Under the Tokugawa a more systematic study of Japanese history and literature was added to that of the Chinese classics, and in the later years of the Yedo period some Western knowledge began to infiltrate. But this process was slow owing to the various barriers created by the policy of seclusion. However, after the visit of Commodore Perry and the opening of Japan to foreign trade

and intercourse, Western culture began to penetrate more easily, and the Meiji Era inaugurated an educational system on the European plan, with liberal participation by Americans in the early stages. In the initial years of Japan's modernization many subjects had to be taught in English and German owing to the lack of scientific and technical terms in the Japanese. "Knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world," declared the Charter Oath of the Emperor, and his Imperial Order was followed.

According to Confucius, the chief ideal of education is the building of character; and strength of character among the Japanese was gauged by the development of such qualities as apply to the struggle for existence. So, because nature in Japan was and is hard on man, the Japanese have aimed first of all to develop and cultivate endurance and other characteristics useful for conquest and progress. Of course, in transplanting Western principles of education the Japanese have had to take into consideration certain psychological differences between themselves and the Occidentals. There still remains to some extent an incompatibility in their mentalities owing to the fact that the Japanese mind was shaped by Chinese culture, adapted by centuries of practice to Japanese peculiarities. Moreover, the diversity of habits is still very great.

Japanese education has always been conducted with a view to training children for collective action. If the child of pre-school age was allowed a great degree of liberty in action, a change was marked by his entrance into school after his sixth birthday; thereafter he or she is subject to discipline. Very light in early years, this discipline gradually becomes stricter. Outwardly modern and Occidental, the Japanese school retains even today certain purely Oriental peculiarities. The Japanese is expected to learn "how to read minds and motives...how to remain impassive under all circumstances...how to remain, even when most amiable, secretive and inscrutable."¹⁰

¹⁰ Lafcadio Hearn, "Japan: An Interpretation," p. 467.

Children are trained to become useful workers for the state; and, as officials or otherwise, they often become slaves to the system. Rigid custom still binds the Japanese to the family, the party, the government. However, this antique patriarchy is, apparently, now on the decline.

In 1890 an Imperial Rescript defined the moral and political basis of Japanese education. Essentially that basis was the Confucian doctrine of loyalty and filial piety. A copy of this Rescript is the sacred possession of every school, and is worshiped along with the portraits of the Monarch and his consort. Administered by Imperial Ordinances rather than by laws originating in the Diet, and mainly supported by taxation, the educational system in Japan is controlled, or at least strictly supervised, by the government. The result is that the entire system is too uniform and stereotyped. "The product of it tends toward uniformity, mediocrity and superficiality," wrote the Hersheys,¹¹ and declared that "intellectual initiative and independent thinking are not common and are not encouraged," and that "utilitarian ideals prevail and absorb most of the trained energy of the nation."

Elementary schools, at which attendance is compulsory for six years, are expected to give children the rudiments of moral education and to prepare good subjects of the Emperor and useful members of the community. They are conducted to provide such general knowledge and skill as are necessary for life and pay much attention to the healthy physical development of the pupils. Illiteracy was almost extinct in Japan a few years ago, but latterly, owing to the growing poverty of the population, a much larger percentage than before is listed as unable to read or write. Nevertheless, the Land of the Rising Sun has the honor of being one of the foremost nations in the matter of literacy.

The middle schools, offering courses of four or five years, are expected to give a somewhat higher general education, and, according to the regulations, to instil "culture necessary for those who are to be of middle or

¹¹ Hersheys, *ibid.*, p. 75.

higher social standing." Technical, industrial and professional education, including the training of teachers in normal schools, is highly developed. Universities and other institutions of higher learning are not numerous, but those that exist are of a rather high scholastic standing.

One of the most serious impediments to educational progress in Japan is the use of hieroglyphs, or ideograms, borrowed from China. There are over fifty thousand of these simplified pictures of things and ideas, made by strokes of the brush. Nobody knows all of them by heart, but one needs to master at least three thousand such pictures to be able to read even a common newspaper. For years the Japanese children spent many hours in mastering that peculiar calligraphy, meanwhile losing much time that could otherwise have been used for obtaining wider knowledge of the sciences and arts.¹² Nowadays there is a much simplified table of fifty signs selected and abbreviated from so many characters, which serves as a sort of phonetic "alphabet." But the practical use of these *katakana* and *hiragana*, as the two varieties of this shorthand are called, is very limited, for more or less the same reason that "*Romaji*" or the attempt to Latinize the Japanese writing had to be abandoned. This reason is the presence in the Japanese language of numerous homonyms, or words that sound alike but have different connotations, making it difficult sometimes to distinguish what particular meaning a word is expected to convey.

Press, Radio, Cinema and Theatre. A not less serious impediment to the enlightenment of the people is the position allocated by the government to the various means of dissemination of knowledge, and various kinds of censorship to which political and other news is subjected.

The press of Japan is notoriously unscrupulous about interfering with the private lives of people. Gossip, calumny and slander are constantly printed, for there is little danger of prosecution for libel. But in the matter of

¹² These ideographs play, of course, a certain rôle in conditioning the minds of those who have to use them.

printing information of genuine social or political importance the newspapers of Japan are extremely cautious, for censorship is arbitrary and severe, and very often the rage of officials is aroused by seemingly innocent news items or otherwise permissible comments; and the price paid by the "offender" may be very high indeed. When reading Japanese papers one is amused by the amount of nonsense allowed to remain in print, partly as result of the restrictions imposed by the government. An interesting commentary on the low standard of Japanese journalism was made some years ago in the Tokyo daily *Nichi Nichi Shimbun*, by Mitsuchi Chuzo, a member of the Diet and a journalist himself. "It can hardly be expected," he wrote, "that the press can be good and clean amid filthy and wicked surroundings. So long as the tastes of readers are high and pure the newspapers will refrain from publishing what is bad and ugly, but if people clamour for morbid and sensational news and do not care for moral and intellectual food, how can the newspapers maintain a high standard?"¹³ But the fact is that the "yellow" journals of Japan, as elsewhere, are not unaware of the harm they are working on the welfare of the people; they are merely "yellow." Nor can the people be held responsible, since the press is controlled and even terrorized by the masters. Of course, Japan has a number of well-conducted papers that compare favorably with the best in Europe and America so far as their news-gathering agencies are concerned. Technically, however, their appearance is not of the highest type. Several papers also cater to the proletarian elements, but their troubles are naturally even more serious and frequent than those of the more "respectable" sheets. Their ability to survive usually depends either on submission to the dictates of the censors, or ingenuity in circumlocution, and very often on clandestine production and distribution.

The radio, cinema and theatre also labor under all sorts of restrictions. Cinematography in Japan is not of a high grade either in technique or subject matter. The

¹³ "Social Questions," p. 64. Yokohama.

theatre, on the other hand, is represented by a wide variety of companies, among which the splendid *Kabuki-za* players maintain a very high artistic standard. It may be said here, incidentally, that until comparatively recent times the players of Japan, like those of China, were exclusively male—though there was one short period in former times when both sexes were admitted to the stage; but latterly actresses have appeared with increasing frequency and, in the case of such an artist as Sada Yakko, with world-wide celebrity. It is a curious fact that she was not known in her own country except as a singing-girl, till the echoes of her successes on the Parisian stage in 1900 reverberated on Japanese shores.

Literature. Creative literature is, of course, less subject to censorship and governmental supervision than the daily press. But few books now published in Japan seem of enduring value. Novels are trivial and their authors display no first-class talents. The so-called "proletarian" literature developed in recent years, giving such outstanding works as "The Cannery Boat," by Takiji Kobayashi, and "The Sunless Town" by Naoshi Tokunaga, but the government is suppressing this kind of writing and it is forced underground. Poetry, however, has always flourished in Japan and continues to claim enormous numbers of votaries, for the writing of poems is encouraged not only by contests and other inducements, but by the example of the Emperor, who himself contributes a poem every New Year's Day. But modern Japanese poetry has not invited translation. Indeed, contemporary Japanese literature in general is practically unknown to foreigners. Few translations are published, and those that have been made are apt to be mediocre.¹⁴

Since the Restoration, and the decisive turn toward the

¹⁴ Translations into English, published recently, include some of the better known works of the past; for instance, "A Pilgrimage to Tsurugaoka," translated by C. Arthur Coan, New York, 1933. "The Tale of Genji," by Lady Murasaki, translated by Arthur Waley. New York, 1935, and "Ochikubo Monogatari," translated by Wilfrid Whitehouse. London, 1934.

West for knowledge and inspiration, some Japanese even went so far as to advocate replacing their own language by English, a demand for Western literature naturally developed, and a number of Japanese literati concentrated on translations of the greatest works of the Occident, while many others imitated or closely followed European literary examples. Waves of enthusiasm for English, French and German authors swept over Japan. John Stuart Mill, Spencer and Darwin on one hand, and Shakespeare, Byron, Walter Scott and Dickens on the other, captivated the students and readers of Nippon. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu were followed in popularity by Victor Hugo and Zola. Germans were chiefly represented in the fields of politics, philosophy and history, though of course Goethe, Schiller and Heine also were translated. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenieff, Chekov, Gorky and other Russians were translated and eagerly read, and their effect was profound. But the foreign influence occasionally resulted in strange aberrations. One of the outstanding ideologists of Japanese Fascism, Kosaburo Tachibana, claims that he is a follower of Leo Tolstoy, but instead of the belief of the Russian sage in the non-resistance, this Japanese disciple advocates violence. He was one of the instigators of the terrorist acts of 1932 when Inukai was assassinated.

The effect of the Western theatre on Japan was not always beneficial. The great masters, such as Shakespeare, Molière, Ibsen, often appeared in poor translation, and under unsatisfactory direction, while the influence of imported second and third rate plays has often been deplorable. The Japanese public and the prestige of Western literature in general have suffered alike.

Plastic and Decorative Arts. We come now to the plastic and decorative arts; and here, as might be expected, the influence of the West upon Japan has seemingly been less considerable, while the influence of Japan upon the West has certainly been greater. This is only natural, for sculpture, painting, architecture, pottery and

the like are independent of the written and the spoken word.

In the matter of art the Land of the Rising Sun has contributed lavishly to the world's treasury. Many beautiful Japanese paintings, frescoes, etchings and prints already adorn Western museums. Numerous sculptures of Buddha, Kwannon and other deities and sacred personages, some monumental in size, others small, in clay, stone, wood and other materials, are found in the architecturally intriguing and very often gorgeous temples and shrines so numerous in Japan. Though mostly Chinese and Hindu in origin or inspiration, many of these works of art are purely Japanese. With the introduction of Buddhism there came from Korea and later from China monks, priests, architects and sculptors who not only constructed and embellished a great many monasteries and temples, but started training Japanese talents in their arts. These talents proved their worth. Their highly artistic netzuke and other carvings in ivory, their stone seals, and their sculptures in wood, such as the famous Sleeping Cat at the Nikko Shrine,¹⁵ are universally admired; while the elaborate carvings on the gates, beams and other parts of the various temples, shrines and palaces are known the world over. Embroideries and textiles, especially the gorgeous and beautiful brocades of Old Japan; lacquers in rich variety of shape and color; enamels, including cloisonné, which sometimes compare favorably with those of China; fans, screens, dolls and masks, all serve to support the high renown of the Japanese nation as one of the most artistic in the world. Japanese pottery and porcelain—though no longer as exquisite as the old Imari, Kutani or Satsuma—and Japanese vases, bowls, jars and bottles continue to attract buyers. Sometimes the appeal lies in the exotic originality of the objects. More often, though, it is now to be found in the low price, which increases the quantity of output,

¹⁵ The Japanese are very proud of Nikko temples and have a saying that can be translated as "Don't use the word splendid without seeing Nikko."

but is having a deadly effect on artistic and other qualities.

During recent years a considerable number of Japanese artists and students of art have studied abroad and, bringing back with them the influence of the Occidental schools, have aided the trend of further Westernization.

Music. In music, likewise, the purely Japanese is gradually and reluctantly giving place to the Occidental. Not only have Western composers begun to appeal to a people used to the entirely different music of their own, but orchestras and bands of Western pattern have been assembled in Japan. It has taken time, of course, to overcome their dislike of the completely alien and to them incomprehensible combinations of sounds and rhythm, but gradually more and more Japanese are finding Western music pleasing or at least tolerable; and already a few Japanese composers have begun to write music according to the Western canons of harmony and the rules of counterpoint. At present, however, the old Japanese music and its peculiar instruments remain predominant, though the organ, piano and other Western instruments are found in increasing numbers. The principal Japanese instruments, some of which came from China, include *koto*, a sort of a harp or lyre played mostly by women; *samisen*, the Japanese three-stringed guitar, the instrument favorite with the *geisha*; *biwa*, a kind of mandolin, often used by blind singers; *sho*, the flute; and *taiko*, the drum.

It has been without the slightest desire to underestimate the creative genius of Japan, or to overlook her great artistic contributions, that we have stressed the Western influences so marked in Japan since the Meiji Era, as one of the signs of a growing possibility of the blending of East and West. Of course, the process of mutual understanding would be accelerated if the West tried as earnestly to understand and learn from the East as the East tries to understand the West. The Orientals are doing more than their share, while unfortunately pitifully few Westerners know or even try to comprehend the

East. How few among us know the Oriental languages, how few realize the value of such knowledge, even in a purely utilitarian way? But many of those who began to study Japan and other Oriental countries for practical ends have become enchanted by the beautiful phases of the Orient. There is always beauty everywhere if we care to find it.

Philosophy. In the past Japan had, in the strict sense of the word, no philosophy of her own. The better-educated Japanese used to study the Chinese classics, Confucius, Mencius and Wang Yuang-ming. Now, since the Restoration, they have shifted their interest toward the Western philosophers.

The first to undertake a serious study of the Westerners was Yukichi Fukuzawa, the so-called "Sage of Mita."¹⁶ After a prolonged visit to America and Europe, he wrote his famous book "Conditions of Western Countries," that ardently advocated Western learning. With a very clear style and convincing argument, both in writing and lecturing, he exerted a wide influence. Prolific in his work, Fukuzawa nevertheless was not original; he did not contribute much to the field of philosophy, but was content to popularize the Western classics among his compatriots, following the utilitarian free-thought of England and America of his period, and stressing the importance of utility, because he knew that the samurai were utterly unpractical. Another current of Japanese thought followed the French doctrinaires of social liberalism and radical democracy. Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu were translated and eagerly studied. The sole surviving Genro, Prince Saionji, was among those whose minds developed under strong French influence, while Itagaki, the founder of the first liberal party of Japan, was another ardent disciple of the French school.

But the German ideas, rationalizing Absolutism, proved most welcome to the mind of the Japanese, and in particular to the bureaucrats seeking a political philosophy.

¹⁶ Fukuzawa (1835-1901) resided in Mita, one of the suburbs of Tokyo.

German nationalistic and anti-democratic tendencies, and the German advocacy of autocracy were eagerly adopted by Hirobumi Ito, the compiler of the Japanese Constitution, and numerous other leaders of the Meiji Era. The philosophies of Schelling, Hegel, Hartman and their schools were distinctly preferred to those of French radicals. But as capitalism developed and industrialism expanded, "Japanese thought gradually became tinged with social questions to a remarkable degree."¹⁷ The romantic idealism of Nietzsche found a few admirers, while the anarchism of Bakunin and Prince Kropotkin was quite popular among certain groups. But gradually all these gave place to socialism, which has found adherents in mounting numbers.

After the World War Neo-Kantism and Neo-Hegelism attracted one stream of thought, and Marxism the other. Kant and Hegel appealed to those who preferred the academic approach of individualists lacking in genuine interest toward social problems. With a few exceptions, most of the exponents of this trend are inclined, in the opinion of Professor Tsuchida, toward German philosophers.¹⁸ For those who did not seek escape from reality but were seeking a practical solution of contemporary problems, Karl Marx and later Lenin were the inspirers. This school is interested in constructive criticism of existing civilization and in social thought;¹⁹ its influence is increasing, for ever since the World War, and with the help of the pressure of economics, socialism has been making great headway in Japanese thought. Many among those who once held the individualistic view of life have now acquired a certain social sense. "The view which had been subjective and romantic became objective and actualistic. The view that had been static and speculative

¹⁷ Kyoson Tsuchida, "Contemporary Thought of Japan and China," p. 32. New York, 1927.

¹⁸ Tsuchida, *ibid.*, p. 64, gives the names of Masuyoshi Kihira and Genyoku Kawaki as the Neo-Kantians; Kitaru Nishida as the Neo-Hegelian; and Hajime Tanabe and Shinichiro Nishi as metaphysics.

¹⁹ Takayama; Odo Tanaka; Kojiro Sugimori; Jiro Abe; Kyoson Tsuchida and Manjiro Hagesawa.

became dynamic and practical. The view which had been aristocratic became democratic," wrote Tsuchida.²⁰

Religion. One of the very few things to which the Japanese government pretends indifference is religion. Religious instruction is not taught in the schools, though lessons in "morals" are compulsory and included in every curriculum. The indifference, however, is largely a pretense, for as a matter of fact the government is now encouraging the leaders of various religions, but especially those of Shinto, in an effort to counteract the spread of Marxist ideas. These attempts were and are supported by many among the ruling classes, and have to a certain extent succeeded in diverting people's minds from radical thoughts. Thus indirectly they have aided the religious revival.²¹

The Japanese people in general are not considered religious, in spite of the fact that the number of shrines and temples is very impressive. At least they are not religious in the Western sense; their attitude toward faith is different from any known to us. Their great nationally revered shrines, such as that at Ise, where the sacred gifts of Amaterasu are held, or the Meiji Temple at Tokyo, where the memory of the Great Emperor is worshiped, or the Yasu-kuni Shrine, in the centre of the capital of the Empire, and dedicated to the souls of those who died for their country on the field of honor, are not so much temples as monuments to the national heroes, designed to remind the living of their patriotic duty.

The oldest and the only genetically Japanese religion is the Shinto, which is more a cult of loyalty and patriotism, a popular code of conduct, than a religion. Confucianism, imported from China, was easily assimilated by the Japanese, partly because it elaborates the same principles. The two other foreign religions, Buddhism and Christianity, had not dissimilar histories in Japan, though the former made much deeper inroads and left a much wider and more profound influence.

²⁰ Tsuchida, *ibid.*, p. 176.

²¹ A. Morgan Young, in the magazine, *Asia*, September, 1935.

Buddhism was in disfavor for a short time in the past, and was again suppressed in the early years of the Meiji Era, but is now incomparably more firmly and widely established in Japan than Christianity. Recently, too, Buddhism has been invigorated by a sort of Reformation movement introducing a number of new ideas adapted to the change in times. These innovations range from a variety of Christian Science up to the revised Omoto-kyo, or the cult of the Great Fundamentals, which originated in 1892 with the object of converting, if not conquering, the entire world.²² As for Christianity, even Dr. Nitobe, who was a Quaker and a Christian, had denied that Christian missionaries had contributed any appreciable amount to the making of modern Nippon. "No," he wrote, "as yet Christian missions have effected but little visible in moulding the character of new Japan."²³

Consistently with the desire to see the nation unified in all respects, certain romantics and "loyalists" have advanced the idea of merging all the existing religions in Japan into one synthetic faith, by which means, declares Mr. Tokonami, the statesman who nursed for years that idea, "Japan would make the best of three worlds—national, international and supernatural."²⁴ But General Sadao Araki, in his ardent efforts to incite the nation to the more glorious exploit of reforming the rest of the world, has advocated something less complicated and more direct. In his scorn of the League of Nations and the efforts of the internationally minded "weaklings," he advocates audacity and aggressive activity, not coöperation in religious or any other matters. "The Japanese have a spiritual life of their own, which they are under obligation to heaven to propagate for the enlightenment of the world," declared the multi-talented general. "The

²² Considered "radical" and disrespectful to the Imperial family, this cult recently has been suppressed. (*New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1935.)

²³ Inazo Nitobe, *ibid.*, pp. 157-8.

²⁴ "Religious Revival in Japan," in *Asia*, September, 1935.

urgent need of the Japanese nation" is to "realize justly and effectively the power of the spirit of the Japanese, by which alone peace in the Far East may be secured and the degradation of humanity may be checked."

Mr. Arthur Cristy, from whose interesting article "Religion of Japanese Militarism" the above pronouncements of Araki are quoted, comments on the general's paradoxical aim of propagating peace by conquest. Of the religion of the Japanese soldier Mr. Cristy says: "At its best it represents the highest moral, social and ethical principles of the race; at its worst it reveals that mankind still wrestles with the problems of ruthlessness and national avarice. . . . The Japanese soldier is in a peculiar sense the result of both his heritage and his environment, if by his heritage is understood the Shinto tradition of his ancestors and by his environment the particular phases of that tradition which the controlling bureaucracy of that country has chosen to emphasize."²⁵

This movement in the field of morals and religion, obviously reactionary and destructive as it is in many respects, seems also not without constructive elements. It is a reaction against excessive and indiscriminate borrowing from alien cultures, and as such it may eventually prove beneficial. To follow good examples in order to benefit by the best is very likely the normal process of acquiring knowledge; but imitation alone does not serve progress, and indiscriminate imitation is dangerous. It may so easily deceive, and lead up a blind alley.

It would be nonsensical to assert that the Japanese have no genius except for imitation, but nevertheless it is true that they are peculiarly prone to follow in the steps of others. They adopted the Chinese civilization as early in their history as the sixth century and followed it rather blindly—though not without exceptions—for a very long time. They repeated this procedure again after the Restoration of 1868, this time adopting the Western pattern, without always properly adapting it to their par-

²⁵ In *Asia*, September, 1935.

ticular environment. Bringing together various civilizations with the probable purpose of merging them into a synthesis wholly new is a process inevitably entailing periods of reaction against excess and attempts at reconciliation through readjustments.



MODE OF LIVING

Cities, Villages and Homes—Family, Women and Children—
Dress, Food and Beverages—Amusements—Sports—National
Holidays—Law and the Penal System—Hygiene
and Sanitation.

Cities, Villages and Homes. The first impression of Japan, especially on arrival from Northern Asia, is enchanting; Nippon is picturesque and colorful in the best sense of these words. But it is the natural beauty of the country that begets this feeling of charm. Cities and villages in Japan do not add much to the attractiveness of the scenery. At best they harmonize with surrounding nature and, by introducing no dissonance, preserve the lure of the whole.

Most Japanese cities leave the memory of monotony. Practically none can pretend either to great variety of sights, or to those majestic beauties produced by edifices of outstanding architecture on a grand scale, or by the large open spaces, boulevards and vistas enhancing the approach to public buildings and monuments that are so common in the Occident. Even the most modern and Westernized cities, such as Tokyo, the capital, or Kobe and Yokohama, the largest ports and centres of foreign residents, or Osaka and other preëminently industrial monstrosities, with their factories and clouds of smoke, can scarcely be regarded as attractive. Certainly no city of Japan compares with the great metropolises of other parts of the world; and if one does experience a queer thrill on first visiting Japanese centres of population, it is rather from the outward strangeness of an exotic world than from its intrinsic beauties.

Every community in Japan is proud of something connecting it with the past, and at the railroad stations you

invariably see special boards indicating the objects of local pride and their significance. Often those points of interest will be scenic, to be admired and enjoyed for the enchantment of their vistas, flowers, or woods. Sometimes they are castles or palaces of historical importance. Frequently, too, a famous shrine or temple is the lure.

In the cities particularly these shrines and temples do much to relieve the monotony of prospect by offering examples of real beauty. Few, however, can be said to vary the skyline, for all are of about the same height as the neighboring buildings, since they have no towers or other elevations to bring them much above their surroundings. A few pagodas constitute the only and the rare exceptions. In front of every *Jinja*, or Shinto temple, you see at least one *torii*, the peculiar gateway formed by two upright and two horizontal beams, the upper of which usually forms a sort of a roof with two slopes. These Shinto temples are wooden structures with thatched roofs and are usually very plain and bare inside. Many are surrounded by parks or gardens, with endless rows of big stone or bronze lanterns called *toro*. The *Tera*, or Buddhist temples, are usually more pretentious; some are quite large, though never high, and they are often beautiful and architecturally elaborate. Inside they are highly decorated and, unlike the bare Shinto temples, are filled with statues, paintings, and other sacred objects of art.

Almost without exception the Buddhist temples are located in picturesque surroundings, at the feet of hills or mountains, with woods or forests in the background. Indeed, were it not for these parks and gardens, with the temples and shrines in their midst, most of the cities of Japan could hardly be regarded as attractive in any way.¹ Their narrow streets of small houses may be charming, the houses themselves graceful, but the composite picture will hardly arouse the enthusiasm of any one acquainted with urban centres in other parts of the world.

Such cities as Tokyo, especially since the almost com-

¹ There were 49,654 Shinto and 71,351 Buddhist temples and 1872 Christian churches in Japan in 1933.


plete rebuilding which followed the Great Earthquake of 1923, have broad streets with more automobiles than *jinrikishas*, modern Western style office buildings in stone and in brick, and gorgeous banks or theatres. They also flaunt such other characteristics of Occidental influence as highly un-Japanese statues, some of which are hideous, un-Japanese displays in the stores, electric and neon signs, and billboards with advertisements that add little beauty to the view. Many cities, notably Osaka, are given a Westernized appearance by their factories, store-houses and shops, all of which make them both less Japanese and less pleasing to the eye.

But whatever the size, whatever the character of the particular community, the dwellings are predominantly Japanese. Peculiar in their architecture, and in their interiors, they still preserve, at least outwardly, the Old Japan. The ordinary dwelling houses are one or two storied wooden structures, sometimes with stuccoed parts, but rarely of brick or stone; they are usually roofed with tiles in the cities and with thatch in the country. Rooms of various sizes are made by the use of walls and sliding partitions that are nothing but light wooden frames covered with paper. The paper used on the outside is transparent, to serve as windows—though glass is occasionally seen—while plain or painted paper or silk is used on the insides. These paper walls permit the enlarging of rooms by simply opening the partitions of the adjoining chambers. Between the beams, which serve as the frame for the sliding partitions, and the ceiling, which in ordinary houses is about nine feet from the wooden floor, there may be wooden or bamboo filling, carved in the well-to-do homes, or just plain.

The floors of Japanese houses are completely overlaid by *tatami* or straw mats uniformly two inches thick and three feet by six in length, covered with grass matting. The passages and kitchen are the only exceptions, for these have polished floors. At night the houses are closely shuttered by wooden panels, which also run in grooves on



(a) Street in the Theatre Section of Kobe



Courtesy Consulate-General of Japan, New York, N. Y.

(b) A New Highway, Hiroshima

the outside. The kitchen is commonly a small undecorated room with utensils and a *hibachi*, or pot with ashes in it, on which charcoal is used for cooking as well as for heating purposes. In more modern houses there are rooms of the Western type, with Western furniture, and possibly even an iron stove. Central heating is found in the office buildings, which are mostly of Western architecture, and more rarely in the richer mansions. There is hardly a house in Japan, outside of the slums and the poorest quarters, without a bathtub. These are usually simple wooden tubs into which hot water is poured and used by the entire family, including the servants, one after another, without change of water, but with the one stipulation that every one must soap and rinse himself before entering the tub.


Fragile though they look, the Japanese houses are well adapted to withstand storms and rains and even the less severe earthquake. Their wood and paper construction makes them extremely combustible, however, and big fires, destroying thousands of houses, are among the horrible calamities unfortunately too well known in Japan. Practically every house is surrounded by verandas. Many, too, have gardens attached, and though these gardens are usually only a few square feet in space, they present an illusion of size, thanks to special landscaping with midget trees, stones, rocks, and sometimes a small pond with gold-fish.

The inside of the home is always simple and usually cheerful, and Japanese dwellings—with the exception of the poorest—are invariably clean, neat, airy, and conducted so as modestly to display the artistic taste of the inhabitants. There is very little furniture. No beds are used, for the Japanese sleep on the floor which is covered for the night with *futon*, or mattresses, and blankets; and there are no chairs, for they sit on *zabuton*, or special pillows. Small tables of the kind we use for guests when serving tea are generally seen, but are low enough to be comfortable for one sitting on the floor; and only the

chests of drawers and bookshelves conform at all to the Western convention. Interior decoration is spare, for it is considered bad taste to display too many objects of art at one time, however remarkable they may be; but most of the rooms have their *tokonama*, small niches or slightly raised alcoves in which are placed one or two—never more than three—*kakemono*, or paintings mounted on rollers and hung on the wall, a vase with flowers, and one or two other ornaments. All these should be in harmony with one another, with the season, and with the day. Other treasures remain stored away until the right occasion justifies their exhibition.

Family; Women and Children. The social structure of Japan, like that of many other countries, was shaped by the cult of ancestors. This laid the foundation for the patriarchal family. Posterity and forebears were supposed to continue their relationship forever; the living worshiped the dead, in expectation that their children would do the same, thereby providing for their own future in the great "beyond." The fear of that "beyond" was very real, and the dead were expected to pay for the respect accorded them by interceding with the deities on behalf of their descendants. The effect of such a belief was, of course, to cement the family and keep its members together; and as a result, the Japanese "family" still embraces a much larger circle of people than its equivalent in the West. It is not limited to the man, his wife and their children, though under pressure of modern economic and other factors it is now gradually disintegrating.

The man is still usually the head of the family in Japan; all the rest must obey him, for men are looked upon generally as superior to the fair sex. Woman's status in the past was decidedly one of inferiority, and no tenets of chivalry entered the code of the Japanese knights, the samurai; a woman was required to be obedient first to her father and mother until her marriage, then to her husband and his parents, and, if widowed, to her own son. The treatise by Kaibara (Ekiken) called *Onna Daigaku*,



Interior of a Japanese House

or "The Great Learning for Women," defined the duties of the latter and their place in the family.² This book was written early in the eighteenth century, when women were treated scarcely better in the countries of Europe; though since that time the Occidental ladies have gone far ahead of their Oriental sisters. Even today Japanese wives are often seen walking respectfully behind their husbands, or, to the horror of the inexperienced foreigner, reverently helping their spouses to undress while traveling together on a train. Of course, much has already been achieved in the matter of emancipation; Japanese women no longer suffer from lack of education. Nor are they any longer completely dependent economically, for numerous women can now be wage-earners, though they are still paid much less than men. But the women of Japan are not yet enfranchised, and there is no evidence in sight that this injustice will be repaired in the near future.

Best of all in Nippon is the lot of the children. Much is done to see that these little flowers, the hope of the future, enjoy their youth. They are clad in bright and gay colors; they are offered the best in food. Much freedom is permitted them, especially in pre-school days; and they are well provided with all kinds of toys, which are variegated, amusing, and surprisingly cheap. Unless extreme poverty precludes, the young folk are carefully attended at home, and are well treated in the schools, though their subsequent fate seems of no particular interest either to their teachers or to the government.

The place the children occupy in Japanese society has been masterfully described by Rudyard Kipling in the following verse:

² The ancient Japanese family was polygamous, but for the upper classes only. The Emperor was allowed twelve concubines; princes, eight, and so on down to the common samurai, who was allowed two handmaids. All below were just "ordinary married men." (Lafcadio Hearn, *ibid.*, p. 78.)

Sayonara Nippon

(Good-Bye, Japan.)

Very sadly did I leave it, but I gave my pledge
To the pine above the city, to the blossom by the
hedge,

To the cherry and the maple and the plum tree
and the peach,

And the babies—Oh, the babies! romping fatly
under each.

Eastward ho! Across the water see the black
bow drive and swings

From the land of Little Children, where the
Babies are the Kings.

Dress. Probably the most stubborn of all the outward differences between nations is that of dress; and the Japanese are probably more conservative in the matter of national costumes than Westernized peoples.

Men, women and children alike dress in familiar *ki-mono* of cotton or silk, and wear as many of these garments at once as the season requires. The main difference between the man's, woman's and child's dress is in the design and color of the fabrics used, and in the accessories. For example, men use a simple *obi*, or belt of silk or other material. But for the ladies the *obi* is the most important of their dress: the best jewelry usually is attached to it, while the *obi* itself is made sometimes of brocade or other expensive stuff, and is always more or less elaborately arranged so as to form a butterfly or other similar effect on the back.

Ceremonial occasions require the use of *hakama*, a sort of broad shirt-like trousers, and they are worn not only by men but by women teachers, and by students, boys and girls alike. Another accessory of ceremonial dress is the *haori*, a silk coat, usually, printed with the wearer's crest or coat-of-arms. Indoor footgear consists of the *tabi*, a kind of sock reaching only to the ankle, and having a separate compartment for the big toe. Instead of



(a) Mother in Japanese Kimono with Her
Son in Western Clothes



Courtesy Consulate-General of Japan, New York

(b) Bride in Wedding Robe

shoes, there are *zoori*, straw sandals, sometimes with leather or rubber soles, or *geta*, the wooden clogs that contribute the very peculiar clacking so commonly heard in Japan. These clogs are generally worn outdoors, and for rainy weather there are special *geta* with higher heels. We must also mention the *waraji*, the simplest and cheapest straw sandals bound tightly round the feet. Indoors no sandals are normally used, but only the *tabi*; sandals and especially Western shoes, increasingly worn by officials, business people and students, must be taken off before entering the house, for otherwise the straw matting of the floors could not stand the wear, and the cleanliness of the home would be badly impaired.

To complete the description of Japanese dress, we must remember the fan for warmer weather, the tobacco pouch fastened with a more or less expensive netzuke button, and the pipe, for most Japanese—men and women too—are smokers. Also, of course, an umbrella for the rainy season. These umbrellas are commonly made of waxed paper on bamboo frames, but in the towns the Western kind of umbrella is fast replacing the native brand.

Many men now wear Western hats or caps. Women sometimes cover their heads with scarfs, but never hats, except with Occidental costume. Furthermore, Western dress, as we have seen, is mainly associated with men—officials, students and business people. Japanese women remain more loyal to their native garb, for they learned through a short Western vogue that they are much more attractive in the traditional kimono. The way they dress their hair is one of the most complicated enhancements to their attractiveness. The very generous use, and sometimes abuse, of make-up continues common among city dwellers. For most of the farmer women-folk and for working girls cosmetics are not a daily necessity, though they are used by them too.

In Winter some Japanese use the padded kimono. Others have overcoats, fur coats, or simply fur collars and fur skins used as mufflers. The coolies and laborers wear the *momo-hiki*, a kind of pinafore with bands crossed be-

hind the back, and tight-fitting drawers; and a sort of gaiter, *kyahan*. Their coats are usually marked on the back, and sometimes on the breast, with the hieroglyphs of their employers. In the rainy season farmers wear straw coats, with umbrella-like straw hats to match.

Food and Beverages. It is hardly to be expected that in the fundamental and inescapable function of eating and drinking the Japanese would be different from other people. Not only do they need food and beverages like other nations, but they take three meals a day at very much the same hours as other peoples. First, they like a light meal on rising in the morning; second, a more substantial repast at noon; and third, a dinner, at ease around sunset. The nature of their food, of course, shows a difference, for the Japanese, like any other nation, must eat the products of their soil, their climate, and the other factors contributing to their environment. The staple nutriment of Japan is rice, which is served at every meal; but this basic food is sometimes replaced by cheaper grains in the houses of the less prosperous. Fish and other kinds of sea food, eggs, vegetables, fresh or pickled, including *daikon*,³ with a very little poultry or other meat for those who can afford such a luxury, complete the diet. Food in Japan is usually very clean, free of grease, and delicious.

More elaborate menus, ranging from a modest dinner in one of the numerous cheaper eating-places to the epicurean feasts served in the best restaurants, include a variety of soups, boiled or broiled fish and other sea food, including *tsubo* or seaweed, and roasts. These are preceded by relishes; for example, row-fish cut in slices, which is considered very wholesome and, if really good, has a delicious flavor. The meat course includes such delicacies as *suki-yaki* and *tori-yaki*, special roasts or stews prepared in presence of the guest, or by the guest himself to suit his taste. There are a number of desserts; and most of these, even the cakes and candies, are made of rice, peas or beans, with sugar and some flavoring. For

³ *Daikon* is the Japanese radish. When pickled it acquires an odor which is almost overpowering.

seasoning the food, besides salt and horse-radish, *soyu*, a sauce made of beans, is always present and much used.

Tea, usually the green variety, is the common beverage, and is not only served at all meals, but is always offered to a guest on arrival at any hour. This tea, served in very small cups, is consumed without sugar, milk or lemon, but very often with cakes. The intoxicating beverage, commonly offered at the evening meal only, is *sake*, an alcoholic liquor prepared from rice. It is usually served hot and is consumed in quantity. Real "drunks" are rare in Japan, but many are slightly tipsy every evening. Beer has become a favorite drink with those who can afford it; but European wines, though served at banquets, have not yet become common beverages even among the rich. Western cuisine is proving increasingly attractive to the Japanese, and a number of "European" and "American" restaurants are to be found in practically every city. This, however, is far from saying that Western food is replacing the native diet.

A peculiar and characteristically Japanese way of serving meals may be observed on the trains. At the railway stations one may purchase *bento* or special boxes, usually two in number, and placed one over the other. These *bento* contain a light luncheon of tiny pieces of fish, chicken, omelette, vegetables, mushrooms, and the inevitable rice. Chopsticks⁴ in a paper bag are attached, and a toothpick serves as fastener for the complete package. Tea in a small teapot with a cup on its top may be obtained at the stations for a penny or so.


Dining in Japan, not only at official banquets but in the home, is apt to be a ceremonious affair; rather tiresome to the foreigner unused to kneeling on a cushion with a small low tabourette, instead of the table, before him. But the repasts are not as elaborate, long, and complicated as the famous tea party ceremonies of bygone days, when people had more time and different ideas of using it pleasantly. Then, for hours and hours, guests

⁴ The Japanese use chopsticks instead of forks and knives, and drink their soup directly from the bowl—i.e., without any spoon.

and host might remain in silence, reverently admiring the skill of making tea and of pouring and serving it.

In the restaurants meals are usually served by maids, and the more elaborate feasts include the participation of *geisha*, the singing and dancing girls, one of whose duties it is to pour the *sake* and converse with the guests. This honored institution of Japan is often misunderstood abroad. *Geisha* are not necessarily courtesans. They are trained for years, very often from the tenderest age, in special schools, where they are taught music, singing and dancing. They are also instructed in manners, if not mannerisms, and in grace—in short, in all that is supposed to constitute the refined charms appealing to men. Many of the *geisha* leave their profession to be married, and in the past a number of Cabinet Ministers and other high officials have married *geisha* without shocking public opinion or even, in the general view, contracting a *mésalliance*. However, it is useless to deny that as they have increased in numbers, the *geisha* have become less rigid in their profession as entertainers, and some are no longer distinguishable from the girls of the tea or meeting houses and other less reputable places. In short, this formerly more restricted profession is nowadays often mixed with far less artistic callings.

Amusements. Sports. Aside from the banquets with *geisha*, the favorite Japanese amusements include the *shibai*, or theatre, partly with the classic repertory, partly with modern plays; *hanashika*, or story-tellers; fencing; and wrestling matches of *sumo* or *jiu-jitsu*. The former are the heavily built, exceedingly fat Japanese equivalent of heavyweight champions; while the *jiu-jitsu*, of course, is the specifically Japanese brand of lightweight wrestling that requires more skill and training than physical strength. Travelling is perhaps even more popular in Japan than in Germany with her picnics *ins Grüne*; and points of historical interest, temples, shrines, parks, and places famous for their beautiful scenery or cherry and other blossoms, always attract crowds of visitors or pilgrims. The ascent to the summit of Fujiyama and a few



Feast in a Japanese Restaurant with Geishas

other mountains is always a cherished dream. Another scene of diversion is the public bath-house, always well patronized in Japan, and offering, particularly to the poor, a combination of sanitary exercises with a socially pleasant way of spending time. Then again there are the fortune-tellers; and another popular diversion, particularly with those who enjoy rambling, is a visit to the licensed quarters, such as the famous Yoshiwara in Tokyo. Men and women, often even with their children, will frequently wander down to that part of the city and spend a little time looking at the shameless display of vice, as others might go window-shopping or merely for a stroll.

Distinctively Western amusements have latterly been gaining ground. The cinema is now extremely popular. In the larger cities numerous cafés are to be found where couples may dance in Western style, for the traditional Japanese dances belong rather to the stage, platform, or temple festivals, and are not for mixed participation by men and women. The vogue of the Western theatre, Western music, and such Western sports as golf, tennis, football and baseball⁵ is growing, though mostly in the cities. The rural population, deprived of this kind of recreation, must continue to enjoy purely Japanese merriment, with occasional pilgrimages to sacred or beautiful places. However, they do not seem oppressed with any particular desire for more sophisticated methods of killing time; and perhaps this is because they have no excess leisure to be used "rationally" or otherwise.

National Holidays. A great number of national and local holidays are celebrated in Japan, attracting many pilgrims to the points connected with the occasions. Offerings are made at such times to ancestors or various national heroes; special kinds of food and drinks are served in the home; and with great display of flags, lanterns and other objects of ritual and pageantry is seen. Sometimes there are fireworks, and always the streets

⁵ Western style accommodations for these sports are provided by certain municipalities. In Tokyo there is an enormous stadium called the Meiji-Jingo Baseball Park.

are crowded with folk spending at least part of the day outdoors.


One of the noisiest of these celebrations is the New Year festival, lasting for three days. Decoratively the most elaborate is the girls' festival, on March 3, when special dolls, mostly in historical costumes, are displayed in every home where little girls are in the family. The boys' festival, on May 5, is more lively. It is celebrated outdoors, and not only do the boys themselves fly kites, but every household that contains a boy displays a large balloon-like fish, resembling a carp, made of paper or cotton-fabrics, and attached like a flag to the pole.

Street scenes in Japanese cities are always interesting, holiday or no holiday, and this is specially true of the evenings, when numerous petty merchants come out with their goods on the sidewalks in expectation of attracting buyers. Here you may find all kinds of curios, antique or otherwise, displayed on pushcarts, shelves and benches, or simply on pieces of cloth spread over the sidewalk. Lanterns of waxed paper of various shapes and colors, with candles or oil lamps, serve to illuminate the tempting wares. At such a time the street will resemble a bazaar, offering a variety of goods: cloth and ribbons, fans, toys, fruit, cake, and certainly flowers, always flowers, cut flowers, or flowers in pots, including the midget trees, some of which are exquisite, some of which very old and expensive and some of which are merely cheap shrubbery. The display of flowers is a special art in Japan, in which many girls, and not only those of the well-to-do families, are instructed; and to encourage that art many communities arrange elaborate flower shows always attractive to the beauty-loving Japanese.

As a rule, the Japanese crowd is not as noisy as other Oriental assemblages. The ever present chattering of the crowd itself, talking and laughing, and the special clacking of the wooden *geta* makes mild and not unpleasant additions to the calls of the street vendors. These include the cries not only of those who have their goods on display, but of the peripatetic sellers of a kind of stew



(a) Japanese Girls' Greetings



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.

(b) A Village Scene. Water-mill Near Ito

alled *oden*, or of *tofu*, a dish made of soya-bean curds. In addition one will hear the *kurumaya*, or riksha-puller, shouting his warning to pedestrians, and the song of the *ma*, or blind masseur, announcing his coming to those who need his services. Possibly, too, music of the *koto* or *amisen* will be heard from the homes and restaurants. At night, usually, there is complete silence, with the rare intrusion of a song or the drunkard's brawl.

Even during the festivals, with their large crowds, the order is always quite remarkable, and the conduct of the people at large demonstrates in no uncertain way the high cultural level of the nation. *Junsa*, or policemen, are always present, of course, to direct traffic or answer queries; but they have little to do so far as the behavior of the crowd is concerned. Politeness and consideration of others' interest and convenience are a matter of course all over Japan.

Law and the Penal System. It is generally conceded that the Japanese are dutifully obedient to authority, and in the past no great amount of legislation was necessary. But with the progress of Westernization numerous new laws, patterned mostly on the French model, came into being. These laws were codified and are generally enforced rather strictly, with two conspicuous exceptions. These exceptions, of course, are the acts pertaining to the constitutional rights of free speech, free assembly and free press, and the labor laws passed over the opposition of the ruling classes and never a real protection for the workingman.

The system of trial in Japan remains, very much as it was in the past, inquisitorial. When we remember that the police in Japan have unusually broad powers, and frequently act in an arbitrary manner, we can easily see how this inquisitorial approach often leads to abuses—even to third degree methods and tortures for obtaining "confessions" from prisoners.

The penal system of Japan has been modernized, and some of the prisons have been reformed to comply with the best Western models. But in others certain echoes of

the Old Japan are heard. Sanitary conditions in some of the penal institutions are decidedly unsatisfactory. The treatment of inmates is not always up to the accepted standards of humanitarianism. Capital punishment has not been abolished, and an average of about fifty death sentences are recorded annually. The fact that in some cases in which offenders of a political character, vaguely accused of crimes against the state, have been executed after a burlesque trial has scarcely added to the reputation of justice in Japan. As we have seen, when discussing labor conditions, the proletarian parties, and the movement to suppress so-called "dangerous thoughts," the number of political prisoners in Japan is large and their treatment ruthless.⁶

Hygiene and Sanitation. In a country with such a dense population as Japan public health provisions would seem of extreme importance. So far, however, the practice of medicine in that country has been mainly a private matter, and very little is being done to further socialization. Medical science in Japan stands high, and research in that field is conducted on a rather large scale and with greatly commendable results. Already the Japanese have made highly valuable contributions to the world's knowledge and the universal benefit of humanity; indeed, the names of such scientists as Kitasato and Noguchi are known the world over. But so far not enough is done for the betterment of public health of the Japanese people at large. There are various obstacles to this. The high cost of medical service, as compared with the low standard of living, is one; and the opposition to the idea of socializing that service is another.

But if medical attendance, by remaining in private hands, is out of reach of the majority, sanitation and hygiene, which are under the control of the state, take

⁶ An interesting peculiarity of Japan is that the number of women in prisons is very small and unusually smaller in proportion to the men inmates if compared with other countries. At the end of 1932 there were 52,508 inmates in the prisons, of which only 779 were women. ("Résumé Statistique de l'Empire du Japon," 1935. Tokyo.)

better care of the population. Well organized and supervised, they counterbalance to a certain extent the sad results of inadequate medical care by foreguarding against contagious diseases through teaching and enforcement of the principles of hygiene, and the provision of proper sanitary conditions.

The number of hospitals in Japan is inadequate. In 1933 there were all together 2489 hospitals,⁷ of which less than one half of one per cent were state or public institutions, while some ten per cent of the whole number were located in the villages. The number of physicians licensed to practice in 1932 was 50,091; ⁸ and this number indeed represents a higher proportion of medical service to the total population ⁹ than some European countries can show. But a large number of these physicians were not of high professional standing. There are also many quack doctors and healers in Japan. The 17,166 dentists licensed in 1932 were not sufficient for the country's needs, and their distribution was such as to leave the teeth of the rural population practically without professional attention. The large number of midwives (54,655) must indicate that much of the attendance rendered at birth in Japan is given by these inadequately prepared persons, with the consequence that the proportion of still-births exceeds five per cent.

Health protection offered by the state includes cost-price treatments and free medical treatment at the hospitals for the poor. These hospitals—also not numerous enough—are not unlike dispensaries. There were in 1932 eight insane asylums kept by public funds and 102 private institutions. The public sanatoria for the tubercular numbered sixty-nine, in addition to private institutions, for tuberculosis in Japan is still alarmingly prevalent.¹⁰ There

⁷ Against 6334 hospitals in the U.S.A.

⁸ As compared with 159,105 physicians in the U.S.A. About 3 per cent of all physicians of Japan are women.

⁹ Namely, 10.14 per cent.

¹⁰ Out of 1,193,987 cases of death in 1933 there were 146,000 cases from various kinds of tuberculosis. Another 10 per cent were ascribed to pneumonia and kindred causes.

are also public and private leper asylums. But all these being quite inadequate in number, the problem of public health is not well met in Japan. That is why the things most dreaded by the laboring classes are sickness and industrial accidents, and the latter are numerous owing to the inadequate protection of labor by proper devices in the factories and other places of work. Once smitten by sickness, or disabled by injury, a workman is thrown out of work, no matter how much he may desire it. He has very rarely means of paying for medical treatment, his days of unemployment may be prolonged forever, he may in the end be stripped of such few possessions as he has, and his family may starve.

Vaccination and other prophylactics, quarantine, sanitary inspections, disinfection, health examinations for school children, soldiers and sailors and in some instances for factory workers, keep mortality in Japan on a fairly moderate basis, though it remains much higher than in the U.S.A. and other countries with better provisions for public health. Nor are infectious diseases alarmingly prevalent, though a few cases of cholera are recorded every year, and typhoid fever shows higher figures than appear, for instance, in the United States. Diphtheria has a large number of victims too, and with a high percentage of fatality. Trachoma is prevalent in a number of localities, and constitutes one of the serious problems in Japan. *Beriberi*, or sleeping sickness, which comes from too much rice, is among a number of diseases of malnutrition and improper diet. Tuberculosis, as we have seen, still ravages Japan to a far greater extent than in most of the countries which are more advanced in preventive medicine.

But when all this is said, it must be admitted that, considering the physical conditions under which the authorities struggle, they are doing very well indeed. Water-works in Japan provide drinking water to only 13.5 per cent of the total population. Sewerage systems are found only in the larger cities. The disposal of refuse is primitive and in many cases borders on direct neglect of the most

elementary requirements of sanitation. The funds available are miserably inadequate, for too much money is required by the militarists; and little hint is given of any real improvement. As we have seen, almost nothing is heard about socialization of medicine, which is probably the only effective way of protecting the nation's health and prolonging people's lives.

Vital statistics of Japan illustrate this point. In 1933 there were 2,121,253 births, with 114,138 still-births. The total number of deaths was 1,193,987, making the net increase of population 927,266. This represented a net gain of 13.79 per ten thousand population, which is not a high figure if compared with sixteen ¹¹ in the United States and over twenty in the U.S.S.R. But the mortality of 17.36 per ten thousand in Japan during the same year was considerably higher than in many other countries, where the average was not much higher than twelve. If we examine the averages for the decade 1924 to 1933 we see that the births were thirty-three per ten thousand, which is considerably higher than in most of the other major countries. But also the death average was very much higher: until 1930 it was over twenty.

If in spite of inadequate provisions for the protection of health Japan now has quite a high percentage of increase in population, one can expect a still larger increase when these shortcomings are eliminated. There are, of course, other factors tending to check the "alarming" growth of population even without application of the birth-control methods so ardently advocated for Japan by foreigners and a few Japanese. But at this juncture the annual addition of almost a million new "souls" means not only so many more conscripts for the army and the navy of the Mikado, but also so many more mouths to be fed, so many more potential candidates for work. In short, this growth of her population does much to aggravate the problems Japan faces today, and is adding to the numerous difficulties she must overcome in the future.

¹¹ Average for 1920-30.



JAPAN AND THE OTHERS

China—England—The Soviet Union.

ONE of the strangest phases of Japan's development is to be found in the history of her international relations. That history, as we know, is not entirely modern. Even before the Restoration the Land of the Rising Sun had not always been a hermit nation; so a brief recapitulation of her former dealings with the outside world seems desirable.

In the remote past, as we have seen, Japan had more or less regular intercourse with her neighbors Korea and China, and from them she borrowed most of her culture of that period. The Chinese influence on Japan was especially deep and wide, lasting for over one thousand years; and the trade relations existing at the same time were mutually beneficial, though political intercourse was marred on a number of occasions. As for contact with the Western world, it goes back as far as 1542, when Japan was visited by Portuguese traders; and the nationals of other countries quickly followed, although, having once established contact with the Island Empire, the foreigners made little headway except in the development of trade. In 1549 there arrived in Nippon the Jesuit father Francis Xavier, called "the Apostle of Japan," and missionaries from various countries came later to continue his work. For a time their teachings found a large and responsive audience; but this period was short, and gave place not only to the persecution of Christianity, but to an almost complete exclusion of the Westerners. Early in the seventeenth century Japan became, as we have seen, a hermit country, practically cut off from the rest of the world. She remained so for over two hundred years; and her intercourse with foreigners during those two centuries was

limited to commercial dealings with the few Hollanders and Chinese permitted to visit and reside on the small Deshima Island.

The Meiji Era was preceded by the restoration of foreign relations forced on the Shogunate not so much by the visit of Commodore Perry as by the demands of the economic life of the country. Since that time these relations have developed, generally speaking, on accepted international lines. Now and again, however, Japan has demonstrated that her diplomacy is not completely free of certain peculiarities surviving from the period of her seclusion.

Among the peculiarities marking Japan's relations with the outside world is the alarmingly large number of assaults on representatives of foreign countries. In the early years of the Restoration several American and British diplomats were attacked. In 1891 an attempt on the life of the Czarevitch, who became later the Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, was made in Otsu. In 1895 the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung-chang, was attacked and wounded by a would-be assassin at Shimonoseki, where peace negotiations at the close of the Sino-Japanese War had been started. In more recent years one of the Soviet trade representatives, enjoying diplomatic privileges, was assailed, and a number of attempts have been made on the lives of various other foreign diplomats.

In outlining the permanent bases of Japanese foreign policy, Viscount Ishii declared ¹ that "ever since Japan's entrance into the family of modern nations her diplomacy has striven, and still strives, to attain two objectives—equality and security." The first, he added, "has been almost, but not entirely, attained; the second has for seven decades been the absorbing problem of the nation and will evidently remain such for long years to come."

One of the first tasks of the new Japanese diplomacy, as shaped to conform with Western principles, lay in the revision of the so-called unequal treaties. The initial step

¹ His article under that title in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1933.

in that direction was taken in 1871, when a special mission under Prince Iwakura was sent abroad. The results were disappointing. Five years later the United States made a pact with Japan, known as the Bingham treaty, whereby all the chief points sought by Japan were conceded. One clause, however, was inserted which invalidated all the rest—a clause to the effect that the treaty was not to go into force until all the other Powers should have concluded treaties of a similar purport. In 1881, a diplomatic conference was convoked at Tokyo, but failed to achieve any tangible results. A similar conference five years later had no better luck.

Under pressure of a public opinion voicing condemnation of the restrictions on Japanese sovereignty, Okuma, then Foreign Minister, tried direct separate negotiations with the several Powers instead of dealing with all jointly, and in 1889 the first treaty on the footing of absolute equality was concluded by Japan with Mexico, and signed at Washington, D. C. England was the first to renounce extraterritorial rights in Japan. To this she agreed in August, 1894, during the Sino-Japanese War, though the actual signing of the treaty incorporating this change was postponed. Five years later a real revision of the unequal treaties was commenced. Beginning in 1899 with the restoration of the judicial autonomy of Japan, the process continued for another twelve years, and by 1911 all restrictions had been abolished, and even tariff autonomy was regained.

Under the Japanese Constitution the power of carrying on foreign relations formally resides exclusively and without restrictions in the Emperor. The Cabinet negotiates the treaties, while by virtue of the Imperial Ordinance defining the functions of the Privy Council the latter advises the Emperor in the matter of ratification. Essentially a compromise between the old monarchical tradition of Yamato and the modern democratic theories of the West, the Constitution of Japan embodies in broad outlines the foundations of Japanese national policy developed since

the beginning of her history, colored by basic principles of modern constitutionalism.²

In practice, therefore, the Foreign Minister of Japan, whatever his nominal power may be, is not always able to act in accordance with his own understanding of affairs and in compliance with his own plans. There is always the Privy Council, without whose approval the agreements reached by the Foreign Office have very little chance, if any, of being ratified by the Sovereign. Still worse, there are the army and the navy, whose Ministers have the right of direct access to the Emperor, and who can therefore invalidate the efforts of their colleague in the Foreign Office. Already this has happened on a number of occasions.

China. The most typical cases of this kind are to be found in the history of Japan's relations with her nearest neighbor. The 1894-5 war against China was started in a way clearly demonstrating that army and navy were in complete control of the affairs of state. At the time of the Chinese war, too, Japan declared that she was forced to start fighting in the interest of peace; and this has been the omnipresent refrain accompanying all the many acts of aggression that have characterized Japan's international relations in the present century.

The weakness of China, long suspected by others, became quite evident with this defeat inflicted by Japan. An "orgy of concessions" followed. In point of fact the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 acted as a kind of signal for the partition of the Celestial Empire by the "civilized nations."

China paid a high price for that first encounter with her modernized neighbor; it resulted, as we know, in the loss of considerable territory and a heavy indemnity. But this was only a curtain raiser to the impressive show Japan was preparing to stage in China later on. The suppression of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 also provided substantial

² Takeuchi Tatsuji, "War and Diplomacy in Japan," p. 37. New York, 1935. For the text of the Constitution see Appendices to the present book.

material benefits to Japan, as it did to the other participants in that celebrated "restoration of order" in "backward" China.

In 1904 Chinese soil again became a battleground, this time for Japan and Russia. Again the Celestial Empire had to pay for the new success of the Land of the Rising Sun, by "approving" the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, which transferred to Japan many of the Russian rights and concessions in Manchuria. This transfer, acknowledged by the Peking Protocol of 1905, subsequently acted as a springboard for the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, for the latter included one providing for the extension of the leases for ninety-nine years. In 1931 it served as a starting point for the occupation of Manchuria as well.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the World War offered new opportunities for Japanese penetration. The occupation of Shantung, taken from the Germans at the outbreak of the war, and the serving of the Twenty-one Demands, were rendered possible because the Great Powers were busy on the fighting fronts and therefore unable to interfere, and because of the conditions of China. The Celestial Empire, now a republic, had not been rejuvenated by revolution. On the contrary, it was further weakened by internal dissent and by the intrigues of her President, Yuan Shi-kai. The latter had planned to elevate himself on the throne, and therefore became a prey for Japanese schemers, who watched him closely and knew how to exploit his weakness.

To stiffen her grip on China, Japan simultaneously used another weapon. Knowing only too well how badly Peking was in need of money, Tokyo generously offered her assistance. She financed the construction of a number of railways built by the Chinese in Manchuria—only to foreclose when the latter failed to pay back the loans. In her ardent desire to help, Japan went far beyond the actual requests of China, and forced on her the so-called Nishihara loans to the amount of one hundred million dollars gold, a considerable part of which disappeared into

the bottomless pockets of the various war-lords and other Chinese grafters of the old order.

The growing arrogance of Japan in her dealings with Peking, together with a number of other causes, brought about the convocation in 1921 of the Washington Conference. Designed to check Japan, it succeeded, outwardly at least, in settling among other things the problem of China. Japan, as one of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, pledged herself to respect China's sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity, and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges. Moreover, she promised by that agreement "to provide fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." The events of 1931 and later were to prove the futility of that document, in so far as Japan's activities in China are concerned.*

When the Nationalist forces of China under Chiang Kai-shek were struggling with the reactionary North, then represented by Chang Tso-lin, the old friend of Japan, the latter scarcely kept her promise of "providing fullest opportunity to China." Through the Tsinanfu incident of May 3, 1928, she interfered in a most scandalous manner. The "positive" policy of General Tanaka, then the Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, was opposed to any fighting on Manchurian soil, yet did not favor Manchurian allegiance to the Nationalist government. That is why Tanaka, without troubling to ask the sanction of the Throne, ordered troops to China to stop the advance of Chiang Kai-shek's armies, and approved the arrogant position taken by the Japanese Commander vis-à-vis those Chinese troops.

It is true that the Tsinanfu incident occurred a year later than the famous Nanking incident, in which American and British warships bombarded the new capital city of China; and the Japanese lost no chance to remind the others of that bloody affair. But it is also true that the

* See the text of the Nine-Power Treaty in the Appendices.

Tsinanfu incident, explained as an attempt to save the Manchurian war-lord, Chang Tso-lin, from defeat by the Nationalists, preceded by only about a month the mysterious assassination of the same Chang "under the bridge guarded by Japanese troops."

Despite Japan's objections, the son and the heir of the murdered Chang Tso-lin, the so-called young Marshal Chiang Hsueh-liang, soon recognized Nanking's authority; and until 1931, when he finally lost his domain to the Japanese, he continued, though irregularly, to be more or less loyal to the Nationalist régime. The year 1931, as we know, saw the end not only of the young Marshal's rule, but of China's suzerainty over Manchuria. The occupation of the latter, and the shaping of Manchukuo, were followed by Japanese occupation of Jehol and parts of Chahar. This drama, too, was staged by Japanese army men stationed on the mainland, undoubtedly with the approval of their superiors in Tokyo, and with the cognizance of the government.

By the Spring of 1933 the Tangku truce actually established the acquiescence of China, or rather of the ruling group at Nanking, in the new situation created by the Japanese bayonets north of the Great Wall.

Two years later Japan renewed her pressure on China, not because of the designs of the Foreign Office, but in accordance with the plans of the Kwantung army. First the Japanese advocated, and later sponsored, the formation of autonomous régimes in the northern provinces of China; and secondly they demanded that Nanking put a stop to anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese population. They also insisted on the recognition of Manchukuo, and the acceptance of Japan's coöperation in eradicating Communists. Here the militarists were openly supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hirota; and their demands, or Three Conditions, became known as Hirota's own three-point program. Actually this program demanded that China should do whatever Japan dictated. On condition of complete submission, China was promised the friendly coöperation of Japan, and this, of course,

would provide the foundation for peace in the Far East.

A number of factors have recently delayed a realization of Japan's continental ambitions. One is to be found in the widespread students' demonstrations staged against the intruders, all over China, and which served to inflame the already growing indignation of the broad masses. Another lies in the fact that the reluctance of Chiang Kai-shek and several war-lords in the northwest to abide by the new humiliating demands of Japan has slowed down the process of formation of new independent states. The bloody events which occurred in Japan proper, on February 26, 1936, have retarded the process still further, but hardly for long. Japanese advocates of audacity and aggression, far from losing their power, remain a very real menace to China's independence. Their daring plans of building up the Empire at the expense of others, beginning with China, have not been abandoned. That the problem is serious we already know, for it is not only in Geneva that people have found out that to check the Japanese one needs more than diplomatic notes filled with lamentations. More, too, is needed than international commissions, staffed with high experts and headed by prominent statesmen, to examine on the spot such evidence as a piece of rail deranged by the Chinese, apparently in order to supply the Japanese with an excuse for the building of Manchukuo.

Such, then, is the kind of diplomacy used by Japan in dealing with her weak neighbor, divided by internal strife, exploited by the Powers, and unable to resist aggression. As for the explanations offered by the Japanese in justification of their high-handed policy in China, they will hardly convince any sound critic. They are conspicuous for unrestricted sophistry and word-twisting, and have generally seemed devoid of any degree of sincerity. Who, for example, could accept at face value the explanation of the Sino-Japanese War offered by Mr. Tsunejiro Miyaoaka, the "distinguished international lawyer of Tokyo and for many years correspondent of the Division of Inter-course and Education of the Carnegie Endowment," as

he was described by the Director of that body, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, in the February, 1935, issue of the International Conciliation series? Mr. Miyaoka writes:

"In 1894 China had not only overwhelmingly strong armies as compared with the very small army which Japan had at that time, but a powerful navy consisting of ships built in the German dockyards. It was because our existence as a nation was threatened that Japan had to declare war on China. We came out the best from that struggle; but of course we were not sure of the result in the beginning, and I recall with gratitude the sympathies which were extended to us by the peoples of the world in that unequal struggle, particularly by the people of the United States of America."³

If the American people in 1894-5 were supplied with information as "reliable" as that offered by Mr. Miyaoka, then there is little wonder that their sympathies lay with Japan. For our further enlightenment this "distinguished lawyer" made in the same pamphlet the following amazing revelations:

"Now, having heard me declare that the maintenance of friendly relations with all the rest of the world, promotion of cultural relations, and the advancement of mutual commercial and economic interests by foreign trade are the principles on which Japan's foreign policy was based, you would naturally ask me to explain categorically how Japan proposed to apply that policy toward China. These are the answers: First, Japan has never committed an act detrimental to the integral maintenance of the independence of China or any of her legitimate interests . . . second . . . Japan has consistently maintained the policy of the Open Door and of equal opportunity to all nations in their relations with China. It is unnecessary to say that Japan observes all treaties entered into by her individually with each of the Powers or multilaterally with several Powers."

Strange as it may seem to those who write such "explanations" and to those who accept them in all seriousness, neither the League of Nations nor any of the indi-

³ International Conciliation Series, No. 307, pp. 39-41.

vidual Powers, including China, is inclined to share the opinions expressed so eloquently by Mr. Miyaoka. No well-informed person would dispute the fact that Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was not an "incident" but a natural outgrowth of Japanese policy of long standing.

"There is, probably, nowhere in the world an exact parallel to the situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighboring state such extensive economic and administrative privileges," said the Lytton Report. Japan obtained that position gradually by systematically gaining exceptional "treaty rights" and "special position" needed for "military defense," and so forth, all of which were vaguely defined and therefore allowed the broadest interpretation by the Japanese themselves whenever circumstances warranted. It is therefore amusing to follow the frequent attempts to account for the Manchurian affair by a specific "psychology." The Japanese, says Takeuchi, "became used to regarding Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as distinct from the rest of China, and to consider the maintenance of peace and order in this region to be peculiarly within the exclusive domain of their responsibility."⁴

The occupation of Manchuria was planned long ago. The famous "Nakamura incident" was only one of the pretexts. But this slaying of Captain Nakamura by unidentified persons while he was travelling through Mongolia in disguise was played to the limit by the militarists of Japan. The incident of September 18 on the South Manchuria Railway, given by the Japanese as explanation of the bombardment of Mukden and the occupation of Manchuria, was actually preceded by elaborate preparations for these "unexpected developments." The informative volume by Professor Takeuchi, that we quoted above, reveals that three days before this incident the now famous General Doihara, then a Colonel, left Tokyo, after an important conference, held by Minami, the Minister of War, and at which "those present were deter-

⁴ Takeuchi, *ibid.*, p. 339.

mined to seek the settlement by a resort to force if satisfactory solution could not be obtained through diplomacy." ⁵

The developments in Manchuria which followed the night affair of September 18 are typical of Japan's methods during the early days of the occupation of that part of China. First the military authorities of Tokyo declared that they were not planning to aggravate the situation, though they were ready to enlarge the military operations if necessary. In addition, they declared that they had no plans to dispatch any troops from Korea to Manchuria. On this occasion, as on many others, the military people not only defied the civil branch of the government, but, having promised one thing, did the opposite. The troops were sent.

Vis-à-vis the rest of the world the Japanese tactics of that period were typical in the *démarches* made and explanations offered by the Japanese officials to the League of Nations and the Powers. The delegate at Geneva, Mr. Yoshizawa, warned the Council of the League "against premature intervention, as it would only have the deplorable result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion." The same manoeuvre of frightening the others was tried again and again. On January 30, 1932, the Japanese representative, Mr. Saito, warned the members of the Council of the League of Nations not to rule on China's complaint regarding the hostilities at Shanghai, for "a very bad impression might be created in Japan." But in this instance the Council overrode his objections and accepted the proposal of forming at Shanghai a commission of representatives of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Norway to report to the League on the incident.

The affair was, of course, a side-show, successfully designed by Nippon to divert the attention of the Powers from the Manchurian events by menacing their direct interests in Shanghai. On January 27 Tokyo issued an Ultimatum to China protesting against an assault on Japanese monks, and against anti-Japanese propaganda.

⁵ Takeuchi, *ibid.*, pp. 348-9.

Simultaneously the Japanese Navy Department issued a statement that unless the demands be accepted promptly, the Imperial Navy would be forced to take independent action "to safeguard the life and property" of Japanese residents in Shanghai. An unconditional acceptance was received by the Japanese Consul-General before the expiration of the time limit, but hostilities were started just the same. Ambassador Debuchi at Washington, and other Japanese diplomats at other capitals, made frequent declarations assuring the Powers of the peaceful intentions of the Japanese in Asia, and promising an eventual withdrawal of the troops. But all this apparently was designed only to gain time and to insure a free hand in proceeding with the plans laid down by the jingoes.

The bombardment of Chinchow by the Japanese, after the promise given by the Tokyo government not to aggravate the crisis, "gave the impression at all capitals of the world that any pledge of that government given to the League could be made a mere scrap of paper by the army, over whose action it had no control." The words are those of Professor Takeuchi.⁶

In concurrence with Japanese diplomats, many attempts were made by the League to prevent further hostilities in Manchuria pending investigation by a special commission from Geneva. All were frustrated by opposition from Tokyo based on "very liberal" interpretations of the Japanese Constitution. This was not the only example of the coöperation, voluntary or otherwise, of the Foreign Office with the army, in spite of the former's protestations of disapproval of the actions initiated by the militarists. The expedition in China was denounced by the left-wing labor group, *Rono-taishu-to*, led by Professor Ikuo Oyama, but this opposition was ruthlessly curbed by the government. On the other hand, the so-called Socialists, or *Shakai-minsei-to*, the group under Professor Iso Abe, adapted a vacillating attitude toward the Manchurian adventure, and even offered a certain

⁶ Takeuchi, *ibid.*, p. 358.

justification. This attitude was given wide publicity by the same government.

On February 16, 1932, the Council of the League of Nations broadly implied that, by her actions in Manchuria and in Shanghai, Japan had violated Article X of the Covenant, as well as the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. The Tokyo government openly repudiated the implication in an answer couched in most vigorous language, and contended that the appeal of the League was "addressed to a quarter where it was not necessary." This historic note concluded by advising the Powers "to exert their utmost efforts to induce the Chinese to refrain from aggressive acts." And to accentuate her contempt of the League, Japan followed up the correspondence by proclaiming, on March 1, the foundation of the "independent" state of Manchukuo.

Were the people's representatives of Nippon opposed to all this? By no means. Indeed, on June 14, 1932, the Diet recommended that the government recognize Manchukuo "as the United States recognized Panama."

On July 4 of the same year the Lytton Commission arrived at Tokyo, and in less than two weeks left for Peking to prepare its report to the League. On September 15 General Muto, then Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo, signed with that "child of conflict" the Protocol of mutual assistance. The Japanese Government explained to an astonished world that she was violating no treaty obligation, as Manchukuo was no longer a part of China but a "secessionist state." But the Lytton Report maintained a different view; it declared that "the new régime of Manchuria cannot be considered to have been called to existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement... it was an instrument of the Japanese."⁷ A number of authoritative Japanese commentators concurred in this opinion. Likewise unacceptable was the explanation offered by the Japanese that "their operations were measures of legitimate self-defense."

⁷ Lytton Report, p. 97.

When asked at Geneva why his country did not first submit her grievances to the League, Mr. Matsuoka, the chief delegate of Japan, explained that: "(1) The national sentiment did not permit of outside interference with the Manchurian question; (2) the Japanese residents in Manchuria feared that their position would be seriously undermined by the delay invariably attendant upon League procedures; (3) the Japanese had persisted, perhaps, too long in a hope of a solution, due largely to the difference in mentality between them and Westerners; (4) the breaking point was reached unexpectedly, after which the events took their own natural course." That the Japanese representative utterly disregarded the facts it is almost unnecessary to add.

When the Assembly of the League adopted by unanimous vote the report of the Commission of Nineteen condemning the actions of Nippon as defiance of the peace structure of the world, and recommended the non-recognition of Manchukuo as an act of public censure of the Japanese adventure, Mr. Matsuoka left the Assembly, followed by the entire Japanese delegation. One month later Tokyo advised Geneva of its intention to withdraw from the League. Was it possible that the League, representing the overwhelming majority of the nations of the whole world, was wrong, while Japan alone was right?

In the article quoted earlier in this chapter, Viscount Ishii asserted that Japan's "policy in China has been based upon the belief that the establishment of an *imperium in imperio* upon her soil by any powerful third nation or group of nations is not only derogatory to her integrity but is also incompatible with our own security," and that "for this reason, if for no other, the preservation of China's integrity was essential to our safety. It was for this reason that we induced China to agree not to cede any part of the province of Fukien to any foreign Power, that we fought Russia in Manchuria, and that we obliged Germany to withdraw from Shantung." Curiously enough, all these provinces of China became points of

attraction to Japan herself. Possibly this is comparable with the pronouncement of the Russia of the Tsars, when jointly with others she first advised Japan to return the Liaotung to China, and three years later obtained the Liaotung concession for herself. But what was wrong for Russia can hardly be right for other "friends of China and advocates of peace," including Japan.

In the closing paragraph of his article Viscount Ishii offered the following explanation:

"The appearance of Manchukuo as an independent state has not materially altered our policy, except for such temporary measures as have been taken to meet the readjustments consequent upon the change of government. Pursuing our traditional policy of security we shall coöperate with any government in Manchuria which, in our judgment, best appreciates that policy and will best coöperate with us. This, and only this, is the guiding principle of our conduct in Manchuria. Today, as thirty years ago, Manchuria is the key to our security."

England. When Japan commenced the latest illustration to the above quoted explanation of her policy in Manchuria, the attitude of England was a puzzle to many. Sir John Simon, then British Minister of Foreign Affairs, refused to support the policy inaugurated on that occasion by his colleague at Washington, Secretary of State Stimson, and the attitude of Paris proved similar to that of London. As a result, the United States, single-handed, failed to check Japan. The note on non-recognition of Manchukuo, sent by Secretary Stimson on January 7, 1932, was answered by Japan only on January 16, and answered in a sarcastic tone, defying the U.S.A. to do something to stop her. But the awkward policy of Sir John Simon, and his hope that Japan might reckon with the Communists, if left alone, does not sufficiently explain the attitude of England. The cause lay much deeper. It was to be found in the very complex and delicate situation then created for Great Britain in the Far East.

England's relations with Japan go back approximately to the time when Commodore Perry's visit demonstrated to the Shogunate the necessity of opening the doors of Japan to foreign trade. Her relations with the modern Japan of the Meiji Era were shaped to a great extent by Sir Harry Parkes, who was appointed British Minister to the Court of Yedo in 1865, and remained in Japan after the Restoration and until 1883. This able diplomat, who served his country in the Far East for over forty years, is credited not only with having been the first of the well-informed foreign representatives to support the adherents of the Mikado from the very outbreak of the civil war of 1868, but also with having helped to mould Japanese history after the Restoration. "Sir Harry," declared Basil Chamberlain, "was always a staunch supporter of his country's commercial interests and believer in the 'gunboat policy' of his master, Lord Palmerston. His outspoken threats earned for him the dread and dislike of the Japanese during his sojourn in Japan. But no sooner had he quitted Tokyo than they began to acknowledge that his high-handed policy had been founded in reason."⁸

In the middle of the nineteenth century England's trade with Asia was already quite considerable. The Opium War with China in 1842 had resulted in strengthening her hopes for profitable trade in that part of the world. The holdings of England in Asia were already so numerous and her interests so diverse that it was obvious that Japan's entrance in the same arena must be a matter of great concern to the Mistress of the Seas. Before the Meiji Era she had failed to establish commercial relations with the domain of the Shoguns on any considerable scale, even though an English pilot named Will Adams, who came to Japan in 1600, had succeeded in obtaining certain concessions for the merchants of his native land. But under the new régime England lost no time in developing trade with the Mikado's Empire.

England was the first country to supply Japan with

⁸ Chamberlain, *ibid.*, pp. 361-2.

instructors in military affairs, but was soon replaced in that field by the more advanced experts of France and Germany. In naval matters, however, the British became real instructors for this newcomer to the family of imperialistic and militaristic nations. In the sphere of diplomacy they served, of course, as examples, though in many instances the Japanese pupils surpassed their tutors, if not always in a way that the latter approved.

Before the close of the nineteenth century Great Britain and Japan found their respective interests in Asia could best be served by joint action. The work of Count Hayashi, then Minister to the Court of St. James, resulted in a Treaty of Alliance signed by him at London with Lord Lansdowne in January, 1902. This important pact, renewed in 1905 and again in 1911 for ten more years, determined Anglo-Japanese relations not only for its duration but even for years following its expiration. In negotiating that alliance Japan offered Great Britain various inducements, among which was the declaration of Tokyo that she would have no objection to the occupation by England of Wei-hai-wei, the Chinese port temporarily held by Japan since her war with China in 1894-5. But England also wanted this alliance, for she was then seeking an ally to curb Russia, her traditional rival in Asia. So actually the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a counter-manceuvre to the Russo-Japanese *rap-prochement* eagerly sought by Prince Ito. It enabled Japan to start her war against Russia in 1904; and it strengthened England's position in Eastern Asia, partly at the expense of Russia, partly at the expense of the United States.

This alliance prepared the way for Japan's entrance into the World War on the side of the Allied Powers, though England doubted the desirability of Nippon's participation, and wished her to confine her activities to the destruction of German warships in the Far East. But Kato, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured England in a special memorandum that his country entertained no territorial ambitions and that her entry into the war

would in no way threaten British trade. But whatever the assurances of Tokyo may have been at that moment, England was soon forced to countenance Japan's plan of extending the lease of Kwantung; for Sir Edward Grey had told Kato in 1912 that this question was one "to be settled between Japan and China, and one not to be intervened in by a third party," which meant, of course, that England had no objections to offer. To say this does not mean, of course, that England did it gladly. During the war various "agreements" were forced by Japan not only on Great Britain and the other Allies, but even on the United States in the form of the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917. Other promises given by England to Japan included, apparently, one regarding the islands in the South Seas. It was this that made Japan so adamant in the matter of the Mandated Islands, when, after her withdrawal from the League, the latter discussed the question of Japan's right to keep them.

Whatever the declarations of Kato, reiterated by Okuma, about Japan's lack of ambitions in China, and her respect for British interests, it was obvious that the entry of Japan into the war meant an opportunity to get what she wanted on the mainland of Asia. And very soon did England learn the truth of this. The Twenty-one Demands were no less a blow to England's paramount interests in Asia than they were a menace to the growing American interests; so it is small wonder that England accepted the invitation to the Washington Conference in 1921, considering it a check on Nippon. She contributed to its success by ending her alliance with Japan, which was declared superfluous since the signing of the Four-Power, Nine-Power and other treaties establishing a new international order on the Pacific and in China.

At the London Conference of 1930 England found out that the new status created by Japan for herself in Asia, and stubbornly defended, was hardly in line with British interests. Similarly, when Japan started her conquest of Manchuria in 1931 England immediately realized the danger to her own position in China, which was inherent

in the policy of her former ally. Unable to resist Japan alone and unwilling to coöperate with the United States, her chief rival, and possibly entertaining the hope that Japan might curb the Communists, the British Government decided to follow the path of compromise, and to handle Japan with velvet gloves.

Even the aggressive commercial policy of Japan, invading England's "pastures" and taking away a considerable part of her trade, was not enough to force London to abandon this policy of compromise. In 1930 she lost more than one third of her exports of cotton goods compared with the preceding year; and in 1931 these figures fell to less than one half of those of 1929, and about one quarter of those of 1913. Losing even in her own market, Great Britain, the protagonist of free trade, finally abandoned the last pretense by introducing tariffs and other measures designed to restrict imports.

Under the circumstances created by Japan it appears that Great Britain can keep only as much of her old positions in Eastern Asia as Japan permits. Consequently, England seems to have come to a decision not to antagonize Nippon, and this obviously implies, in Far Eastern affairs, a policy of non-coöperation with other Powers, including the United States. Moreover, in Great Britain certain small but influential elements, mostly among the die-hard Tories, are advocating revival of the alliance with Japan. More sober Englishmen, however, remind them of the humiliation their country has suffered in the recent years and recall the heavy losses incurred through the aggressive trade policy of Japan. On the whole, the prospects of the pro-Japanese elements seem quite dim.

The Soviet Union. The first casual contact between Japan and Russia was recorded at the end of the seventeenth century. Then followed a long procession of monotonously unsuccessful attempts by the Russians to establish regular relations with Nippon. But still living as they were in the isolation prescribed by the Tokugawas, the Japanese not only turned a cold shoulder to all the Russian advances, but, on occasion, opposed them

quite vigorously, being always suspicious of the "Western barbarians."

It was not until Commodore Perry had succeeded in persuading Japan that the Westerners meant business, that Russia was able to sign at Shimoda in 1855 her first treaty with the Empire of the Rising Sun. Born in suspicion, and developed among intrigues, the Russo-Japanese relations reached a more or less satisfactory basis only after passing through the "purgatory" of war, but gradually they became cemented by common interests. These mutual benefits were first accentuated by the attempts of certain Americans to undermine the respective positions of Russia and Japan in Manchuria. The Consul-General of the United States at Mukden, Willard Straight, advocated ambitious plans for railway construction across that part of the globe, and was readily supported by such a railroad magnate as Harriman with ample financial backing from New York.

This scheme was inferentially recognized in 1909 by the so-called Knox plan for the neutralization of railways in Manchuria, and resulted in bringing together the erstwhile adversaries, Russia and Japan. In order to resist American penetration, they joined hands and strengthened their control over Manchuria and Mongolia by a series of agreements. Their respective rights and interests in those countries were defined; and in 1916 they finally even became allies through the secret treaty contracted by Sazonov for Russia and Motono for Japan. This was achieved with the active help of France, the old ally of Russia, and England, who was her ally during the World War.

Basically this rapprochement was possible because it was seen that the interests of Russia and Japan were not after all irreconcilable. Their armed encounter of 1904-5 was the result of a clash between the imperialist ambitions of the Tsar and the expansionist plans of Japan. The aggressive policy of Nicholas II was neither justified by the needs of Russia nor approved by the people, and even the Ministers of the Tsar did not advise going as

far as engaging in a war with Japan. The conflict, indeed, might have been avoided had it not been for the unreasonable stubbornness of the Tsar's courtiers, instigated by the German Kaiser, and for the exaggerated suspiciousness of the Japanese at large, and the boldness of their militarists, intoxicated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the readiness of certain American bankers to finance Japan in such a venture.

Prince Ito, the advocate of a Russo-Japanese entente, was sent in 1901 to St. Petersburg because Prime Minister Katsuma wanted to have a free hand for his pet idea of an alliance with Great Britain. There was no chance for Ito's success, as before his arrival in Russia the draft of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was already accepted in principle. When Ito learned about it, he begged to postpone signing the pact with England, but in vain. The militarists of Japan wanted war with Russia, and forced it through.

The war ended in a victory for Japan partly because the Russian Navy was crippled before any formal declaration of impending hostilities was made by Japan, who resorted to the surprise attack on the Russian squadrons in Port Arthur and Chemulpo. Another cause was to be found in the unpreparedness of the Russian Army. And yet another lay in the fact that Russia had at that time no proper transportation facilities connecting her European territory with her Far Eastern possessions. Even the single-tracked Trans-Siberian Railway was not completed at the outbreak of that war, and in any case this solitary line was inadequate to deliver troops, munitions, and all necessary supplies to the large army required for such a conflict. This victory over what was supposedly one of the strongest of Western Powers, consequently brought Japan not only prestige but even the right to be considered a Great Power herself, though not without unpleasant complications.

In the opinion of the Japanese historian, Katsuro Hara, the years immediately succeeding the Russo-Japanese War "formed the culminating period of the

glorious era of Meiji, and also a turning point of the national history. Up to that time the foreign nations had been lavishing their kindness in the education of the novice nation, who seemed to them to be yet in her teens on account of having just entered into the concert of the world as a passive hearer. They did not know what would become of Japan, brought up and instructed in that way." Mr. Hara then enquires: "Who would have dreamed at that time of the victory of the Japanese over the Russians?" and goes on to observe that "in the war, it is true, a great many foreigners sympathized with the cause of the Japanese." However, he declares, after the victory of Nippon "the pet nation of yesterday was turned suddenly into the most suspected and dangerous nation of today."⁹ The words were written sixteen years ago; how incomparably more apt they are today!

The Russo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1916 was short-lived, for in the next year the Russian Revolution occurred which annulled it, as it did all the other pre-revolutionary agreements. From an ally of the Russia of the Tsar, Japan now became a bitter antagonist of the New Russia which came to take its place. If not actually the initiator, Japan was at least one of the first to intervene in the internal affairs of the Soviet state. According to the most authoritative and brilliant account of that episode, written by General William Graves, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, Japan acted on that occasion in a most peculiar manner.¹⁰ In order to make the Siberian expedition possible, General Terauchi, who was the Prime Minister of Japan at that time, created the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. Though not necessarily a "Brain Trust," it served as a driving force to carry through the Cabinet the aggressive plans of the militarists, and consequently was composed of members willing to support those plans.

⁹ K. Hara, "An Introduction to the History of Japan," pp. 394-6. New York, 1920.

¹⁰ Gen. William Graves, "American Siberian Adventure." New York, 1931.

That Council was quite influential under Terauchi, but with the advent of Mr. Hara, his successor, it began to lose power. Late in 1922 it was dissolved.

That ill-fated intervention brought no laurels to the Japanese Army, nor to the Mikado's diplomats. Its cost was enormous, the losses of human life were considerable, and the chief result was bitterness on both sides. To this might be added the augmented suspicion of Japan aroused among the nations who joined her in that inglorious international affair, and who learned some new lessons from their coöperation.

When the intervention was over, and the actual meaning of the revolution in Russia was more adequately understood in Japan, the new régime was recognized by Tokyo. In January, 1925, following the example of most of the Great Powers, Japan signed her first treaty with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Theoretically at least, normal relations between these two neighbors were restored.

It is significant that in 1929, when certain Chinese generals made an abortive attempt to liquidate by force the Russian right in the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Russians, Japan took a stand opposite to that adopted by the majority of other Powers. She favored Russia's side, and refused to join those who belatedly reminded China and the Soviet Union alike of their obligation under the Kellogg-Briand Pact not to resort to force. Very likely Japan followed such a course, not because she was anxious to stand by Russia, but because she wanted a precedent for her own forthcoming action in Manchuria which had to be justified on the grounds of Chinese lawlessness and disregard for contracts.


When Nippon started occupation of that part of China two years later, she announced her determination to respect the Soviet Union's rights and interests, and promised not to interfere in the latter's operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These promises, of course, were no more binding on Japan than all the other treaties and

ウイクトル・アレクサンドロウィッチ・ヤホントフ氏

日露協會評議員

ヲ囑託ス

大正六年一月十三日



日露協會總裁載仁親王



An Official Japanese Letter

It is written in vertical lines starting from the upper right corner. The first vertical line is the name of the author of the present book. Two lines that follow, announce his appointment as Councilor of the Japanese Russian Society. Then follows the date, January 13, 1917. The last line, on the left, is the signature of the writer, Prince Kaum, with his seal.

pledges neglected in the course of that *magnum opus*. When in pursuit of the "bandits" her troops had crossed the Chinese Eastern Railway and surrounded the Russians, they abruptly changed tactics, and started a campaign of raids and abuses designed to provoke an armed clash.

To eliminate this cause of friction, the Russians decided to withdraw completely from Chinese soil. Moscow then offered the Chinese Eastern Railway for sale. Tokyo immediately approved this idea, and tripartite negotiations among the Soviet Union, Manchukuo and Japan were started to consummate the transaction. More than once the militarists of Japan advised their government not to spend money for a railroad they were ready and willing to take by force; but fortunately, Tokyo succeeded in keeping these overzealous Empire-builders under control and ordered the parleys continued.

To have some idea of the extent of these provocations one should read the report made in August, 1934, by the general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the governing board of the same road. The report revealed the following state of affairs along that railway from January 1 to August 6, 1934: "Sixteen trains wrecked by planned damage to the tracks; 91 armed raids on railway stations and barracks; 116 railway employees arrested or kidnapped; 9 bridges damaged; 46 murders, including 9 of railway agents; 102 persons injured, including 83 railway agents; 42 robberies suffered by railway employees; 22 cases of arson affecting railway property; 21 locomotives and 207 coaches damaged, and so forth."¹¹

But in spite of all these endless provocations, the Soviet Union, consistent with its policy of peace, patiently continued negotiations. Finally, the road was sold to Manchukuo, as the heir of China, with a Japanese guarantee of payment. The militarists, to be sure, disapproved of the transaction, for it deprived them of a

¹¹ Quoted from the article by T. A. Bisson, "The U.S.S.R. in the Far East," published in the May 15, 1936, issue of the Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union, by the American-Russian Institute.

constant source of friction with the U.S.S.R.; but their anxiety was soon dissipated by the Minister of War, who frankly declared that if pretexts were needed to start trouble with the Soviet Union, there would be no difficulty in finding plenty.

By this time, naturally, the Russians had been convinced that the militarists of Japan were not disposed to understand any other argument than that of strength. So before leaving Manchuria they started fortifying their side of the border dividing them from their restless new neighbor. Furthermore, they concentrated forces in their Far Eastern possessions in order to be ready to hit back, if Japan decided to strike. Apparently this move was accomplished effectively; at any rate, a change in Japan's tactics soon became obvious. The General Staff at Tokyo, having obtained information regarding the actual state of the Soviet Union's very serious preparations to defend its borders, apparently decided to "soft-pedal" its arrogance, and to revise the policy vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.

The relations of the two countries at this juncture, and the direction in which they are likely to develop, will be discussed in a later chapter dealing with present-day problems of Nippon.



Courtesy Consulate-General of Japan, New York, N. Y.

(a) Signing of the Contract Covering the Sale of the Chinese-Eastern Railway. Mr. Koki Hirota, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Center, and the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. C. Yurenev, Seated to the Right of Mr. Hirota



Courtesy Consulate-General of Japan, New York, N. Y.

(b) Admiral F. B. Upham, Commander-in-Chief of the American Asiatic Fleet (in Center), Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine at Tokyo

CHAPTER X



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Beginning of Japanese-American Relations—Rivalry in China
—Other Causes of the Growing Tension—Difficult Situation of the United States—Trade with Japan versus Trade with China.

CONTRARY to the assertion of certain contemporary writers, America's interest in Asia is by no means insignificant. Neither is it new. The "Boston Tea Party," for example, stands as proof that before the end of the eighteenth century the Americans already had a certain indirect commercial interest in the Orient in general and in China in particular. China at that time was the world's main, if not sole, producer of tea.

The importance of America's interest in Asia today may be judged by the growth and present extent of her trade with the countries of that continent. Not only are the absolute figures of that trade imposing, but they are increasing in a most spectacular way. From \$125,000,000 in 1913 they rose to almost two billions in 1928, which means fifteen times growth in fifteen years. Not only this, but the rapid increase of that trade has been at the expense of other markets. Asia's part of the entire foreign trade of the United States was slightly over ten per cent in 1915. It had doubled by 1920, and continued its upward trend until by 1934 it already constituted over one quarter of the total.¹

Beginning of Japanese-American Relations. Trade with China has been carried on by the Yankees ever since 1784, when the first American ship arrived at Canton.

¹ In 1915 out of the total of \$5,333,268,000, American trade with Asia represented \$607,051,000; in 1920 it was two and one half billions out of the total of thirteen and a half billion; in 1934 it amounted to \$962,736,000 out of the total of \$3,788,463,000.

Trade with Japan, however, commenced much later, owing to the isolationist policy of the Tokugawas. Thus, while attempts were made to induce the Japanese to arrange for commercial intercourse long before Commodore Biddle's recorded visit in 1846, all were of no avail; and the history of Japanese-American relations may properly be considered as beginning with the opening of Japan in 1854 on the advice of Commodore Perry.² This was followed in 1858 by the signing of the first commercial treaty between these two countries, contracted by the *Bakufu* and Townsend Harris, the Consul-General of the United States.

For years these relations developed in a most friendly manner, and the United States, itself a young country, became known as the "kindest patron" of the youngest member of the family of nations, as Japan was called by the Westerners of that time. Of course, there were certain unpleasant and sometimes embarrassing incidents, such as the assault on the American diplomatic agent Heusken in 1861, the firing upon an American merchantman by the forts of Shimonoseki, and the retaliatory bombardment of the same Shimonoseki by American and other Western warships in 1864. But all these episodes, unavoidable in the transitory period of Japan, when the old and new orders were struggling for control, were regarded as such, and did not prevent the Americans from cultivating the very best of relations.

The good-will of the United States toward Japan was demonstrated, as we have seen, in the Bingham Treaty of 1878, by which the former expressed willingness to consider the latter as an equal, if and when the other Powers should do likewise. It was, in a way, a gesture of compensation; for Washington had entered into an agreement with Hawaii, under which that archipelago became practically a protectorate of the United States, and this

² That treaty was superseded by another one signed in 1894. Their texts are found in the "Treaties and Conventions" compiled by W. Molley, Washington, D. C., 1910. Treaty of 1854 on pp. 996-8, and that of 1894 on pp. 1028-35.

was not to the liking of Japan, who herself had been casting a covetous eye on those islands. Another gesture of good-will toward Japan was made in 1883 when the Congress of the United States passed a resolution renouncing the American part of the indemnity due for the Shimonoseki affair.

At the time of Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 many Americans showed sympathy for Nippon.³ In the case of her war with Russia in 1904-5 they went much further, and offered the financial assistance that enabled Japan to embark on that venture. Furthermore, President Theodore Roosevelt even issued a warning that if Germany or France backed Russia the Americans would side with Japan.

Rivalry in China. In the long run, the outcome of the Russian war influenced America's attitude toward Japan adversely. The gathering clouds of trade competition in China were the cause. With the success of the islanders it became obvious that an Asiatic country would rapidly develop into a dangerous rival for the United States, now deeply involved in the game of conquering foreign markets. America could not afford to ignore the Japanese menace.

For several years the United States had been marching with the other imperialist Powers along the road of expansion, the traditional "stay-at-home" policy having been abandoned under the pressure of economic growth. When the continental expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific had been completed, and the great American Republic, economically speaking, had grown from a mere market for European goods into an industrial country seeking foreign outlets, she turned her eyes first on Europe and then toward the Orient.

Appearing rather late on the Asiatic scene, the United States, unlike the other Powers, refrained from asking

³ Others were on China's side. An American, former Secretary of State, Mr. Foster, was attached to the Chinese delegation, headed by Li Hung-chang, during the Shimonoseki peace conference.

territorial concessions in China. But by taking over the Philippines from Spain in 1898, she acquired a solid foothold close to Chinese territory, and convenient for the development of her trade with the Orient; while through the very ingenious "most-favored-nation" clause inserted in her treaty with the Celestial Empire, the United States also acquired all the rights and privileges for which the other Powers fought. In 1898 also the United States secured Hawaii and Guam, breaking thereby the distance separating her Pacific Coast from that of Asia. Already, too, the idea of shortening the distance from the Atlantic by building a canal across the narrow strip of land connecting North and South America was under consideration. Actually the work on that project, designed by a French group, was taken over by the United States in 1902, and in 1914 that engineering marvel, the Panama Canal, was completed.

With the development of the United States into a world Power with colonial possessions and an interest in the Far Eastern markets, she was brought into competition with others in the Orient. Soon she was forced to fight for the protection of her position; and one of the basic steps in that direction was made by Secretary of State John Hay, who inaugurated with the lukewarm approval of other Powers the so-called "Open-Door" doctrine, establishing the principle of equal opportunity in trade with China.

At once Japan realized that an arrangement by which she was expected to face other competitors in China on an equal footing was rather hard on her; decidedly behind the industrially more advanced nations so far as finances and technology were concerned, she considered herself handicapped unless granted certain exclusive rights. Therefore she started to seek a special position and its recognition by the others. In 1911 she succeeded in obtaining the abolition of the restrictions contained in her "unequal treaties" with the Westerners, and having secured by that time a solid foothold on the mainland

of Asia, she proceeded with the creation of that exclusive position.⁴

In the years immediately following the Russo-Japanese War the struggle between American interests and those of Japan was marked by a number of ill-designed motions made by certain individual citizens and officials of the United States. Such was the abortive plan of Edward H. Harriman and others to buy the South Manchuria Railroad, received by Japan as a war prize; another was Willard Straight's project, frustrated by the Russians and Japanese, to arrange for the building by Americans of new railways in Manchuria. And, finally, came the ill-fated Knox neutralization plan, also blocked by Japan jointly with Russia. Those were early signals for a change in the Japanese-American relations. They estranged the former "patron" from her protégé. The open rapprochement between the erstwhile adversaries, Russia and Japan, united by a common desire to resist American encroachment, added still another reason for the cooling of the former friendship.

The extremely unceremonious and aggressive *démarches* of Japan in China during the World War, culminating in the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, incited protests from Washington; but the results were scarcely satisfactory either to the United States or to other nations. "The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack of enthusiasm . . . it was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation," wrote the American Minister to Peking at that time. "In fine," he continued, "the general temper and direction of Japanese action was not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan has taken advantage of a conflict, which was primarily European, into the rigor of which she did not

⁴ In 1908 Japan and the United States reached an understanding, the so-called Root-Takahira agreement, the main concern of which was the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific region, adherence to the policy of supporting the territorial integrity of China and equal opportunity for commerce and industry.

enter for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany in the Far East and the Pacific at the time when they could be but weakly defended." The Minister then goes on to point out that "this policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise in China, as also that of the other leading nations."⁵ Yet in 1917 the new position of Japan in China, if not sanctioned, was at least acknowledged by the so-called Lansing-Ishii Agreement, when in an exchange of notes the United States expressed formal recognition of the principle "that Japan actually possessed, by virtue of geographic propinquity, certain special advantages which universally follow from proximity." More exactly, the American note declared that "consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."⁶

In opening those negotiations the Japanese representative, Viscount Ishii, said: "We Japanese had taken to arms against Germany because agreements are not scraps of paper for us. We entered the war not for securing any egoistic interests or achieving any ill-conceived plans."⁷ The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, accepted in 1917 for expediency's sake, was terminated after the Washington Conference, in 1923. On that occasion the same Ishii declared that "this did not affect the actual position of Japan, since her special position was not based upon the discredited agreement but upon concrete realities of history and geography."⁸

Meanwhile in 1918 the intervention in Russian internal affairs had taken place. Certain Japanese writers ascribe the initiative of the Siberian adventure to President Wilson, though its actual inception was in Nippon,

⁵ Paul Reinsch, "The American Diplomat in China," pp. 127-8. New York, 1922.

⁶ George H. Blakeslee, "The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States," p. 201. New York, 1925.

⁷ Quoted from the Russian translation given by Belly in his "The Struggle for the Pacific." Moscow, 1929.

⁸ Takeuchi, *ibid.*, p. 203.

for Japanese warships were sent to Vladivostok several months before the international agreement was reached. The lesson learned by the United States through co-operating with Japan in that venture has been vividly described by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, General Graves, in his volume "The American Siberian Adventure." It almost ended in a war between the United States and the Land of the Rising Sun.

"The violation of the agreement with the United States, the efforts to monopolize the trade of the country, the extreme harshness toward the local population, the frequent refusal to carry out a policy of genuine co-operation, and the intrigues with various factions for political influence with the apparent aim of retaining the country permanently—all characteristic of the military elements at their worst—helped to increase the widespread resentment in the United States against the methods of Japan and to heighten the distrust of its purposes," wrote Professor George H. Blakeslee, commenting on Japanese actions in Siberia.⁹

The perfectly justified American complaint that Japan had sent to Siberia ten times as many soldiers as had been agreed upon with the United States was brushed aside by certain Japanese "interpreters" in an extremely ingenious fashion. They maintained that Japan had in Siberia concurrently two expeditions: one, according to the understanding with the United States, equal in size with the forces of the latter, and a much larger independent expedition to protect Japan's own interests.¹⁰ When the American troops were ordered home in 1920 Japan regretted that she had not been consulted, but expressed satisfaction that Americans did not object to Japanese troops remaining in Siberia, or even to an increase in their numbers. Most of the latter were recalled at the close of 1922, but a small garrison remained in

⁹ George H. Blakeslee, *ibid.*, pp. 201-2.

¹⁰ Takeuchi, *ibid.*, pp. 205-7.

Sakhalin until a settlement had been reached. A treaty was signed by Tokyo with Moscow in January, 1925.

Since the time of the World War the actions of the United States have been distinctly opposed to Japanese expansion. However, they have succeeded only in retarding it through the agreements reached during the Washington Conference of 1921-2—namely, the Four-Power and the Nine-Power Treaties and the treaty restricting naval armaments by quotas. High sounding as those documents were, they have not prevented Japan from resuming her advance when she has found it timely; for to check her required, if not the use of force, at least the coöperation of other Powers. This was not forthcoming either in 1931, when Japanese militarists started their new drive on the Asiatic mainland, or later. Secretary Stimson's soundings failed to produce the desired reaction either in London or Paris, while the Soviet Union was not in the State Department's social register. Thus the success at Geneva of the Stimson-Hoover doctrine of non-recognition of advantages gained by force and in violation of treaty pledges was hardly more than academic. President Hoover in his nomination speech on August 11, 1932, declared: "Above all I have projected a new doctrine into international affairs, the doctrine that we do not and never will recognize title to possessions of territory gained in violation of the peace pacts. That doctrine was accepted by all the nations of the world on a recent critical occasion, and within the last few days again by all the nations of the Western Hemisphere."¹¹

Other Causes of the Growing Tension. The steadily growing tension in Japanese-American relations is, of course, traceable chiefly to Japanese aggression in China, endangering American commercial and other interests. But the bad feeling has been aggravated by other causes, and particularly by the so-called "exclusion clause" of

¹¹ Quoted from the International Conciliation Series, No. 286, January, 1933. Others expressed the opinion that this non-recognition doctrine was nothing new, as it reiterated the stand taken by the United States in 1915, at the time of the Twenty-one Demands.

the American Immigration Act of 1924, which barred from the American soil any new influx of emigrants from Nippon. This discrimination was vigorously resented by the Empire of the Mikado. Baron Shidehara, her liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared it "irreconcilable with the rules of international comity and justice," while others, less restrained, have used the phrase "deliberate insult." However, it must be noted that many people in the United States have never approved of the clause and that various fruitless attempts have been made to have it invalidated. Other American elements have resisted all efforts in that direction. Indeed, early in 1929 the two legislative chambers of the State of California passed a joint resolution recording their "protest against any character of action designed to modify the present immigration laws relating to the exclusion of Asiatic laborers." Nor was this action by California in any way a surprise, for a Japanese problem had existed on the Pacific Coast of the United States for many years. As early as 1906 an unpleasant episode had already occurred in the form of the "school controversy" that developed around the order of the San Francisco School Board to segregate Japanese pupils.

Washington was decidedly perturbed by the Californian stand on the education of Japanese children, and in his message to Congress in December, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt went so far as to say that "to shut them out of the public schools is a wicked absurdity." The case had, however, incited the Japanese to a high pitch of indignation; for as Count Soyeshima wrote in comment on that episode: "Certain Japanese statesmen with jingoistic tendencies gave vent to very irresponsible utterances amounting almost to a threat of war with America. A certain section of the American press, well known for its yellow character, was not slow to seize the opportunity for urging naval expansion and the fortification of the Philippines and Hawaii." ¹² In 1907 Mr. Taft, the Secretary of War in Theodore Roosevelt's Administration, vis-

¹² Soyeshima, *ibid.*, pp. 77-8.

ited Japan on his way to the Philippines, while the American fleet displayed its strength on a stop-over in the Japanese waters during its cruise around the world. By 1908, however, the Roosevelt Administration succeeded in settling the episode by a gentleman's agreement, the terms of which were not set forth in a single document but were embodied in an extended exchange of communications between the American and Japanese Governments.

The period following that incident was not such as to strengthen the friendly relations between Japan and the United States. Rather, it contributed a great deal of material destructive of real cordiality, for the Knox Plan, the World War, the Twenty-one Demands, and the Siberian expedition all augmented suspicion and friction between the two countries. In addition the famous Webb-Heney act was passed by the California Legislature during that period, depriving the Japanese of all rights to own agricultural land in that State. This act was formally protested by Tokyo, and war talk was again heard on both sides of the Pacific. Furthermore, while the Washington Conference of 1921-2 settled a number of questions, the character of the settlement was not conducive to friendliness. Such was the opinion of the aggressive elements of Japan, who complained that it deprived their country of the British alliance, checked their natural expansion in China, and blocked the healthy development of their navy. Undoubtedly it accentuated another point of friction—namely, the problem of inequality in naval force, of which we shall say more later.

On the occasion of the Great Earthquake of 1923, the United States was one of the first to express condolence and to offer generous material aid to Japan and the Japanese. But the good impression created by this friendly gesture soon was erased by the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act, and Nippon was again swamped by bitter anti-American feeling. For a while that country was alive with posters proclaiming that her people would never forget "the intolerable insult inflicted by the United States."

It is true that the American Government and numerous private organizations and groups in this country have never ceased in their efforts to overcome this unfortunate situation, but the issue remained unsettled, and the ill-feeling has been distinctly aggravated by Japan's activities in China since 1931. Furthermore, efforts of those desirous to serve the interests of peace and of the United States, as a nation, were accompanied by others actuated by different motives, including that of profit for private enterprise. In 1928 Thomas Lamont of the banking house of Morgan was seriously contemplating a large loan to the South Manchuria Railroad; but fortunately for the United States, this plan was opposed not only by China but by numerous Americans, and was never permitted to materialize. It is easy to see how embarrassing would have been the situation of the United States when Japan embarked on her occupation of Manchuria, if considerable American funds had been invested in a Japanese-owned railroad.

Another serious point of friction contributing to Japanese-American tension was, as we have seen, the inequality in the naval quotas allotted by the Washington Conference. By the time of the London Conference of 1930 it had become obvious to all who wished to read plainly the meaning of Nippon's demand for the revision of these quotas that the temporary retreat to which Japan had been forced in Washington was now at an end. Her army and navy men were again seeking the dominant position in Japan's affairs at home and abroad. The seemingly successful fight led by the civilians under Prime Minister Hamaguchi against the militarists was only illusion.

Though headed by a commoner, the former Prime Minister Wakatsuki, the Japanese naval delegates to the London Conference succeeded in obtaining at least part of what the navalists wanted. They managed anyhow to pierce the first hole in the Washington Treaty, which they were determined to break. Instead of the old ratio of 5:5:3, defined at Washington as the relative strength of

the American, British and the Japanese navies, the proportions were now to be 10:10:7, and they wanted more. But there was a conflict of views and, lacking unanimity, the delegates failed to obtain better terms at that moment. The chief naval delegate, Admiral Takarabe, being at that time Minister of the Navy, acted more in line with instructions from the Prime Minister than from the Naval General Staff, and so incurred the wrath of his colleagues. Admiral Kato, the chief of that staff, even resigned in protest against the signing of the London Treaty over the opposition of a number of high ranking admirals.

In the Japanese parliamentary struggle that followed, the Seiyu-kai, then the opposition party, criticized the action of the government on the ground that it acted in utter disregard of the views of the naval authorities and had thereby usurped power not constitutionally vested in the Cabinet. However, on October 2, 1930, the treaty was finally ratified as the Court was strongly behind Hamaguchi and his government. But opposition to the agreement continued to divide naval circles and even the Japanese people at large. The outcome was the announcement by Tokyo at the end of 1934 of Nippon's determination not to renew the Washington Treaty, and her intention not to renew the London Treaty either, as demonstrated by her withdrawal from the new London Conference held early in 1936.¹³

Difficult Situation of the United States. The occupation of Manchuria by Japan late in 1931, and her military operations in Shanghai early in the following year, created for Washington diplomatic problems extremely unsuceptible of swift and satisfactory solution. Not only were flagrant violations of existing treaties continued by the Japanese Army and Navy, but no ray of hope for the checking of their activities by any Power was in sight. No expectation of obtaining the whole-hearted coöperation of Tokyo could be entertained, for in spite of the earlier

¹³ Illuminating details on that situation are given by Takeuchi in his "War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire," pp. 296-335.

prospect that the civil branch of the government might oppose the outrages initiated by the jingoes, that government proved in no mood either to stop the abuses of the militarists, or to listen to what the League of Nations and the Powers, including the United States, had to say.

An interesting exposé of the American interests and policy in the Far East at that period was offered by Mr. Glover Clark in his address before the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia in July, 1933:

"We have no disagreement with the Japanese people, for they too want peace and would act honorably in their dealings with other people. We do not have grave grounds for disapproval of what the Japanese militarists have done. . . .

"We do not need war with Japan. We do not need a formal, official boycott. We do need, urgently, to make it inescapably clear to the Japanese people that we will not deal with their Government as though it were trustworthy and honorable until it once more proves itself so. That is the way, and the only sure way, to end the menace of Japanese militarism in the East.

"That is the way, too, and the only sure way, so to deal with this situation as to restore to ourselves, to the Japanese and to the other peoples of the world some measure of confidence that we live in a world which is at least beginning to be sane and civilized. Unless we can restore that confidence, unless we can reanimate the faith of the peoples of the world, and particularly the people of China, that international fair dealing, justice and respect are not the prerogatives alone of those nations who are powerfully armed, just as surely as we face darkness after day we face wars following more devastating wars until all civilization ceases to be."

The manner in which the delegates of Japan at Geneva dealt with the general opposition to their actions, voiced by that international body, and the roundabout way in which the Japanese diplomats tried to avoid plain speaking and thus appease the indignation of the countries to which they were accredited, left little doubt in the minds of those who were responsible for the foreign relations that negotiations with Japan, not to mention attempts of

persuasion, were out of place. Those who had to shape their policy vis-à-vis Japan did it accordingly. But theirs would not in any case have been an easy task, for the policies dictated by the interests of a nation as a whole cannot always be applied, especially when they conflict with the private interests of individuals. Now the difficulties were intensified by the unparalleled conduct of Japan. As for the League of Nations, it could do nothing but protest and send the Lytton Commission, whose efforts may have been highly successful as literature, but were pathetically devoid of tangible results.

Failure also greeted the logical suggestion, made by a number of outstanding Americans, to apply economic pressure on Japan in order to check her aggression and penalize her shocking disregard of international obligations also. It was opposed by many, but particularly by those who did not like the idea of losing profits from the trade with Japan. The exporters of various goods reasoned out that circumstances were forcing Japan to buy urgently, and therefore at high prices, as much as possible of the raw materials and other commodities necessary for such an emergency as war. Their calculations proved correct, for Japan purchased in the United States, for instance, considerably larger amounts of cotton,¹⁴ scrap-iron, nitrates, and so forth, than usual.

The extent of the increase in the Japanese-American trade for these years can be judged by the fact that from five per cent the Japanese part of the total exports of the United States in 1929 jumped to ten per cent in 1934, representing a hundred per cent increase in five years. Not only that, but, as if to express appreciation for services rendered by those profit-seekers, the Japanese trade with the United States upset tradition by showing balances favorable for the American side. For years Japan

¹⁴ In 1932 Japan's purchases of American cotton reached a record volume of 2,244,000 bales. Beginning 1933 they began to slump, being replaced by the product of British India. In 1932 cotton constituted 64 per cent of the entire American export to Japan; in 1933, 60 per cent, and in 1934, 53 per cent.

had enjoyed favorable balances regularly, exporting to the United States considerably more than she imported from this country. Now the reverse became true. Perhaps, however, this was not achieved deliberately; first it happened that cotton, the chief commodity shipped to Japan from the United States, was needed at that turbulent time in quantities substantially larger than before, while scrap-iron became a major item of export. On the other hand, the demand for raw silk, the chief commodity imported by the United States from Japan, was on the decline owing to the economic crisis. But whatever the causes, the increased trade and reversed balance favoring American business undoubtedly served Japan's designs in preventing economic sanctions.

If sanctions were not ordered by the League, they could still be applied by individual Powers, either in the form of a blockade, or by the less dangerous method of official or unofficial curtailment of commercial and financial intercourse with Japan. This would be especially effective if such measures were instituted jointly by several important trading nations; but such a move was never seriously attempted, and Japan was allowed to get away with all her spoils, and continue in the same way.

The threats that such economic sanctions or even a blockade would mean war, widely circulated by various people from various motives, were hardly warranted. Japan was not in a position to fight single-handed the rest of the world, or even any of the Great Powers individually in the event that the League of Nations was really unable to present a united front for collective resistance and left one or more countries directly interested in the Far East to face Japan alone. A determined stand on that line would achieve much, but it was never seriously contemplated. Instead, the bluff was kept alive, and was even supported by those not interested in checking Japan. Some hesitated in the hope that she would curb communism; others had in mind such more prosaic considerations as trade and growing profits, which seemed

particularly inviting in a time of depression, dwindling trade, and stubbornly persistent unemployment.

Later, when the Italo-Ethiopian conflict again brought sanctions to the fore at Geneva, they were again opposed on the ground that, if applied, they would precipitate a European war. It was argued that Signor Mussolini would retaliate them by attacking the chief proponent of these penalties, Great Britain. This did not happen. But the meek souls and the conspirators of various brands were ready with their explanation. Hostilities were prevented by carefully restricting the list of commodities not allowed for trade with the aggressor. The "fortunate" exclusion of oil and certain other equally important items from the list, they would say, played the salutary rôle of keeping the East African "punitive expedition" from developing into a European war. But was there no other reason for the protection of oil? If the answer to this query is no obvious, one should consult the records of trade with Italy during her civilizing mission in Ethiopia, and then stop spreading exaggerated fears of sanctions.

Trade with Japan versus Trade with China. Trade with Japan was the beginning of America's relations with that country, and that trade remains an important factor to-day. In recent years the Japanese market has absorbed from five to ten per cent of the total American exports, and American goods have supplied about one third of what Japan was importing.¹⁵ On the other hand, the United States was and still is the best and most desirable customer for Japanese goods, taking from one quarter to one third, if not more, of the entire export of Japan.¹⁷ Ame-

¹⁵ In 1929 the United States sent to Japan about 5 per cent of her total export. In 1931 the Japanese part of the total was already 7 per cent; in 1932, 8; in 1933, 9, and in 1934, 10 per cent of the total export trade of the United States.

¹⁶ The American goods constituted 27.7 per cent of the total imports of Japan in 1931; the next year 35.6 per cent; in 1933, 32 per cent; and in 1934, 33.7 per cent.

¹⁷ In 1931 the United States bought 37.0 per cent of the total exports of Japan. In 1932, 31.6 per cent; in 1933, 26.4 per cent and in 1934, 18.3 per cent.

ican trade with Japan grew fivefold in the twenty years from 1895 to 1915, and again five times in the next five years, reaching a total of \$792,521,000 in 1920. The balance was usually favorable to Japan.¹⁸ Then, owing to the world economic crisis, the Japanese-American trade slumped considerably, reaching its lowest point in 1932 with a total of only \$271,853,500; but beginning with 1933 it resumed its upward trend. Now, however, the balances were unfavorable to Japan to the extent of over fifteen million dollars in 1933 and of over ninety million dollars in 1934.

This change in the balances occurred, as we have seen, because the export of raw silk from Japan slumped under pressure of the economic crisis, while imports from the United States, such as cotton, automobiles, machines, and especially scrap-iron, increased very materially under the demand of the war fever.

In spite of the obviously impressive volume of the American-Japanese trade, it is wrong to assert, as many students of this question do, that it is much more important to the United States than her trade with China. The obvious deduction from such a theory is that it would be only natural to sacrifice the latter trade, if such were the price of peace with Japan, for the sake of keeping the commerce with Japan uninterrupted. This exaggerated appraisal of Japanese-American trade is very misleading and pregnant of conclusions dangerous because based on illusions. If we examine the situation more closely, we find first of all that China, though less important as a market for the United States than Japan today, is potentially much more promising. Since Japan renewed her aggression in China, the latter's trade with the United States has been increasing; and China has occasionally done more business with the United States than with Japan. Secondly, the main items of Japanese-American trade are such as to raise certain doubts about their future.

¹⁸ American trade with Japan amounted to \$28,331,000 in 1895, and in 1915 it was already \$140,401,000, while in 1920 it reached \$792,521,000.

If we compare the absolute figures of American trade with China and those with Japan, we see that the latter are usually about twice, and occasionally even three times, as large as the former.¹⁹ But we also notice that Japanese-American trade has been declining since the onset of the present economic crisis. Furthermore, it is quite likely to continue the downward trend, first because the abnormal situation created by the war preparations of Japan may terminate at any time, and secondly because of the pronounced shift of the Japanese purchases from America to other parts of the globe. The increasing dependence of Japan's cotton import from British India is attained by cutting down the percentage of import of the same from the United States. In 1932 some seventy-five per cent of the total cotton imported by Japan came from the United States, and less than twenty-five from British India. By 1933 India's part already was not far from one third of the total, and in 1934 it was almost equal to that from the United States.²⁰ Besides, Japan is developing the cultivation of cotton in her colonies, Korea and Formosa, and encouraging by a variety of methods the expansion

¹⁹ Total trade of the United States with:

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Japan.</i> <i>(In millions of dollars.)</i>	<i>China.</i>
1895	28,331	24,149
1915	140,401	56,558
1920	792,521	338,445
1929	691,104	290,396
1933	272,000	89,738
1934	329,671	112,564

²⁰ Japan's import of cotton in piculs:

<i>Sources.</i>	<i>1932.</i>	<i>1933.</i>	<i>1934.</i>
From the U. S. A.	9,101,000	7,434,000	6,446,000
From British India	2,739,000	3,977,000	5,749,000
Total from all sources..	12,740,000	12,489,000	13,554,000

of cotton raising in China. Judging by the declarations of responsible officials of Nippon, she is obviously contemplating emancipation from the American market in regard to this important commodity. American oil, another important item in Japan's trade, is also losing ground to other competitors, primarily to the product of the Dutch Indies.

In other words, important as they are, trade relations between Japan and the United States are not of a nature absolutely to guarantee friendly relations. To America they can hardly be sufficient to dictate a docile endorsement of Japanese aggression on the mainland of Asia, especially when this aggression clearly menaces the growing American interest in the Chinese market.

Here is what one of the outstanding American writers on the Far East thinks about this situation:

"Deepest down the Far Eastern conflict is a Japanese-American conflict . . . the drift of political and economic forces, the whole development of our times, is toward a war between Japan and the United States. And we have been moving in that direction at an accelerated pace in the last few years. Nowhere else is this so little comprehended as in the United States."²¹

"The race for markets is on . . . it underlies all the international policies. . . . If we are entering now on a struggle for control of the Far East—or to prevent Japan from acquiring control. . . . We do so in order to exist. . . . Not to do so is to imperil our economic system and our social order. . . .

"If international conflict to the point of war is inherent in the social order, we shall have conflict and war."²²

And again: "Conflict is inevitable. It can be prevented only by the elimination of the motive"; and "the motive of political aggression is economic expansion."

And then: "We have to choose . . . or social control in

²¹ Nathanael Peffer, "Must We Fight Japan?" p. 154. New York, 1935.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 231-2.

the name of the whole population, if for no other purpose than as assurance against war.”²³

Latterly the idea of withdrawal of the United States from the Far East, accompanied with the efforts of neutrality legislation, attracted much attention and found considerable support among various and influential groups, including well-informed specialists on Asiatic affairs. The suggestion of withdrawal hardly can be considered as anything but temporary jockeying, as a matter of expediency on sober consideration of actualities. Such a policy, temporary as it is, serves nevertheless to strengthen Japan's position. It is not only tolerating her aggression in China, but also allowing her entrenchment there, and thereby making the future attempts of adjustment more difficult. As for the neutrality legislation, it can be of no real value so long as it leaves trade intercourse with the belligerents free for those who seek profits. If they are allowed to carry on such a trade, they easily can, and most probably will, drag the country into the conflict. That is obvious enough!

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 235.



PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF JAPAN

Domestic problems: economic, financial, social and political—
International problems: economic, political, diplomatic
and military.

IN preceding chapters describing Japan and how she became what she is today we have briefly reviewed her history and resources, and the predicaments forcing her to struggle for a better lot. We have learned how she has met this problem and how much she has accomplished. But we have also seen that although Nippon has created for herself an imposing colonial Empire, with incomparably larger resources and broader opportunities than she ever enjoyed before, she is at the same time in an extremely embarrassing position, and now faces grave problems at home and abroad. She cannot claim that her new Empire is a well-organized and healthy entity, with settled and reassuring order and happy prospects.

The spectacular transformation of the small mediæval Japan into a modern state was not accomplished with desirable thoroughness; precariously rapid, it brought in its wake numerous conflicts and endless domestic problems. Similarly, the spectacular expansion of Japan beyond her original confines, resulting in the creation of an enormous colonial Empire, at the same time created numerous enemies abroad and boundless obstacles to her future international dealings. Many of these problems, both domestic and foreign, are undoubtedly the result of the reckless jingo policy forced on the Land of the Rising Sun. Others, as we have seen, are not of her own making, and have developed from conditions beyond Japan's control.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

From one point of view, the accomplishments of modern Japan may be described in terms of the hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory, the billions of tons of mineral deposits, and the millions of acres of forests added to her possessions since she ceased to be a secluded insular principality. It may also be measured by the millions of people who have been registered as new subjects of the Mikado since Nippon began to develop into a Great Power. But the change that this territorial advance and these accomplishments have brought to the Japanese people at large is hardly to be described in glorious terms and imposing figures. To the majority of inhabitants of the beautiful islands where the ancient Yamato originated, the benefits of expansion have been meagre, if not microscopic.

Economic Problems. The old problem of Japan, inherent in her deficiency in natural resources, is growing less serious. Nippon has now found in her colonies, Korea and Formosa, and in Manchukuo, most—though not all—of the raw material she needs for her industry. Her food supply, in peacetime, is now procurable without heavy purchases abroad. But Japan is still short of oil, iron, cotton, wool and various other commodities.¹ For oil she is looking southward to the Dutch Indies, where she may acquire long-term concessions; but at the present time she must still buy almost eighty per cent of what she consumes. In regard to iron, her dependence on the outside world has been somewhat decreased by the acquisition of complete control over Manchukuo and partial control over Chahar; yet it will be a long time before these sources are developed and efficiently exploited, and even then a certain amount of this metal will probably continue to come from foreign lands. Turning to cotton, we find that Japan expects to create a reliable source in

¹ Japan produces no rubber, but certain Japanese interests control rubber plantations in the British Malay, Java, Borneo and Sumatra.



Courtesy of Japan Tourist Bureau, New York, N. Y.
Entrance-gate to a Middle-class Home

China, where she is encouraging its cultivation; but at present she still must import up to ninety per cent of her requirements from other countries, and will continue importing for years to come. For wool she may rely to a certain extent on Mongolia, but not for amounts sufficient to meet all her demands; she must still buy from Australia, Africa and South America. In the matter of machinery, including airplanes, automobiles, and the like, Japan is far from independent, and her recent acquisitions in Asia have not improved the situation in that respect; on the contrary, the much larger area to be served and defended by Japan has increased her need for such apparatus and machinery. In short, however much Japan may have improved her status in regard to natural resources, she is still far from self-sufficient. Furthermore, the inferior quality of the products of her industries has adversely affected Japan's foreign trade, though that commerce is extensive and even disproportionally large compared with the domestic trade. This has created a problem for the population at home, for it is responsible for keeping the import of various goods on a high level to the disadvantage of domestic industry and the detriment of the consumers' pocket.

The disproportion of her highly developed light industry and the still somewhat lagging heavy industry remains a serious defect in Japan's national economy. Particularly is it a source of anxiety to those concerned with matters pertaining to war, for in case of such an emergency Japan would be seriously handicapped in regard to mining, metallurgy and machine-building. As the Director of the Economic Research Institute of Japan, Seichi Kojima, points out: "In the event of Japan becoming diplomatically isolated from the powerful countries of Europe there will be real reason to be disturbed about the weakness of Japan's production capacity."²

Dwindling agriculture, however, is probably the most acute domestic problem. The appalling injustice in dis-

² Quoted from O. Tanin and E. Yohan, "When Japan Goes to War," p. 94.


tribution of land and high taxes are responsible for the poverty of the overwhelming majority of the peasants; while the catastrophically low prices of agricultural products in recent years seem to have deprived them of such little income as they may once have had. The peasants are in arrears on taxes, heavily in debt, and very restless. Furthermore, neither these pauperized peasants nor the underpaid workers in the industries producing for war or dumping are in any position to be purchasers. Hence the always limited domestic market of Japan shrinks still further.

Financial Problems. With many years of regularly adverse balances in foreign trade, with gold reserves evaporating, and with the exchange rate of her currency sinking since she went off the gold standard and engaged in adventures of conquest, the financial condition of Japan is anything but sound. And if this were not enough, her indebtedness is mounting further because the budget, overburdened by military expenses, has not balanced for years.³ Deficits have been covered by new issue of bonds, floated on the domestic market, or rather forced on the banks, since the population at large has no money to buy.

The problem of finding new sources of revenue is obviously difficult. The late Minister of Finance, Takahashi, resisted the pressure of the military circle, and refused to increase taxes, knowing that the burden laid on the population was already heavy. The new Minister, apparently yielding to the same pressure, was reported to be planning new levies, but it is a safe guess that he will quickly find how little there is to squeeze from the nation.

Financial assistance from abroad has been out of the question during these recent turbulent years; and the 1936 political assassinations, including that of the most trusted of Japanese financiers, Takahashi, have made the chances of borrowing from the foreigners still fainter.

³ In four years that followed the commencement of the Manchurian adventure over four and a half billion yen worth of new bonds were issued.



(Low in The Nation)

"The Tonnage Problem"

Under certain circumstances the international bankers might possibly again consider Japan a "good risk" and float loans for her, but the chances are not improved by the continued aggression of Japan in China. Perhaps, too, there might be certain groups that would offer financial assistance to Nippon for fighting Soviet Russia; such persons, however, are not sound business men but fanatics, bemused by hatred of the Bolsheviks and incapable of logical thinking. Japan's chances to win a contest with the U.S.S.R. appear very slim; the risk would be so great that Lloyd's of London might find it difficult to get bids favoring Japan in such a venture. Indeed, to start any major war Japan must first find money, for her own finances cannot stand the strain of such a conflict; and since at this juncture it seems unlikely that she can expect any considerable funds from abroad, her financial problems could be solved much more easily if she would end aggression and improve her foreign relations in general.

Social Problems. There are certain elements in Japan, and influential elements too, that advocate still greater audacity as the cure-all for Nippon's problems. Force, not coöperation, is their remedy. But there are others who differ; and these are much more numerous, for they are backed by the broad masses of a nation already suffering from the aggressive policy of its masters. Even among the rich and privileged are numerous well-informed, far-seeing dissenters from the views of the jingoes. That the people at large would prefer to live in peace can hardly be doubted; they are not in sympathy with the Empire-builders, for they have long known that the process of empire-building has always been harmful to them. The population has paid the bill in lives and property; the benefits, if any, have gone to the rich and privileged.

At this juncture the ills of the prevailing system are deeply felt in Japan, for the already extreme economic inequality is growing more pronounced. Wealth continues to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. And at the same time the wages of the working class sink still further, the hours of work increase, and the standard of living

declines. These things, together with unrelieved poverty in the countryside, and the absence of genuine social welfare, breed unrest, with the consequence that social problems accumulate daily. As solution, the Japanese extremists can only recommend patience and obedience, more work and meagre diet for the glory of the country and less thinking, "dangerous" or otherwise. They promise better life in the future, after their plans of conquest are fulfilled. Meanwhile the people seem tired of waiting and suffering. They grow restless, and are organizing. The explosion may come at any time.⁴

Political Problems. The conflict between the remnants of the feudal system, never completely eradicated from Japan and still stubbornly holding their own, and the hastily established new order of the constitutional system, has created a vortex. The partisans of tradition, advocating antiquated methods for meeting problems born of an advanced stage of capitalism, are faced with events utterly unlike those of the bygone times of the Shogunate. They are mainly responsible for the awkward manner in which this young and ambitious Power conducts its domestic and foreign affairs.

Quasi-constitutional, but actually theocratico-monarchical, Nippon has a Parliament but no political parties

⁴ Mr. Kagawa, who used to be "a leader of the workers and organized the Tenant-Farmers' Union in Japan, but is now a warm ally of the Government, and anything but a revolutionary," as he was introduced by Freda Uteley in her very valuable study of working conditions in Nippon, that was quoted elsewhere in these pages, and who is rather widely known to the American public through his preaching tours of this country, declared in 1928 at the Conference of Applied Christianity, at Karuizawa: "We need to face the facts in a situation which is terrible beyond our imagination.... It was during the European War that Japan first fully experienced the system of Capitalism; and last year during the panic we discovered that this new and interesting system is really a horrible mistake in Japan... millions are suffering acutely ... it is no wonder that they are turning to the philosophy which describes their actual plight and which offers such a plausible way of escape from the system of Capitalism which more and more they are determined to disestablish." Freda Uteley, *ibid.*, pp. 137-9.

of real importance, and no genuinely representative system under which the people control their affairs. The peculiar rôle reserved for the army and navy, that makes Cabinets their plaything and Parliament their obedient servant, only complicates the already difficult problem of government. The constant interference of the military elements in affairs of state, both at home and abroad, makes the path of Cabinets extremely thorny, their steps uncertain, and their promises unreliable.

At present the conflict between the reactionary forces, chiefly represented by the army and navy, and the democratic elements, is clear. The latter, advocating greater consideration of present realities, are looking ahead to the future. The reactionaries who fight for a "restoration," which actually means a return to the old order, are mobilizing under the Fascist banner with an appropriate Japanese name, and are preparing for battle. Behind them are massed those who fear the growing power of the lower classes, who want to preserve their privileges, and who are losing confidence in a government toying with the parliamentary system and occasionally practicing mildly liberal methods. As for the methods that the militarist-Fascists of Nippon would substitute, they have been amply demonstrated by a number of political assassinations, including the ghastly affair of February 26, 1936. Anything but original, these extremists almost copied the notorious act of Herr Hitler in June, 1934, though they were not yet in control of the government. If these gentlemen from the "Right" ever come to power, they will undoubtedly demonstrate their real character in a still more striking manner.

The liberal forces in Japan, as elsewhere, are poorly organized. They include too many meek souls and persons incapable of decision; they cannot be counted on to resist, much less stop, the super-gangsters who—very obligingly for these meek souls—call themselves "patriots." As for the workers, the peasants, the underpaid professionals, the desperately struggling petty bourgeois, and the unemployed, including youth fresh from schools

with no jobs in sight, these too lack organization. The lack of organization and consciousness on the part of the proletariat makes hardly possible any effective attack on the existing conditions. They are not united by any definite program, nor do they seem severally to have any recognizable plan of action. The most to be expected of them in the event of a *coup d'état* staged by the Fascists would be spontaneous resistance. The outcome would depend first of all on the momentum gathered through action defined by the dimensions of the discontent, the degree of unrest, and the state of enlightenment of the masses; and secondly on the presence of good organizers and leaders.

The Fascists have already made several attempts to seize control. Abortive as they have been, these attempts have made clear the will to power that is brewing in these circles. The outcome of the bloody bath of February 26, 1936, was neither the end of these attempts, nor a quietus to the movement. On the contrary, all indications point in the opposite direction—and the present situation suggests not only that the contest for power is here, but that it may yet be won by the Fascists. Their victory, to be sure, might very well serve to awaken the nation and cement the now disunited masses of malcontents, preparing them to overturn by revolution a system based on discrimination favoring the few and visiting abuse and injustice on the majority.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Since the very first hour of her emergence from seclusion, Japan has found it no simple matter to conduct intercourse with the rest of the world. The tutors with whom she studied the intricacies of a life shaped by advancing capitalism and imperialistic arrogance and aggression, lost no time in supplying their new friend with advisers and missionaries to preach brotherly love. But the pupil was soon found to enjoy certain critical capacities in addition to a pronounced flair for imitation. The Japanese were not satisfied with sermons and good ad-

vice; they were eagerly observing and drawing their own conclusions. It was not long before they discovered that while "Peace on Earth, and good-will to men!" is a beautiful motto, the real law of the game is: "Take care of your own interests; do not worry about the others; take advantage of their weaknesses; and watch them lest they encroach on your pasture!"

Ambitious and energetic, the Japanese entered this game with excess of enthusiasm; and, imitating the Westerners without discrimination, eventually surpassed their tutors in the field of aggression. Of course, they began by practicing on their weakest neighbors, Korea and China; but having found that aggression paid, they developed an insatiable appetite for acquisition. Thus, starting as they did with the good intention of improving the lot of their people, the rulers of Japan have done little if anything actually to benefit the nation; instead they have brought the country to the verge of starvation at home and aroused widespread enmity abroad.

Economic Problems. Despite the wide territorial expansion, Japan has found no real outlets for her growing population either in the colonies of Korea and Formosa, or in Manchukuo. In addition, she has discovered no satisfactory opening abroad, for Japanese immigration has been restricted or even completely excluded by most of the foreign countries attractive to her emigrants. The reason was largely economic, but a contributing factor has been the aggressiveness for which the Japanese people at large were blamed, thereby suffering for a policy actually dictated by the ruling class. And another penalty of expansion has been that in obtaining control over the natural resources of the newly acquired parts of the Empire and thereby depending to a lesser extent on foreign markets, Japan has become less attractive to those countries in which she used to be a good customer.

Regarding outlets for the excess production of her growing industry, Japan has indeed found a certain market in her newly acquired territories, and has forced her way into many others by means of dumping. The result

has been economic warfare with a number of foreign countries which have adopted various special restrictions and barriers to stop the invasion of cheap Japanese goods produced by underpaid labor and in certain instances by more perfect machinery. In spite of extremely aggressive trade practices, Japan has succeeded only in increasing the volume of her exports; but, forced to accept very low prices on catastrophically falling markets, she has gained little in the way of receipts. Her foreign trade remains unfavorable, as the balances continue to be adverse; and for this situation independent action, ignoring others, affords little remedy. Without coöperation Nippon will not gain enough to justify underselling, which means undermining her national economy and pauperizing her population. Even on the conquered markets, in China and elsewhere, Japan must seek the coöperation and good-will of the population if she wishes to develop substantial and healthy trade. To do this is one of the tasks utterly neglected up to the present by Japan's aggressive militarists, who are convinced that "might is right," and foolishly expect to force trade on unwilling customers.

With all her achievements, Japan is not yet the industrial equal of other nations more advanced in the capitalist stage of history. To attain a status of parity Japan may, of course, go her own way and speed up development industrially and otherwise; indeed, some people might say that by becoming an outcast she may be forced to develop even more quickly than would otherwise be the case. Did not Soviet Russia expand her industries in an amazingly short time because she was blockaded and boycotted by the rest of the world? However, one may question the validity of such reasoning, for any explanation of Russia's success must take into account her planned economy. Is Japan ready or willing to follow suit?

Political Problems. Her industrial disparity with other countries, unpleasant and embarrassing as it is to Japan, can and most probably soon will be overcome by the efforts of the nation. The one-sided treaties forced on Nippon in the opening years of her relations with Europe

and America were long ago revised, making her nominally the equal of other lands. Her growth in size and might has raised her to the status of a Great Power. But for all this the Japanese still feel that they are not on a par with the Westerners. They remember that at the Versailles Conference their delegation failed to obtain recognition of equality. They still consider the exclusion clause of the American Immigration Act as discrimination against them. They still chafe under the restrictions imposed by Canada and by Australia, which is open only to white immigrants. This racial question is therefore one of the problems that Japan is most anxious to solve. But what are the chances for a desirable settlement so long as Nippon defies the rest of the world, abuses her neighbors, encroaches on the interests of other Powers, and confronts them with a chronic menace? The withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations, however low the prestige of that institution may be at present, has not improved Japan's international position. Her contempt for the comity of nations can hardly be forgotten; and atonement or compensation of some sort will have to be made before the question of inequality is adjusted to her satisfaction.

Diplomatic Problems. After persistently disregarding international obligations, defying the Covenant of the League, violating treaties, and retorting with curt answers to the protests and diplomatic notes of the foreign governments, Nippon is faced with the necessity of regaining her reputation as a trustworthy party to contracts. The systematic recurrence of flagrant disagreements between the declarations of Japanese diplomats and the deeds that have followed, also requires attention. Difference in the diplomatic methods practiced by the Japanese and other nations has become so obvious in recent years that one has the right to expect a thorough overhauling of the entire machine run by the *Gaimusho*, the Foreign Office at Tokyo.

It will take much time and manœuvring to adjust Nippon's position vis-à-vis China. The three-point pro-

gram advanced by Mr. Hirota while Minister of Foreign Affairs, will hardly suffice. China, disunited, misgoverned, and plagued with a multitude of grave problems at home, is not willing either to recognize the present Manchurian situation as final, or to accept Japan's domination, even if the Nanking régime should acquiesce in the demands of Tokyo. The internal strife of China is intensified by Japan's aggression; pressure for settlement on terms of submission and the humiliation of four hundred-odd million Chinese does not augur well for future amity.⁵

It will take time and ingenuity of a different kind from that represented by Doihara, the "Lawrence of Manchuria," and other militarists of his school, to adjust Japan's position in Mongolia. On the one hand she is

⁵ The chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao Tse-tung, declared in an interview broadcast over the radio station of his government that "if Chiang Kai-shek's army or any other army ceases hostilities against the Red Army, then the Chinese Soviet Government will immediately order the Red Army to stop military action against them. The Red Army will then, together with the previously hostile army, carry on with all its strength the anti-Japanese war and thus fulfill the desires of the Chinese people." And the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Wang Chia-chien, in the same broadcast declared: "Our foreign policy is based on the principle of the freedom and independence of China and the safeguarding of the interests of the Chinese people. Our foreign policy is open and rejects all secret diplomacy. The chief enemy confronting us is Japanese Imperialism, and the countries which preserve a benevolent neutrality toward our struggle against Japan are our friends, and we are ready to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with them based on equality. Our country is still backward economically, hence we must coöperate with those which are economically progressive. Therefore the Soviet Government is prepared to conclude economic agreements, based on equality, with all countries which are friendly to us. The annulment of the unequal treaties is, however, one of the most important foreign political tasks of the Chinese Soviet government. With the exception of Japan, this condition can be accomplished through diplomatic negotiations. Japanese Imperialism is the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people. With every other country the Chinese Soviet Government wishes to maintain peaceful and friendly relations which will not injure the interests of the Chinese people." (Quoted from *China Today*, May, 1936.)

sponsoring a movement to create an independent Mongolian state on the Manchukuo pattern, and on the other she is advocating reunion of all Mongols scattered over Asia, and a revival of their glorious national life.

It will take time and concessions to extort from the Powers a recognition of Manchukuo, and still more time and expenditure to pacify that "independent" country and convert it into an asset to its protector. The numerous "bandits" can still make plenty of trouble for the invaders of their motherland; diplomacy alone will not stop their raids, or establish that peace and order which Japan offered as justification for occupying that part of China.

It may take less time to adjust Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R., whose patience she has abused for so many years, for to achieve that end Tokyo is offered easy terms. She has only to stop the violations of the Russian and Outer Mongolian borders by arrogant soldiers stationed in Manchukuo, and to conclude a non-aggression pact. The terms are simple and easy, provided Japan really wants peace and has no sinister designs against the U.S.S.R. But to say that such is the case is hazardous indeed at this moment.

At the time of this writing the attention of the Japanese militarists is definitely shifted from the Soviet Union toward China. There are two foci of their activities in the latter: in the north around Shantung and Hopei, and in the south in Fukien. The Kwantung army, considerably reinforced by new contingents shipped from Nippon, recently intensified her preparations in northern China. Those preparations may indicate that the Japanese still dream of creating a new autonomous area out of the five northern provinces, as was designed by Doihara, though the growing desire of the Chinese to resist further encroachment of Japan may check it, or at least postpone the action and limit its scope. At the same time, under the benevolent non-interference of the Japanese military authorities, the smuggling into China via the autonomous East Hopei area or simply through Tientsin,

has developed to such gigantic proportions that Great Britain and the United States were forced to protest this "new technique for closing the 'Open Door' in China."⁶ It may be explained also as an attempt to substitute economic pressure for armed warfare in the hope of forcing China to accept the major aims.⁷ But whatever the explanation of the particular detail, it seems that "In the struggle between Japanese, British and American imperialism for the mastery of China, all of the aces appear to lie in the hands of the Japanese. That they obtained them by trickery and failure to play the 'civilized' rules of the game does not matter greatly. Financial imperialism is a powerful force, but unless it is backed by force of arms, as Britain is apparently unable to do at the moment, it is under a tremendous handicap. Smuggling is a new weapon in the twentieth century imperialistic struggle, but it is fully consistent with the crudity and essential lawlessness of Japan's bid for power in Eastern Asia."⁸

The increased Japanese activities in the Fukien province recently alarmed the Canton group to such an extent that the leaders of that Southern régime embarked on a large-scale demonstration of their military strength, apparently designed to force Chiang Kai-shek into action against the intruders. It aroused new hopes among many Chinese and certain foreigners who would like to see Japan checked, but one is inclined not to overestimate the chances of direct action of the Chinese armies in a contest with the Japanese military machine. Anyhow, the solution hardly can be sought in the use of force by either side. Though one cannot be optimistic in expectation of a speedy peaceful settlement either.

It will take time to re-create a common language for dealing with the rest of the world, to restore Japan's

⁶ T. A. Bisson, in "Japan Drives On in North China," F. P. A. Bulletin, June 5, 1936.

⁷ Sterling Fisher in *New York Times*, June 7, 1936.

⁸ Maxwell Stewart, "Smuggling: Japan's Latest Weapon," in *China Today*, June, 1936.

position as a trusted member of the family of nations, and to return the country to the road of coöperation. All this can hardly be achieved while the aggressive elements of Japan remain in power, first of all because they themselves are not prepared to consider these points compulsory or even desirable; and secondly because the outside world could not and would not rely on the good faith of these elements, even if they attempted such readjustments. They believe in force, rely on force, and plan to use force whenever there is prospect of success. That is why military problems seem of paramount importance in Japan today. Coöperation is renounced on the ground that the League and other international groups are designed to promote only the interests of those who are already mighty, powerful and rich, and to hinder the rightful ambition of others to expand.

Military Problems. It is quite in line with this mood that Japan should be flooded with martial literature. Books and pamphlets by the most prominent generals and admirals, as well as obscure authors, are widely circulated in the Land of the Rising Sun. These works advocate belligerence and suggest methods of conducting war in all imaginable combinations and against all potential adversaries. Their authors are busily taking stock of Japan's and others' military and naval strength and resources, comparing, drawing conclusions, scheming, forecasting results.

Some of these essays visualize a war with Russia, some have in mind the United States, while still others see in Great Britain the most likely enemy; practically all declare that war in the Pacific or on its rim is unavoidable. There can be no doubt, however, that at present the centre of gravity of Japanese foreign policy is preparation for a war against the Soviet Union. So, not unnaturally, the largest number of these martial works deal with Russia. Particularly noteworthy is the pamphlet⁹ published in October, 1934, by the Press Bureau of the Ministry of

⁹ Under the title, "The True Significance of Military Defense and an Appeal for its Intensification."

War, and regarded as an elaboration of Baron Tanaka's plans.

"While the tentacles of Japanese imperialism stretch towards the Soviet Far East, to the Mongolian People's Republic, to the Soviet Republics of Central Asia, and to Baku, to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, Singapore and Suez, intense preparations are being made for war in Japan, in Manchuria, and in the mandatory islands. Feverish creation of an armaments and munitions industry in Japan and Korea; the building of strategic railroads, warehouses and airdromes in Manchuria; establishing air and submarine bases on the Kurile and mandatory islands; re-equipping the Japanese army with modern implements of war; carrying out supplementary programs of military and naval construction; accumulating enormous reserves of weapons and of strategical raw materials—such are important features of war preparations." The words are those of O. Tanin and E. Yohan, whose "When Japan Goes to War" offers the most comprehensive study yet made of Japan's resources and ability to carry on a modern war.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the bullies and alarmists, there are still many Japanese who recommend caution and restraint. They recognize the growing strength of the U.S.S.R., her large, highly mechanized, and well-equipped army and mighty air force, and a rapidly developing industry that is already far ahead of Japan's and can draw on incomparably larger and wealthier resources. These people at least seem to realize that before embarking on an armed conflict with her northern neighbor, Nippon must safeguard the financing of such a venture. She must insure an ample and undisturbed supply of raw materials and of such goods as are not available at home but must be purchased and delivered to her factories. Then, as armaments and ammunition, and food and clothing, for the soldiers, such goods must still be delivered to the front across territories full of enemies, call them "bandits"

¹⁰ O. Tanin and E. Yohan, "When Japan Goes to War," pp. 14-15. New York, 1936.

or what you will. All this ought to dampen the enthusiasm of the advocates of war against the Soviets; if it does not they must indeed be poorly informed about the real situation.

It is very likely that in staging raids over the Siberian and Outer Mongolian borders the officers of the Kwantung army, stationed in Manchukuo, have not always acted in accordance with the designs of their superiors, and may even sometimes have defied orders from Tokyo. Probably the shattered discipline of the Japanese Army, made clear through the participation and even leadership of army men in practically all the numerous recent political assassinations, has been responsible for these acts. At the time of writing, Tokyo and Moscow were reported in agreement on the setting up of special joint commissions for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of such border incidents, and of settling existing disputes.

So long as the extremist elements of Japan are not in complete control of the government, there is a good chance that the Russo-Japanese tension created by the jingoes will not be allowed to develop into an armed conflict of major proportions. But if the Fascists of Japan should obtain control, the danger that the country will be dragged into some kind of war will be greatly increased. Undoubtedly, a clash with the Soviet Union would then become much more likely than it is at present.

The better informed among the militarists of Japan undoubtedly are aware of the actual strength of the U.S.S.R., and quite naturally consider a single-handed contest with the latter too risky. That is why they would like to have the coöperation of Germany, attacking the Soviet Union from the west simultaneously with the Japanese attack from the east. But the feasibility of such a stratagem does not seem, at least at present, extra good. Germany is not in a sound economic position, neither is she ready in the military sense. As for the international situation, it is little more favorable for Berlin than for Tokyo. The Franco-Soviet mutual-assistance pact is an

important check on Herr Hitler, and that is why the aggressive elements of Japan greeted it with catcalls.

It is superfluous to reiterate that Soviet Russia is anxious to preserve peace, for she has demonstrated this most convincingly on a number of occasions. Japan should be aware by now that the attitude of the U.S.S.R. is dictated not by unpreparedness or lack of strength, but by the consistent policy of peace on which her relations with the rest of the world are founded. Besides, there is another very obvious reason why the Soviet Union wants peace; she is busy rebuilding the country, and has no desire to suspend this work in order to fight off intruders. Stalin and other leaders of the U.S.S.R. have announced repeatedly that while the Soviet Union does not covet an inch of land belonging to others, it will not tolerate any encroachment on its own territory. In conjunction with the additional explanation given by Stalin in his celebrated interview with Roy Howard, it means that if Japan embarks on a new adventure aiming at Soviet Russia's territory or Outer Mongolia, she will meet a most determined resistance. The U.S.S.R. has been allied with Outer Mongolia since 1921 and bound by treaty of mutual assistance since March, 1936. Knowing this, the General Staff of Japan appears to be exercising caution; and can hardly be willing to allow a free hand to the hotheads advocating war with the northern neighbor.

There are no differences between Japan and the Soviet Union which cannot be solved through peaceful negotiation; and happily the more reasonable elements of Nippon, including the Court and extensive business interests, decidedly prefer such a solution to a costly and risky war. Indeed, the Social-Democratic party, *Shakai Taishuto*, that won several places in the Diet at the election of 1936, has conspicuously in its program the following points on foreign policy: immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union; redemarkation of the borders between U.S.S.R. and Manchukuo, and also between the latter and Outer Mongolia through negotiations in order to eliminate the danger of war be-

tween Japan and U.S.S.R., and general adjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations. This is promising, for it indicates that more and more Japanese are perceiving that coöperation is better than pin-pricks and provocation; for while Japanese interest in the rich Soviet possessions in the Far East is only natural, the methods recommended by her militarists can only harm both sides. A friendly accord with her neighbor would benefit Nippon immeasurably more than all the attempts to apply force; especially when the force seems inadequate.

The editor of the influential Tokyo newspaper *Asahi*, Taketoru Ogata, in reviewing the Russo-Japanese situation as a whole, came to the conclusion that "neither side wants war; both sides believe it is inevitable. It is this belief which has to be destroyed. And the only effectual way to do this is to tackle all outstanding questions between the two nations one at a time, without attempting general discussions, which simply serve to reveal the fundamental differences of ideology between the two people, as well as the geographical and other natural factors which tend to bring them into conflict."¹¹

Another group of writers is concerned with Great Britain as the most probable adversary. In the opinion of Commander Ishimaru Tota, whose recent book, "Japan Must Fight Britain," is available in an English translation, Japan must fight England because the latter is not willing to make way for his country; and this naval officer advocates alliance with Soviet Russia, whether the enemy is to be Great Britain or the United States. "We are rendered powerless if we make Russia hostile," he writes. Commander Tota is even angered at "certain soldiers who talk too much of war with Russia." Similar opinions have been expressed by a number of other Japanese writers, some of them civilians but mostly naval officers. This is only natural, for their interest is centred in naval preparedness; Soviet Russia, having no navy of appreciable size, is of no concern to them. They must think, talk and

¹¹ See his article in *Contemporary Japan*, December, 1934, "War or Peace with Soviet Russia?"

write about the nations with larger navies—namely, Great Britain and the United States. They want naval equality. Their care is to struggle for larger appropriations in the budget, and they do their best. But it is highly improbable that most of these writers really believe that naval battles with either of the two Anglo-Saxon nations will be fought in the near future. They may frown on the naval base being erected by Great Britain at Singapore, but actually they must be aware how insignificant are the British naval forces stationed in the harbors of the Far East, since Signor Mussolini invited by his actions in Ethiopia a larger concentration in the Mediterranean and adjacent waters. They realize, or should realize, that Great Britain has ceased to be mistress of the seas, and is no longer in a position to dictate to Japan. Their alarm is false; for the present at least Great Britain is neither able, nor desirous, to attack the Land of the Rising Sun.

Those writers of Nippon who are concerned with the "menace" from across the Pacific are possibly on a sounder ground than those who assert that war between Japan and the United States is "unthinkable." But they, too, are exaggerating, at least so far as the element of time is concerned. What the situation will be later on it is hard to foresee. It will be guided by the course of events both in Japan and in the United States, and by the leadership in both countries; for much depends on the identity of the hands in which will be the choice between coöperation and war. The danger of war exists and may become much more real with the ascent of bellicose elements. But the cause of peace is by no means lost; and it can be greatly strengthened by bringing together those who want peace preserved. Such forces are found in Nippon as elsewhere, and the near future will depend, to a great extent, on what these Japanese forces do.



CONCLUSIONS

Japan in Crisis—Is Japan Really Different?—The Normal Course—Racial and Economic Equality—Crisis of Imperialism—Preparation for War—Is Coöperation Possible?

Japan in Crisis. There is no escape from the general conclusion that Japan faces a grave, widespread and multiform crisis. It is foreshadowed in her economic and social life, in her political as well as her cultural status, and in her relations with the rest of the world.

It would be foolish, of course, to ascribe all this merely to the fact that in her hasty transformation Japan has stressed modernization of her economic structure without making commensurate changes in the social structure. Nevertheless, this seems the cardinal cause of her malady. The bonds of feudalism, far from being shaken off, have been drawn still tighter under pressure of the poorly adapted new system; while the discrepancy between the growing demands of the state for industrial and territorial expansion—not to mention the unduly high recompense demanded by the private and privileged entrepreneurs—and the retarded economic welfare of the productive elements of the country, have combined to render dangerously shaky the very foundations of Japan's national economy.

The constantly growing demands for military expenditures dictated by advocates of unlimited expansion without proper consideration of the status of the treasury, were alone sufficient to necessitate an aggressive trade policy; and to say that such a trade policy has proved disadvantageous is putting the matter mildly, since eventually it developed into a dumping system which is a drain upon a national wealth that was never very great. The exporters engaged in that practice have, of course, made

profits; the bankers who financed the trade have seen their funds returned with lucrative gains. But those who produce the goods are forced to stand the cost. The industrial workers have been badly underpaid, while the farmers are practically not recompensed at all. For a number of years the tillers of the soil rarely were able to get enough for their produce to offset expenses of production, let alone the payment of taxes and the meeting of debts. Very often they were unable even to make ends meet or to keep their families from starvation.

The economic consequences were disastrous, the social repercussions more than disturbing, and that they remain so at present may be seen from the mounting number of industrial disputes, lockouts and strikes, and agrarian conflicts. The political horizon of Japan at the time of the bloody affair of February 26, 1936, was surely dark enough; and that the outlook improved with the so-called suppression of the mutiny is open to serious doubt. For if the militarists were really crushed, as reported, how was it possible for the army men to dictate to the new Prime Minister the composition of his Cabinet, and to get complete satisfaction of their demands by removal of three nominees and the appointment of others of whom they approved? It is true that their latest attempt at a *coup d'état* was abortive, even though it was on a wider scale and had a larger number of victims than its two predecessors; but the fact that it was put down is no guarantee against a recurrence.

One must also take with a grain of salt the announced determination of the government to curb unrest by severe punishment of the culprits in previous outrages. The crisis continues, and hardly can be settled without a reconstruction of the economic foundation and a thorough readjustment of the social structure. In other words, the struggle now developing in Japan is primarily a struggle for a radical change in her economic and social systems.

The cultural crisis basically is due to the same clash between the resolutely advancing ideology, trends, and methods and the remnants of an old order stubbornly

antipathetic to all-round modernization. In some cases, of course, the conservatives are justified in their stand by excesses and errors for which the other side is responsible, but more often they only reflect the desperation of forces seeking escape in reaction.

Is Japan Really Different? This attempt to return the nation to the Yamato-Damashi, or virtues of ancient Nippon, can only fail. It seems nothing but an attempt to check the natural development of the country, and to check it by force if the regular authority of the existing government proves inadequate.

Examination of the various peculiarities of Japan reveals no national traits which indicate that she is utterly different from the rest of the world. Differences exist, but they are not fundamental. Of course there are peculiarities born of the specific geographic and climatic conditions under which Nippon came into existence and her people lived and developed. All these peculiarities, however, seem to undergo moderation as the advance of science makes possible a more successful struggle with Nature. Of course, Japan's history has been unusual in the sense that she remained isolated from the rest of the world for over two centuries, though even in this she was not unique. It is also true that this heritage of isolation has served to alienate her from the rest of the human race, and to cultivate a sort of provincialism with excessive suspicion toward outsiders. But as regular intercourse develops, these peculiarities too are apt to fade. In other words, there are certainly numerous points on which Japan differs, or seems to differ, from the rest of the world. These constitute her individuality, but they do not by any means render her irreconcilably different from other nations.

In the process of modernization Nippon has gained much from contact with the rest of the world, and at the same time has exerted an influence on the Occident. The process persists. Modern Japan continues to undergo a gradual remodelling, not without setbacks and painful experiences. Her troubles and difficulties, however, are not essentially dissimilar from those undergone by certain

other countries in the past. Russia, for instance, experienced a more or less parallel period in the struggle between an old order shaped by a strange mixture of Byzantine and Tartar influence superimposed on the semi-barbaric Slavonic basis, and the advancing influence of the more civilized West. It took an autocrat of strong will-power and boundless energy, such as Peter the Great, to convert the Muscovites to Western civilization after centuries of stubborn resistance in an artificially created seclusion. But in Russia this change took place almost two hundred years before Mutsuhito inaugurated a similar transformation in Japan; and the process developed differently in the two countries. In the case of Japan it was marked by less violence, partly because the privileged classes included more who were willing to support reforms than was the case in Russia, partly because the former was so much smaller than the latter, and partly because in the second half of the nineteenth century the Japanese people at large were considerably more cultured than were the Russians in the early years of the eighteenth.

In the case of Russia the road to be covered in order to catch up with the more advanced Europeans was shorter than that confronting the Land of the Rising Sun. Japan, coming out of isolation almost two hundred years later, was handicapped by entering the race after the Industrial Revolution in the West had greatly accelerated the economic changes in the rest of the world. Furthermore, by starting her advance in another epoch, Japan was forced to adopt a different tempo; and that tempo, dictated by the Industrial Revolution and embraced by Japan with all the enthusiasm of a novice, allowed her to achieve amazing results in a very short time. The price, however, was high, for haste was not balanced with thoroughness; and behind the rapidly advancing modernized elements of the New Japan there remained and accumulated numerous unadjusted conflicts created by friction between the retreating old and the advancing new. This residue proved more than Nature was able to dissolve,

or modern Japan to assimilate. It remains today as the penalty for an undue haste attained through neglect of numerous vital problems, including the survival of an anachronistic feudal system. It also includes the handicap imposed on agricultural progress by the appalling injustice of land distribution, the extreme concentration of wealth partly created by the too generous support accorded by the state to private entrepreneurs, and the unrestricted exploitation of the working people by the privileged few.

All attempts to retard the process in order to gain time for necessary adjustments seem doomed to failure. The country must keep pace with its rivals. It must act in accord with the rest of the industrialized and commercially aggressive countries; and this cannot be done by a return to the old order. The call for reversion to the Yamato-Damashi might, of course, be considered of some value if it were genuinely an appeal to the better side of the human nature, and a sincere protest against such excesses of Westernization as greed, selfishness, exploitation of others, and neglect of communal interests. But how can it succeed when it comes from those who indulge in all these vices and advocate purification only for those whom they exploit? Is not this an "appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober"?

These attempts to stop the wheel of history, to force a nation back, are nothing new. Similar advocates of the return to national virtues were found among the Slavophiles of Russia, who utterly failed in their ill-designed plans. Many among them were undoubtedly people of noble aims and high personal qualifications, but as applied in practice their appeal to reliance upon those three corner-stones of Old Russia—Nationalism, Orthodox Christianity and Autocracy—proved nothing but a specific brand of patriotism abused by unscrupulous elements. It was not unlike the "One-hundred Per Cent Americanism" of the World War period—a brand of national zeal which usually is less effective as a stimulus for noble acts than as a screen for the nefarious practices

of crooks. In Japan the super-patriots and super-gangsters often coöperate with such harmony that it is difficult to distinguish the real patriots from the *soshi*, *ronin*, and mere hooligans. History affords examples enough of defenders of "purely national virtues" and advocates of policies "strictly conforming with national peculiarities," who have been not so much assets as menaces to their own countries and hindrances to proper relations abroad. One is inclined not to rely on such patriots too blindly. Human beings on the average are basically very much alike, and act in similar ways under similar conditions. The environments in which they act are more important than racial peculiarities which are only the reflections of these environments.

The Normal Course. Can Japan follow any line of development but that pursued by the rest of the world? The question seems purely rhetorical. Having joined the procession of the Westerners, Japan has so far followed them closely, though allowing the remnants of Feudalism to hinder her progress; she has nevertheless adopted their economic system, and has somewhat rearranged her social strata better to fit the new scheme of production. She has transplanted the constitutional system of government, though only to the extent of superimposing it on the old theocratico-monarchical régime. She has introduced Western culture, though naturally the latter has not yet penetrated the entire country, and fortunately has not completely replaced the old culture of Japan.

Along with this transformation the people of Nippon have acquired more and more of the characteristics of the Industrial Age, and its heir, the Power Age. In other words, they have developed similar if not actually the same features, good and bad, as are now found in the rest of the modern world. Thus, by dint of their renowned capacity for imitation the Japanese have gradually reached the stage where similarities with the present-day Occident prevail over the heritage of an Oriental past. The pattern of modern capitalist society is now omnipresent in Nippon, and practically every manifestation thereof affects

her daily life. She can no longer choose some other path of her own liking. Her way henceforth seems definitely that of the rest of mankind.

We hear it said that mode of living and trend of thought are defined by material conditions arising from the prevailing economic system; and if this is true, there is little reason to expect important deviations in Japan's course. Living and developing under a similar system, Nippon must further adjust herself to the conditions of today rather than retrace her steps and part company with other nations. Eliminating the remaining traces of the old system and straightening out a zigzag course would seem her normal task. The interdependence of the world of our time is such that the isolated existence of one country is no longer feasible.

At this juncture Japan, like other nations, is vacillating between Fascism, as the latest device to salvage whatever remains of capitalism, and one form or another of socialism. The latter, of course, is opposed by those who benefit by the existing system and do not necessarily care about the best interests of the country as a whole. The more advantageous position now occupied in Japan by the elements advocating, or likely to advocate, Fascism may indicate the trend of Nippon's development in the near future. In the long run, however, she will probably join the others on the Socialist highway, as she joined them on the road of capitalism less than a century ago.

Racial and Economic Equality. In the matter of Japan's intercourse with the rest of the world, the outstanding factor affecting her conduct is her racial "inequality" with the Westerners. Basically of economic origin, this factor accents her economic inequality and makes coöperation with the others doubly difficult. To blame the Westerners alone for this state of affairs is foolish. Japan's own economic system was founded not on coöperation but on competition, not on mutual help but on taking advantage of other people's weakness and inability to resist. After her advent to the international arena she repeated in her relations with weaker neigh-

bors the same tactics, the same abuses, employed by other great Powers against the smaller and weaker nations, including Japan. This was inevitable, because in following the Westerners she had no alternative but to take the road of imperialism and all that it implies. She herself demonstrated an utter disregard of the interests of the "backward" Asiatics; she embarked on a policy of conquest and annexation. And when certain backward Asiatics like the Formosans and Koreans became her colonials, she began to treat them with a degree of ruthlessness that Westerners never employed against the Japanese of the past. Today these colonials entertain no illusions about racial equality with the Japanese Imperialists, and certainly enjoy no economic equality. This attitude of Nippon toward her colonials was later on extended to other peoples; so that now the victims of her imperialist aggression are the Chinese, for they are Japan's inferiors in the military sense. There is nothing strange in all this. Imperialist aggression is no monopoly of Japan, but a phase of capitalistic development; though probably because Japan started on that road later than the others, and has employed many antiquated methods, her policy appears almost an anachronism. Neither is it surprising that Japan, the encroaching, should be opposed by the encroachers of the past. Naturally they would prefer to see the *status quo* unchanged, for they have obtained what they want and wish no interference from Japan or anyone else.

Crisis of Imperialism. There are numerous definitions of the term Imperialism. Some are one-sided or incomplete, while many others listed by Sailli re in his comprehensive work "*La Philosophie de l'Imp rialisme*," are only of historical interest. Lenin defined Imperialism as the advanced or, to be more precise, the monopolistic stage of Capitalism. If we accept this interpretation as the most up-to-date, our logical conclusion must be that Imperialism is now approaching a crisis in this epoch of decay of the Capitalism of which it is a corollary.

By the "monopolistic stage" of Capitalism Lenin un-

derstood a point in the system at which the concentration of capital became such as to give control to finance-capital either through the merging of banking and manufacturing interests, or through the subjugation of the latter by the former. At that point the exporting of capital to exploit "backward" nations becomes imperative in order to ease economic conditions at home, and thereby postpone social revolution in the mother country by increasing imperial revenues at the expense of abused and underpaid colonials.

Events of the post-war period offer much material for the study of contemporary trends in Imperialism, and its crisis. Japan's new aggression in China, begun with the creation of the puppet-state of Manchukuo out of the latter's flesh, continued with the annexation of Jehol, and later on extended to the northern provinces of China proper and Inner Mongolia, is no refutation of that crisis. Neither is the Ethiopian adventure of Signor Mussolini. It is even possible that these most recent spasms of Imperialism are not the last; they may well be followed by other attempts to acquire new colonies on the part of Germany—and who knows what other nation? When countries become Fascist, when they fall under the rule of advocates of ultra-nationalism, it inevitably means hatred of others, and leads to aggression and war. Sooner or later Messianism always implies grabbing what belongs to others and forcing them to work for their new masters, who pretend that they possess a higher culture than the conquered simply because the latter have been unable to resist brute force.

But along with the deplorable examples offered by the hitherto successful aggression of Japan and Italy, we are witnessing the steadily developing emancipation of certain retarded or colonial and semi-colonial countries. The most striking instance of this process is to be found in Turkey under Kemal Ataturk. Less pronounced but also impressive are the changes taking place in Iran, the Persia of the past, and Afghanistan. Slow in development, but unmistakable in determination, are the trends in

Egypt and India. Pathetically slow is the awakening of the so-called backward peoples of Asia, Africa and Polynesia; but these too are showing desire for a life different from that prescribed by their more "civilized" masters.

Whatever the cause delaying the emancipation of these peoples from the rule of imperialists, that rule is doomed. The methods applied by the *Kultur-träger* in exploiting the "backward" are not only ethically indefensible, but utterly false from the economic point of view; they are out of date, and therefore harmful not only to the exploited but to the exploiting nations themselves.

The present world-wide economic crisis has intensified the struggle of various imperialist interests all over the globe. It also weakened them quite materially, thereby prompting local resistance to their arrogance. The heavy losses China has experienced through the new Japanese onslaught on her territories and independence has already taught her much about the weakness of others. This has served to cultivate nationalist feeling and to invigorate the anti-imperialist cause. The success of the Red Armies of China, the recent anti-Japanese demonstrations staged by students in various parts of that country, and the growing mass movement advocating resistance to Japanese encroachment, are signs of a coming struggle that may well put an end not only to Japanese but to every other brand of imperialism in China. No one can say how long this will take, but no one is justified in denying the seriousness of that process either. That the doom of imperialism is a corollary of the decay of capitalism should be obvious to all who wish to see, and have no special reason to deceive themselves or others.

Preparation for War. On the surface, of course, it seems otherwise. The Japanese aggression in China continues, and Nippon is feverishly preparing for a major war. But forces within all nations, including Japan, are being divided. Well discernible, and apparently growing, forces of peace and coöperation are already making the elements of abuse and violence, aggression and war, less comfortable than of yore. The warmongers, including the im-

perialists of Japan, are now occasionally forced to retreat as their opponents press the fight for a new order. Luckily there are numerous factors conducive to their success.

Economically, as we have seen, Japan is in no position to allow further adventures on a large scale. Her industries are inadequate to meet the extremely heavy demands of a prolonged modern war; her finances are shaken and unable to endure the strain of a major conflict; and foreign bankers are hardly likely to consider as a good risk the lending of money to a country where statesmen are so readily assassinated by the advocates of aggression. Their governments would scarcely recommend such loans to those whose ambitions are in conflict with the interests of the countries of which these bankers are subjects or citizens.

In the matter of naval and military preparedness, Japan seems likewise far from ready. This naturally weakens the position of the jingoes and strengthens that of their opponents. The affair of February 26, 1936, far from eliminating the danger of a new militarist-Fascist *coup d'état*, seems only to have postponed the change, though for a while at least the more reasonable elements of Japan are provided with a better chance to fight the extremists. Unfortunately, they have already failed to exploit their opportunity, since they have not curtailed the appropriations for the army and the navy.

The chances of the Fascistically inclined elements of Japan to become the rulers of Nippon are by no means ended; and if their hour ever comes, they will undoubtedly drag their country into some new adventure of aggression, even though such a project might be a matter of despair rather than the outcome of a well-designed plan. For on acquiring power, the militarists would soon discover that there is no money in the treasury, as the late Minister of Finance, Takahashi, told them, and was assassinated by them because they did not believe his words. They would soon discover how little there is to be squeezed from the pauperized population and how little

to be borrowed abroad. And when they have discovered these things, they are quite likely to start in desperation something that seems logically absurd. In other words, if those elements succeed in getting the upper hand, they may even embark on a new war, possibly against the Soviet Union at the start, but gradually involving the whole world. Meanwhile they will pray for a miracle. But are there any miracles left in the twentieth century? And what would be the price of such an adventure?

The military and naval writers of Japan have contributed more than their share in spreading alarm and threatening the world with a new conflagration. Vice-Admiral Reijiro Kawashima has publicly declared that "a Japanese-American conflict is an absolute necessity." Vice-Admiral Nobumasu Suetsugu, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet, wrote an enthusiastically approving preface to Commander Fukunaga's "The Coming War With the United States." General Tadaharu Sakurai and General Tsunematsu Sato have both predicted armed conflict with America, while others have been prophesying a Japanese war with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and with Great Britain on the other. Latterly, however, these forecasts have become so embarrassing to the civilians of Japan that the New Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hachiro Arita, whose appointment was approved by the military people, was forced to say before the Diet—and obviously for foreign listeners—a word of disapproval about one particular book by Lieutenant-Commander Ishimaru Tota. This was "Japan Must Fight England"; which the famous spokesman of the Foreign Office, Mr. Eiji Amau, has described as "irresponsible nonsense."¹ Two years earlier, by the way, the same Mr. Amau had boldly challenged all the Western Powers with a statement of April, 1934, in which he suggested to the West in no uncertain terms a "hands off China" policy. This statement was made only a little while after his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, had exchanged "amity notes" with the American Secretary of State,

¹ *New York Times*, May 12, 1936.

Cordell Hull. Such are the puzzles created in Japan, as elsewhere, by conflicting forces working simultaneously.

Is Coöperation Possible? To assert that the militarists alone are seeking war, and that the rest would like to preserve peace, would be a dangerous, because misleading exaggeration. If such were the case the chances of coöperation would be high indeed. Actually the condemnation of the vociferous advocates of aggression may sometimes be a matter of expediency rather than of principle. However, the better-informed people in Japan cannot but realize the danger to their country from continued aggression, when they consider its cost in money, privation, and international complications. When they also consider the relative poverty of the country, the growing dissatisfaction at home, and the menacingly disapproving attitude of the outsiders, they must know that the moment is not propitious.

Neither is the matter in complete control of any one group, in power or out. In Japan, as elsewhere, the disapproval of war as an instrument of national policy may have the sincere backing of multitudes, including a considerable number of officials and of privileged members of the aristocracy and plutocracy. The Kellogg Pact voiced that sentiment, and was accepted by Japan, though with reservations that made her participation worthless. The objection lay not to the phrase "in the name of the people," which seemed inconsistent with the Japanese idea of Emperor's unlimited authority to sanction contracts with the foreigners, but in the exclusion of certain territories from its application. As for the idea of collective security as represented by the League of Nations, it was supported by Japan, though only over the opposition of one powerful group which considered the Covenant of the League unacceptable "as establishing a super-state and infringing the Imperial prerogative of sovereignty."² This support, however, lasted only so long as it did not conflict with the selfish plans of Nippon. The new expansion in Asia necessitated withdrawal

² Takeuchi, *ibid.*, pp. 225-6.

from the League, while the Covenant proved no check on her aggression. Neither had the slightest effect on Japanese abuse of China the Nine-Power Treaty, the diplomatic notes stressing that pact, or the interpretation of other international agreements supposedly binding on Japan.

The non-coöperation elements prevailed and took the course of Japan's foreign policy in their own hands, to the horror of the outside world and the embarrassment of Japanese diplomatists. The situation justified, indeed, Mr. H. E. Wildes' declaration that "Japanese assurances and Japanese practices are poles apart."³ In a more elaborate form the same thought was expressed in the statement issued to the press by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on December 5, 1935, after the Japanese Foreign Office had asserted that the North China "autonomy" movement was a purely domestic Chinese affair. An editorial comment in the *New York Herald Tribune* states: "In substance Mr. Hull said: 'I have been asked about this kaleidoscopic and befuddling North China "autonomy" situation. In answer I can only say, without naming names, that that situation has arisen through the meddlesome tactics of a certain power that has no treaty right to promote such trouble in that area. America is deeply interested. This country discharges its treaty obligations faithfully. We know of one country that doesn't, as this situation proves. That is most unfortunate—even embarrassing to friendly relations. We are very sorry for that nation.'"⁴

It would also be an exaggeration to assert that the Japanese government and ruling classes were unanimous in supporting such wholesale contempt of others. However, the fact remains and cannot be erased from the pages of history. The same applies to the record of the League of Nations, which has failed again and again to check aggressors, whether Japanese or others. But it would also be false to condemn the very idea of coöperation on this

³ H. E. Wildes, "Japan in Crisis." Preface.

⁴ *New York Herald Tribune*, December 7, 1935.

score. That idea remains the hope and guiding star of the human race. No failure of the League in its present form, no ineffectiveness of the Kellogg Pact after emasculation by various Powers, including Japan, can justify cynics in declaring the idea itself discredited, utopian, impracticable. The League of Nations cannot be better than the sum total of the régimes it represents and the systems its member states are supporting.

So long as private profit derived from exploitation intensified by competition and the neglect of community interest is the basis of economics, so long as imperialism prevails in relations between the countries, it will be difficult to expect success for an order based on principles mutually incompatible. So long as the struggle for markets goes on and the aspirants for these markets continue their contest, coöperation will be difficult indeed. Under such conditions Japan can easily be dragged into a war, and others, inevitably, would be forced in; though neither Japan nor the others will gain much, if anything, out of it. But to admit that Japan may start a war does not mean that war is unavoidable or that it is the only course open to Japan. In fact, the alternative policy of coöperation might gradually solve most, if not all, the numerous grave problems confronting that country.

If she is still in need of an outlet for her growing population as such, there is plenty of unoccupied and fertile land that could be used by Japanese emigrants without a fight. Siberia and Soviet Russia's possessions in the Far East are not closed either to Japanese or to other settlers. Australia's boundless emptiness, coupled with her exclusion of other than white immigrants, constitutes an anomaly and a political danger—she could accommodate many more millions of Japanese. The South Sea Islands could be used for the same purpose to a larger extent than at present. But if the ruling classes of Japan are seeking more elbow-room for their exploitation, naturally, they face an entirely different problem: a problem that cannot be solved so easily and without a fight.

The raw material problem of Nippon could be easily

solved too, even without the redistribution of colonies and other sources of supply, of which certain statesmen are now talking, but so far without any signs of sincere support from those who could decide such a matter. The Malthusian idea that the Earth cannot sustain its "alarmingly" growing population never was a sound one, and not in accord with the facts; it did not take into account the rapid development of technology spurred by new victories of Science.⁵

The problem of markets would present no insurmountable difficulties either if coöperation were to replace exploitation and competition, greed and aggression. Under such new conditions an expanding internal market, resulting from growing purchasing capacity along with the rising productivity, and the accessibility of the external markets would solve the entire problem without a resort to force.

To say that all these is a dream, beautiful but unreal, is to beg the question "What is the use of talking? Why not concentrate on the practical end of the dilemma?" These may be easy phrases of escape for those who believe that "might is right," but they do not provide an honest answer to the extremely important query, "Peace or War?"

⁵ One should not forget the disastrous effect of the growing efficiency of production involving shrinkage of purchasing capacity of the masses, for their earnings do not keep pace with that industrial progress. But this anomaly, being a feature of the existing economic system, could be eliminated with the change of that system.

APPENDICES



THE CONSTITUTION¹

Chapter I

THE EMPEROR

Article I. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article II. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article III. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article IV. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article V. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article VI. The Emperor gives sanctions to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.

Article VII. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article VIII. The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law.

Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article IX. The Emperor issues, or causes to be issued,

¹ Quoted from G. E. Uyehara, "The Political Development of Japan. 1867-1909. London, 1910, pp. 277-284.

the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article X. The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution, or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).

Article XI. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article XII. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

Article XIII. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article XIV. The Emperor declares a state of siege. The conditions and effects of state of siege shall be determined by law.

Article XV. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honour.

Article XVI. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments, and rehabilitation.

Article XVII. A regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in his name.

Chapter II

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SUBJECTS

Article XVIII. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.

Article XIX. Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public offices equally.

Article XX. Japanese subjects are amenable to service

in the Army and Navy, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXI. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXII. Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of law.

Article XXIII. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.

Article XXIV. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law.

Article XXV. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.

Article XXVI. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolable.

Article XXVII. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolable.

Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be provided for by law.

Article XXVIII. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.

Article XXIX. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.

Article XXX. Japanese subjects may present petitions by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.

Article XXXI. The provisions contained in the present chapter shall not affect the exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor in times of war, or in cases of a national emergency.

Article XXXII. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding Articles of the present chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and

discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

Chapter III

THE IMPERIAL DIET

Article XXXIII. The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses—a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.

Article XXXIV. The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, or of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor.

Article XXXV. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Laws of Election.

Article XXXVI. No one can at one and the same time be a member of both Houses.

Article XXXVII. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article XXXVIII. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to it by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.

Article XXXIX. A Bill, which has been rejected by either one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be again brought in during the same session.

Article XL. Both Houses can make representations to the Government as to laws or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they can not be made a second time during the same session.

Article XLI. The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.

Article XLII. A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months.

In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by Imperial Order.

Article XLIII. When urgent necessity arises, an ex-

traordinary session may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one.

The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial Order.

Article XLIV. The opening, closing, prolongation of session and prorogation of the Imperial Diet, shall be effected simultaneously for both Houses.

In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued.

Article XLV. When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, Members shall be caused by Imperial Order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution.

Article XLVI. No debate can be opened, and no vote can be taken in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one-third of the whole number of the members thereof is present.

Article XLVII. Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote.

Article XLVIII. The deliberations of both Houses shall be held in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government, or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.

Article XLIX. Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.

Article L. Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.

Article LI. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.

Article LII. No member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses for any opinion uttered, or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in

writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law.

Article LIII. The members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion, or with a foreign trouble.

Article LIV. The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.

Chapter IV

THE MINISTERS OF STATE AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Article LV. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

All laws, Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the counter-signature of a Minister of State.

Article LVI. The Privy Council shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of state, when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

Chapter V

Article LVII. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law, according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

The organization of Courts of Law shall be determined by law.

Article LVIII. The judges shall be appointed from among those who possess proper qualifications according to law.

No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment.

Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law.

Article LIX. Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provisions of law or by the decision of the Court of Law.

Article LX. All matters that fall within the competency of a special Court shall be specially provided for by law.

Article LXI. No suit at law which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the administrative authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

Chapter VI

FINANCES

Article LXII. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.

However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.

The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided for in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXIII. The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as they are not remodelled by a new law, be collected according to the old system.

Article LXIV. The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.

Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the appropriation of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXV. The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives.

Article LXVI. The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary.

Article LXVII. Those already-fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the Government.

Article LXVIII. In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund for a previously fixed number of years.

Article LXIX. In order to supply deficiencies, which are unavoidable in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Revenue Fund shall be provided for in the Budget.

Article LXX. When the Imperial Diet can not be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety the Government may take all necessary financial measures by means of an Imperial Ordinance.

In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its appropriation shall be obtained thereto.

Article LXXI. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.

Article LXXII. The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be submitted by the Gov-

ernment to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law separately.

Chapter VII

SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

Article LXXIII. When it has become necessary in the future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Ordinance.

In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present is obtained.

Article LXXIV. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be required to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.

No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law.

Article LXXV. No modification can be introduced into the Constitution or into the Imperial House Law during the time of a Regency.

Article LXXVI. Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, Ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called, shall so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in force.

All existing contracts or orders that entail obligations upon the Government, and that are connected with expenditures, shall come within the scope of Article LXVII.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Provisions that Governed the Action of the Council and the Assembly in the Dispute between China and Japan

ARTICLE X

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE XI

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE XII

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE XIII

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which can not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.

3. For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE XV

1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the

dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

TEXT OF NINE-POWER TREATY

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking:

(a) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope,

duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE V

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE VI

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

ARTICLE VIII

Powers not signatory to the present Treaty, which have Governments recognized by the Signatory Powers and which have treaty relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the present Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to non-Signatory Powers and will inform the Contracting Powers of the replies received. Adherence by any Power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

[Here follow signatures.]

TEXT OF THE PACT OF PARIS

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Power parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages both texts having equal force, and hereunto affix their seals.

DONE at Paris the twenty-seventh day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight.

[Here follow signatures.]

NOTES OF SECRETARY STIMSON TO
CHINA AND JAPAN **January 7, 1932*

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed.

The American government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan.

But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese government and the government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between these governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

LETTER OF SECRETARY OF STATE STIMSON TO
SENATOR BORAH, MADE PUBLIC,
FEBRUARY 24, 1932

February 23, 1932.

MY DEAR SENATOR BORAH:

You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine-Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modifica-

* Quoted from the *New York Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1932.

tion, and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this Government.

This treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the "open door" policy towards China. That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various Powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles: (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the Powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress, Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the Powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion. He said:

The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other Powers to the policy thus announced.

In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, expressed himself "most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States."

For 20 years thereafter the "open door" policy rested upon

the informal commitments thus made by the various Powers. But in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal Powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallized into the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that treaty, the Contracting Powers, other than China agreed:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

This treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the Signatory Powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed—and the whole history of the development of the “open door” policy reveals that faith—that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

In its report to the President announcing this treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, said:

It is believed that through this treaty the "open door" in China has at last been made a fact.

During the course of the discussions which resulted in the treaty, the chairman of the British Delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that

The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any Power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of interest" was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government were concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.

At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidehara, announced the position of his Government as follows:

No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny.

The treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark, and Mexico. Germany has signed it but her parliament has not yet ratified it.

It must be remembered also that this treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various Powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction, and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity

for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other Power at the expense of China. One can not discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker Power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine-Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which having been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved; for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which can not, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value

of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement entered into by those Governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

In the past our Government, as one of the leading Powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual goodwill. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its Government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the "open door" was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations, in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours,

THE HONORABLE

WILLIAM E. BORAH,

United States Senate.

HENRY L. STIMSON

CHRONOLOGY



B.C.

- 2600-2200 China's traditional Golden Age.
- 1122 Foundation of Korean Kingdom.
- 660-585 Jimmu-Tenno, Traditional First Emperor of Japan.
- 100-21 A.D. Era of "Wide Empire" of China. Han Dynasty.

A.D.

- 68 Buddhism introduced into China.
- 203 Japanese Empress Jingo invades Korea.
- 552 Buddhism introduced into Japan.
- 710-720 First historical works on Japan, Kojiki and Nihongi.
- 710-784 Imperial Court at Nara.
- 794 Emperor Kwammu moved the capital to Kyoto.
- 866-1159 House of Fujiwara usurped the authority of the Emperor.
- 1159-1185 House of Taira.
- 1118-1181 Taira Kiyomori.
- 1190 Minamoto defeated the Taira in the naval battle of Dan-no-Ura.
- 1192-1226 Shogunate under the House of Minamoto. (Kamakura.)
- 1200-1333 Sikken or regents from the House of Hojo.
- 1281 Kublai-Khan attempted invasion of Japan.
- 1338-1573 House of Ashikaga. Shogunate at Kyoto.
- 1542 First Europeans (Portuguese) reached Japan.
- 1549 Jesuit mission under Francis Xavier in Japan.
- 1534-1582 Oda Nobunaga.
- 1536-1598 Toyotomi Hideyoshi.
- 1587 First decree expelling foreigners from Japan.
- 1582-1598 War with Korea.
- 1613 Sir John Soris arrived in Japan.
- 1603-1866 Tokugawa Shogunate. Yedo period.
- 1614 Expulsion of foreigners enforced.
- 1638 Massacre of Christians in Japan.
- 1614-1854 Japan in seclusion.

A.D.

- 1823 Rice riots in Japan.
- 1831 Uprising in Nagano.
- 1838-1847 Unrest in Omi, Hizen, etc.
- 1846 Commodore Biddle of the U. S. Navy arrived in Japan.
- 1847 Japan attempted to occupy Formosa, but advised by Great Britain to withdraw.
- 1853 First visit of Commodore Perry.
- 1854 First Japanese-American Treaty.
Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
- 1855 First Russo-Japanese Treaty.
- 1857 The Shogun's audience to Townsend Harris.
- 1860 Assassination of Minister Ii by anti-foreign group.
- 1861 Outrage by the anti-foreign fanatics on Heusken, Secretary of the American Legation.
Attack on British Legation.
- 1862 Russians attempted to occupy Tsushima island, but advised by Great Britain to withdraw.
A second attack on British Legation.
The Richardson party incident.
- 1863 Outrage of the Chosu clan upon an American merchantman, a French gunboat and a Dutch man-of-war.
Admiral Kuper's attack of Kagoshima.
- 1863 Richardson assassinated.
American Legation at Yedo burned.
- 1864 Attack of a combined fleet of Great Britain, Holland, France and the U. S. A. on Shimonoseki.
- 1865 Armed conflict between the Shogun's Government and the daimyos of Choshu.
Arrival of Sir Harry Parkes, British Envoy.
- 1866 Death of the Shogun Iyemochi. Succession of Keiki.
- 1867 Death of Emperor Komei.
Assassination of a number of British sailors.
Accession of Prince Mutsuhito.
The Shogun's letter of resignation.
The Restoration.
- 1868 Reforms. Struggle with the adherents of Tokugawa.

A.D.	Removal of the Imperial Court from Kyoto to Tokyo (Yedo).
	Construction of telegraphs.
1869	The first publication of the Official Gazette. Complete victory over the Northern rebels. Mediatization of the daimyos.
1870	Beginning of the railway construction. First loan from England.
1871	Abolition of feudal system. Introduction of modern postal system. Abolition of sword-wearing custom. Iwakura's party dispatched to Europe and America.
1872	Completion of the Tokyo-Yokohama railway.
1873	Adoption of the conscription system of military service. Adoption of Georgian calendar. Kido's memorandum concerning the establishment of a constitutional government.
1874	The Saga insurrection. The Formosan expedition.
1875	Ogasawara Islands recognized by the U. S. A. as Japanese. Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuriles.
1876	Insurrection in Kumamoto.
1877	The Satsuma Rebellion.
1878	Establishment of prefectural Assemblies.
1879	Petition of Okayama for the establishment of a National Assembly.
1880	Petition for a treaty revision. Enactment of the Law of Public Meeting and Association. New penal code.
1881	Imperial decree announcing the establishment of National Assembly in 1890. Organization of the Liberal Party.
1882	Ito's departure for Europe to investigate the political institutions in the West. Progressive Party organized. Attempt to assassinate Itagaki.
1883	Dissolution of political parties.

A.D.

- 1884 Conflict between the pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese parties in Korea.
- 1885 The Treaty of Seoul between China and Japan, agreeing to evacuate Korea.
Reconstruction of the Cabinet System. Ito, Prime Minister.
- 1886 The formal opening of negotiations for treaty revision.
- 1887 Peace Preservation Law.
Terrorism in Tokyo.
- 1888 Privy Council established.
- 1889 Promulgation of Constitution.
Attempt to assassinate Okuma.
First Yamagata Ministry.
- 1890 First General Election.
Assassination of Minister of Education Mori.
The First Session of the Diet.
Imperial Rescript on Education.
- 1891 Mutsukata Cabinet.
Attempt to assassinate the Russian Czarcvitch, Nicholas.
Dissolution of the House of Representatives.
- 1892 Second General Election.
- 1893 Dissolution of the House.
- 1894 Third General Election.
Dissolution of the House.
War with China.
New Treaty with Great Britain.
- 1895 Attempt to assassinate Li Hung-chang, the Chinese Envoy.
Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki.
- 1896 The Russo-Japanese agreement.
The Matsukata-Okuma Ministry.
- 1897 Dissolution of the House.
Gold standard adopted.
- 1898 The third Ito Ministry.
The Fifth General Election.
Electoral Reform Bill.
Repeal of the Peace Preservation Law of 1887.
Dissolution of the House.
The Second Yamagata Ministry.

A.D.

- 1899 Russia recognized Japan's special interests in Korea.
- 1899-1900 American notes on Open Door in China.
- 1900 Organization of the Seiyu-kai Party.
Boxer Rebellion in China.
- 1901 First Katsura Cabinet.
Assassination of Hoshi.
- 1902 Alliance with Great Britain.
Dissolution of the House.
- 1903 The Eighth General Election.
Dissolution of the House.
- 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.
- 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.
A new Treaty of Alliance with England.
Peking Protocol with China.
- 1906 Saionji Cabinet.
The Railway Nationalization Bill.
School incident in California.
- 1907 Russo-Japanese Conventions defining their interests in Manchuria.
Secretary of War Taft and later on the American fleet visited Japan.
- 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement (*on status quo*).
Resignation of Saionji Cabinet.
Second Katsura Cabinet.
- 1909 Knox plan for neutralization of railroads in China.
- 1910 Korea annexed by Japan.
Russo-Japanese Conventions.
- 1911 Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Chinese Revolution.
- 1912 Emperor Meiji dies. Yoshihito begins the Taisho Era.
Yamamoto Cabinet.
- 1914-1918 World War.
- 1914 Japan occupies Shantung.
- 1915 The Twenty-one Demands.
- 1916 Russo-Japanese Conventions (Alliance).
Count Terauchi Cabinet.
- 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement.
Russian Revolution.

A.D.

- 1918 Sino-Japanese agreement on military coöperation in Siberia.
Rice riots in Japan.
- 1918-1921 Hara Cabinet.
- 1921 Prime Minister Hara assassinated, November 4, at Tokyo.
- 1919-1921 Economic crisis in Japan.
- 1921-1922 Washington Conference.
- 1923 Termination of Lansing-Ishii Agreement.
Great Earthquake.
- 1924 Exclusion clause of the American Immigration Act.
- 1925 Soviet Union-Japan Convention, recognizing new régime.
Universal Manhood Suffrage Law.
- 1926 Death of Emperor Yoshihito.
Ascension of the Emperor Hirohito. Showa Era begins.
- 1927 General Tanaka's Seiyu-kai Cabinet.
- 1928 Tsinanfu Incident. Ultimatum to China.
Memorandum concerning Japanese interests in Manchuria.
Chang Tso-lin assassinated.
Sino-Japanese deadlock on Manchuria.
- 1929 Kuhara, Cabinet Minister, publicly urges return to the Twenty-one Demands policy in China.
Fall of Tanaka's Cabinet.
Inauguration of new, milder policy toward China (Shidehara).
- 1930 London Naval Conference.
- 1931 Japan starts occupation of Manchuria.
- 1932 Stimson note to Japan. Non-recognition doctrine (January 7).
Lytton Commission appointed by the League (January 14).
Shanghai hostilities (January-May).
Declaration of independence of "Manchukuo" (February 18).
Prime Minister Inukai assassinated at Tokyo (May 15).
Japan signs Protocol with Manchukuo to coöper-

A.D.

- ate in the maintenance of their national security (September 15).
- 1933 League of Nations adopts the Report prepared by the Lytton Commission censuring Japan.
Delegates of Japan withdraw from the session.
Japan announces her determination to withdraw from the League of Nations.
Jehol annexed by Manchukuo.
Tangku truce with China.
Okada Ministry.
- 1934 Chinese-Eastern Railway sold by Soviet Union to Manchukuo.
- 1935 Recurring raids by the Japanese and Manchukuoans over the Siberian and Outer Mongolian borders.
“Autonomous” régimes in Northern China under Japan’s protection.
Dissolution of the Diet.
- 1936 New elections reveal a turn to the Left.
February 26 affair. Assassination of former Prime Minister Saito, Minister of Finance Takahashi, and others by militarists.
New Cabinet under Koki Hirota organized in accordance with the demands of the militarists.
Stalin declared that in case of an attack by Japan on Outer Mongolia U.S.S.R. shall be forced to help the Mongols.
Soviet Russia-Outer Mongolia treaty of mutual assistance made public.

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